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I. INTRODUCTION
In Buchanan v. Warley the Supreme Court found that a
Louisville, Kentucky, residential segregation ordinance was unconsti-
tutional because it interfered with the Fourteenth Amendment right
to own and dispose of property and could not be justified as a police
power measure.' The Buchanan decision came at a crucial juncture in
the history of American race relations. Several cities in the southern
and border states had recently passed residential segregation ordi-
nances, and other cities were poised to follow suit if the Supreme
Court ruled that such ordinances were constitutional.2 Several
northern cities were considering adopting residential segregation laws
as well,'3 and there was considerable agitation in the rural South for
de jure segregation.
4
1. See 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917).
2. See, e.g., Carl V. Harris, Reforms in Government Control of Negroes in Birmingham,
Alabama, 1890-1920, 38 J. So. HIST. 567, 571 n.10 (1972) ("Several times between 1900 and
1920 Birmingham citizens or officials proposed residential segregation ordinances, but none
were adopted, largely because of uncertainty as to how the United States Supreme Court would
rule on the constitutionality of such ordinances.").
3. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 41 (1993) (explaining that some northern cities considered
following the lead of Baltimore, Richmond, and New Orleans in adopting residential segregation
laws). In the absence of such laws, some whites turned to violence. See CHARLES S. JOHNSON,
PATTERNS OF NEGRO SEGREGATION 178 (1943) (discussing the violence used against blacks
attempting to move into white neighborhoods in Chicago in 1917); William H. Brown, Jr., Access
to Housing: The Role of the Real Estate Industry, 48 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 66, 68 (1972) (stating
that "black buyers, real estate agents, or anyone selling a home to blacks in areas where they
were not wanted were subject to having their homes and offices bombed" in Chicago in the early
1900s).
4. See 9 ALEXANDER BICKEL & BENNO SCHMIDT, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE
GOVERNMENT, 1910-1921, at 791-94 (1984); Jeffrey J. Crow, An Apartheid for the South:
Clarence Poe's Crusade for Rural Segregation, in RACE, CLASS, AND POLITICS IN SOUTHERN
HISTORY 216, 217-18 (Jeffrey J. Crow et al. eds., 1989).
No wonder many thought that Buchanan "may, in fact, largely determine if the Negro is to
be segregated in the United States." Fight on Negro Segregation in the South, 33 SURVEY 59, 72
(1914).
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The spread of residential segregation laws reflected the antipa-
thy the average white American felt toward African-Americans. 5
Most whites, including most white intellectuals, believed that African-
Americans were culturally and biologically inferior.
6
Progressive political and intellectual leaders generally shared
the racism of the day,7 and Progressive social scientists promoted
pseudo-scientific theories of race differences.8 Not surprisingly, the
idea of coerced segregation resonated with Progressive reformers,
who, consistent with their statist outlook, 9 believed in "public control"
of the housing market. Some Progressives insisted that capitalism
forced unwilling races to live together.10 Others justified segregation
5. Jack Kirby has argued that 'nearly all pre-World War I white Americans were rac-
ists." JACK TEMPLE KIRBY, DARKNESS AT THE DAWNING: RACE AND REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE
SOUTH 5 (1972).
One reflection of the spirit of the times was the success of the blatantly racist movie, Birth
of a Nation. It opened in theaters in 1915 and, despite African-American protests, became the
most popular movie of its time. See 3 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1910-1932, at 87-90 (Herbert Aptheker ed., 1973) [hereinafter A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY] (describing an exchange of letters between Reverand F.J. Grimk6 and Hollis B.
Frissell debating whether Hampton Institute should have allowed its name to be associated
with the screening of the Birth of a Nation).
6. 'The literature of sociology was dominated by the view that Negroes were inferior to
the white race in every way. The position of scholars both reflected and reinforced popular
beliefs." CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY 65 (1959).
7. See DONALD K. PICKENS, EUGENICS AND THE PROGRESSIVES 19 (1968); DAVID W.
SOUTHERN, THE MALIGNANT HERITAGE: YANKEE PROGRESSIVES AND THE NEGRO QUESTION,
1901-1914, at 48-49 (1968) (describing the racist connotations of scholarly works of the late
nineteenth century); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1877-1913, at 369-
95 (1951) (asserting that both northern and southern Progressives were essentially racist); C.
VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 91-93 (3d rev. ed. 1974) ("Racism was
conceived of by some as the very foundation of southern Progressivism."); Nancy J. Weiss, The
Negro and the New Freedom, in THE SEGREGATION ERA, 1863-1954, at 129, 130 (Allen Weinstein
& Frank Otto Gatell eds., 1970) (stating that Progressivism found "room for race discrimina-
tion").
8. See THOMAS F. GOSSETT, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA 154-74 (1963)
(explaining how social scientists used the idea of recapitulation to differentiate between the
races); Harvey Wish, Negro Education and the Progressive Movement, 49 J. NEGRO HIST. 184,
184-200 (1964) (discussing the reliance on turn of the century sociological theories that used
false ideas about the differences between the races to limit the education of blacks).
9. On the statism of Progressives, see, for example, David M. Kennedy, Introduction to
PROGRESSMSM: THE CRITICAL ISSUES at vii, xiii (David M. Kennedy ed., 1971) (noting that "a
common commitment to the positive state... united the men who called themselves
Progressives"); William E. Leuchtenburg, Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive
Movement and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1916, 39 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 483, 504 (1952)
(arguing that Progressives "lost sight of the distinction between the state as an instrument and
the state as an end"). See generally PAUL D. MORENO, FROM DIRECT ACTION TO AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION 27-28 (1997) ("If there was any chance that the Progressives' willingness to use state
power to reform the political economy might work to the advantage of black Americans, it was
lost to a general indifference or outright hostility to black interests.").
10. See Dewey W. Grantham, Jr., The Progressive Movement and the Negro, 54 S.
ATLANTIC Q. 461, 472 (1955) ("Socialists contended that the races did not want to live together
and that capitalism was at fault, since it forced them to do so.").
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laws as furthering the "public interest" by preventing miscegenation
between "superior" whites and "inferior" African-Americans."1
Progressives argued that segregation laws promoted public safety,
protected property values, and helped maintain the public order.12
National political leaders supported segregation laws as well.13
Despite protests from the NAACP and others, the Wilson
Administration implemented segregation in the federal workforce for
the first time since the Civil War.14 The Wilson Administration was,
in fact, consistently hostile to African-Americans, 5 and Congress was
11. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985
DUKE L.J. 624 (examining the relationship between law and sociology during the period when
most segregation laws were drafted).
12. See DONALD G. NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP: AFRIcAN-AMERIcANs AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, 1776 TO THE PRESENT 101 (1991) ("Poor blacks should be quarantined
in isolated slums in order to reduce the incidents of civil disturbance, to prevent the spread of
communicable disease, and to protect property values among the white majority."); see also
MORENO, supra note 9, at 28 ("Disenfranchisement and segregation were the cornerstones of
Southern Progressivism and Northern Progressives were not involved to object."); Charles
Crowe, Racial Violence and Social Reform-Origins of the Atlanta Riot of 1906, 53 J. NEGRO.
HIST. 234, 245 (1968) ("Segregation as a civic reform was a commonplace idea among Southern
Progressives ... ."); Randall Kennedy, Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration:
The Case of Professor Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1632 (1986) ("Campaigns against
unsanitary living conditions [by southern Progressives] became part and parcel of the
movement to bar Negroes statutorily from predominantly white residential districts.").
Professional city planners, who themselves were generally infused with the Progressive spirit,
were important advocates of racial zoning. See Christopher Silver, The Racial Origins of
Zoning: Southern Cities from 1910-40, 6 PLANNING PERSPECTIVE 189, 190 (1991) (stating that
"racial zoning remained a mainstay of planners and not just a manifestation of misguided
southern leaders out of touch with the mainstream of urban reform").
13. See DESMOND KING, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: BLACK AMERICANS AND THE U.S.
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 21 (1995) ("[Flew politicians dissented publicly from the desirability of
segregation.").
14. See A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 5, at 63 (discussing a letter from the Board
of the NAACP to Woodrow Wilson protesting the Wilson Administration's segregation policy);
see also George C. Osborn, The Problem of the Negro in Government, 1913, 23 HISTORIAN 330,
338-39 (1961) (describing Wilson's approval of plans to segregate government departments such
as the Treasury Department, the Post Office, and the Bureau of Printing and Engraving); Nancy
J. Weiss, The Negro and the New Freedom: Fighting Wilsonian Segregation, 84 POL. SCi. Q. 61,
61 (1969) ("Woodrow Wilson's first administration inaugurated officially-sanctioned segregation
in the federal departments."). Wilson added insult to injury by acting rudely toward African-
American petitioners at the White House. See Vast Crowd Attends Denunciation: Mass Meeting
Sunday, CHICAGO DEFENDER, Nov. 21, 1914, at 13A, reprinted in A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 5, at 76-78 (denouncing Wilson's treatment of William Monroe Trotter, Editor of the
Boston Guardian). Wilson also attended a private screening of Birth of a Nation and remarked
that "[i]t [was] like writing history with lightning and my only regret is that it [was] all so
terribly true." A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 5, at 87.
The other major candidates in 1912, Republican William Howard Taft and Progressive
Theodore Roosevelt, had run campaigns that were so hostile to African-American interests that
many leading civil rights activists had actually supported Wilson. See Michael J. Klarman,
Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 VAND. L. REV. 883, 915-17 (1998).
15. See generally Henry Blumenthal, Woodrow Wilson and the Race Question, 48 J.
NEGRO HIST. 1 (1963) (asserting that the Wilson Administration's "discrimination against
Negroes had all the earmarks of racial prejudice"); Cleveland M. Green, Prejudices and Empty
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only marginally better.16 For the first time since the Civil War,
Congressmen seriously proposed a range of discriminatory bills, and
some of those nearly passed.
17
The judicial branch of government, meanwhile, hardly seemed
to offer civil rights activists shelter from the rising tide of racism.
The Supreme Court's record on segregation issues was abysmal; it
had upheld several race segregation statutes over the past few dec-
ades. 8 The precedent most obviously relevant to Buchanan, Plessy v.
Ferguson, held that segregation was a valid police power function, and
was infused with pseudo-scientific racist theories. 9
To make matters worse, by the time Buchanan reached the
Supreme Court, Progressives had launched a vigorous intellectual
attack on the judiciary's role in restraining government. Under the
banner of supporting "sociological jurisprudence," Progressive legal
theorists sought to discourage courts from interfering with regulatory
legislation. By the 1910s, Progressives so dominated mainstream
legal thought that Charles Warren remarked that "any court which
recognizes wide and liberal bounds to the State police power is to be
deemed in touch with the temper of the times."
20
Promises: Woodrow Wilson's Betrayal of the Negro, 1910-1919, 87 CRISIS 380 (1980) ("[Flor
blacks, the Wilson years were a step backward in their struggle for advancement."). For exam-
ple, when African-American migration to cities provoked white hostility, Wilson personally
evinced sympathy with the goal of keeping African-Americans in the rural South. See Green,
supra, at 386. He would not condemn lynching and refused to allow the federal government to
intervene in the bloody riot against African-Americans in East St. Louis in July 1917. See id.
Wilson even refused to allow a U.S. Attorney to investigate federal crimes committed during the
riot. See id.; see also ELLIOTT M. RUDWICK, RACE RIOT AT EAST ST. Louis JULY 2, 1917, at 133-
37(1964).
16. See generally Morton Sosna, The South in the Saddle: Racial Politics During the
Wilson Years, 54 WISC. MAG. HIST. 30 (1970) (arguing that Wilson's southern ties and the
composition of Congress created a hostile attitude toward African-Americans).
17. See id.
18. See Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1908) (holding that a law requiring
private school segregation did not implicate the Constitution); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
550-51 (1896) (holding that segregation laws were within the police power and did not violate
constitutional equal protection guarantees); Louisville, New Orleans & Tex. Ry. Co. v.
Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587, 592 (1890) (holding that a railroad segregation law did not unconsti-
tutionally burden interstate commerce).
On the other hand, in 1914 the Court held that railroad accommodations, if racially segre-
gated, had to be truly equal. See McCabe v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 235 U.S. 151,
161-62 (1914). This was a vast improvement over the Court's holding in Plessy, which seemed to
hold that segregation was constitutional even if accommodations were not equal.
19. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 483, 549 (1896) ("Upon the other hand, if he be a
colored man and be... assigned [to a colored coach], he has been deprived of no property, since
he is not lawfully entitled to the reputation of being a white man.").
20. Charles Warren, A Bulwark to the State Police Power-The United States Supreme
Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 667, 668 (1913). Warren prefaced this remark by noting that "[u]nder
the present prevailing anti-individualism, there can be no doubt that the test of the progres-
siveness of a court is the degree of remoteness of the line fixed, within which the legislature
1998] 801
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The rise of Progressive sentiment within the legal world
seemed to bode particularly ill for challenges to racial zoning. In
1915, the Supreme Court, in one of its occasional bursts of Progressive
sentiment, stated with regard to a general zoning ordinance that
"[t]here must be progress, and if in its march private interests are in
the way they must yield to the good of the community.21 Law review
authors writing before Buchanan, influenced by the racism of the
time and the statism and populism of sociological jurisprudence,
unanimously agreed that residential segregation ordinances were
constitutional.
22
Despite the foreboding intellectual climate, the NAACP had no
choice but to carry its fight against residential segregation laws to the
Supreme Court. To do anything less would have allowed the laws to
become entrenched without challenge. Fortunately, the Supreme
Court refused to assimilate contemporary racism and jurisprudential
theories into its decision in Buchanan. Rather, the Court assumed
the role assigned to it by traditional jurisprudence and protected
individual constitutional rights from the broad-based popular and
intellectual movement supporting residential segregation ordi-
nances.23
With this background in mind, Part II of this Article discusses
the opposing philosophies of traditional jurisprudence and sociological
jurisprudence. This Part argues that by the time the Supreme Court
decided Lochner v. New York in 1905,24 traditional jurisprudence had
become associated with at least a mild form of laissez-faire jurispru-
dence. Of the Supreme Court Justices, only Justice Holmes opposed
traditional jurisprudence and favored sociological jurisprudence.
Part III of this Article contends that the Court had previously
implicitly adopted the principles of sociological jurisprudence in the
context of race in Plessy v. Ferguson.25 The conflict between Plessyism
and Lochnerism, and thus between sociological and traditional
jurisprudence, came before the Supreme Court in Berea College v.
shall have scope to legislate without being held to infringe on the Constitution." Id. See
generally BLAINE F. MOORE, THE SUPREME COURT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION (1913)
(attacking court decisions "based on the individualist theories of a century ago").
21. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915).
22. See infra notes 195-219 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 79 (1917) ("The Fourteenth Amendment
and... statutes enacted in furtherance of its purpose operate to qualify and entitle a colored
man to acquire property without state legislation discriminating against him solely because of
his color.").
24. 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
25. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
802 [Vol. 51:797
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Kentucky.26 Instead of resolving the conflict, the Court conspicuously
evaded the issue.
Part IV discusses the spread of residential segregation laws in
the South and border states during the 1910s, and the support these
laws found in contemporary law reviews.
This Article next focuses on Buchanan v. Warley, a case in
which the plaintiffs argued that residential segregation laws violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and also
denied, without due process of law, the right to buy and sell
property.27 The State of Kentucky responded with briefs that relied
on sociological jurisprudence and blatant appeals to racism.
Ultimately, the Court held that the Louisville statute violated the
rights to acquire, use, and dispose of property.28 The Court rejected
Kentucky's contention that the various public policy rationales the
State advanced in support of segregation laws justified these laws as
valid uses of the police power.29  Civil rights advocates were
predictably pleased with the decision, while law review commentators
expressed disappointment and anger at the Court's "unscientific"
opinion.
Part V of this Article discusses the practical significance of
Buchanan. First, the Article concludes that Buchanan had little
effect on segregation, but that it did ensure that whites bore far more
of the burden of their discriminatory attitudes than they would have
if Buchanan had been decided in Kentucky's favor. Second,
Buchanan prevented state governments from passing harsher anti-
black measures than the one at issue in Buchanan. Finally, the
Court's decision in Buchanan spurred the growth of the NAACP and
signaled a turning point in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on
racial issues.
This Article concludes by drawing several lessons from
Buchanan. First, legal scholars have underestimated the contribution
of Lochner-era cases to the development of civil rights and civil liber-
ties jurisprudence and have overestimated the novelty of the protec-
tion of individual rights announced in Footnote Four of Carolene
Products.30 Next, the history of Buchanan should give pause to those
who advocate a return to the aggressive statism of the Progressive
Era. The final lesson from Buchanan is that the vestigial influence of
26. 211 U.s. 45 (1908).
27. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
28. See id. at 82.
29. See id. at 80-81.
30. See United States v. Carolene Prods., Inc., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
1998] 803
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sociological jurisprudence on constitutional theory should be ex-
punged.
II. TRADITIONAL JURISPRUDENCE VS. SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE
In the late nineteenth century, two schools of constitutional
jurisprudence began to emerge. The first school can be described as
"traditional," although that term does not capture the relevant nu-
ances. This school believed that the Constitution had a fixed meaning
and that the judiciary's role was to serve as an elitist institution that
limits popularly controlled legislatures from exceeding constitutional
boundaries. 31
The competing school of constitutional thought was the pro-
genitor of sociological jurisprudence, which ultimately absorbed
Progressive statism. This school believed that social science and
public mores should be weighed heavily in constitutional adjudication
and ultimately advocated extreme judicial deference to legislative
enactments. 32
A. Traditional Jurisprudence and Laissez-faire Jurisprudence
Members of the traditional school believed that it was the role
of the judiciary to enforce the limitations on governmental power
intended by the Constitution's Framers and ratifiers.33 Justice David
Brewer, an eloquent proponent of traditional constitutional theory,
argued that it is better "to suffer the injuries which come from [the
Supreme Court's] occasional mistakes than the marvelous wrong
which would flow from the attempt to settle all questions of right and
31. See infra Part II.A.
32. See infra Part II.B.
33. See Howard Gillman, The Collapse of Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the
"Living Constitution" in the Course of American State-Building, 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEv. 191,
197 (1997) (describing traditionalists' conception of the Constitution as a super-statute that
limited government action); cf. G. Edward White, Revisiting Substantive Due Process and
Holmes's Lochner Dissent, 63 BRoOK. L. REv. 87, 105-06 (1997) (asserting that traditional
jurists believed that policing the boundaries between the public and private spheres was the
judiciary's task).
Whether the founding generation understood that the Constitution was to be interpreted
through an originalist methodology is an open question. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 887-88 (1985) (arguing that jurispru-
dence of original intent is contrary to the intent of the Framers who assumed that the
Constitution would be interpreted through traditional common law mechanisms). For effective
criticism of Powell, see Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5
CONST. COMMENTARY 77, 79-85 (1988).
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wrong, of power or the lack of power, by mere numbers of the accumu-
lation of majorities."34
Traditional constitutional theorists believed that it was mani-
festly not the privilege of the judiciary to ignore constitutional man-
dates even when circumstances seemed to so dictate. 35 Justice George
Sutherland, one of the traditional school's last representatives to sit
on the Supreme Court, wrote that "[a] provision of the
Constitution... does not mean one thing at one time and an entirely
different thing at another time."36 Traditionalists specifically rejected
the notion that public opinion should affect constitutional
jurisprudence. 31 As Justice Sutherland put it, "[t]he elucidation of
[constitutional] question[s] cannot be aided by counting heads."38
The very purpose of the Constitution, according to traditional
theory, was to prevent short-lived enthusiasms from encroaching on
American liberty.39 Treatise writer Thomas Cooley wrote that bills of
rights are necessary to guard against "the danger that the legislature
will be influenced by temporary excitements and passions among-the
people to adopt oppressive enactments."40 Justice Brewer, meanwhile,
argued that "[clonstitutions... represent the deliberate judgment of
34. David J. Brewer, Government by Injunction, 15 NAT'L CORP. REP. 848, 849 (1898).
35. See Gillman, supra note 33, at 204-05 (noting that traditionalists believed "courts [had
to] give effect to the intentions of the [Framers] as expressed in textual provisions"); cf Thomas
James Norton, National Encroachments and State Aggressions, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
REPORT OF THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 237, 237
(1926) (noting that the Constitution is "not of a past age but for all time [because it] deals with
principles of government as unchangeable as... the principles of morals covered by the ten
commandments").
36. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448-49 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dis-
senting). Despite the macroeconomic circumstances of the Depression, including a massive
deflation of the currency, Sutherland wrote an opinion for four Justices that refused to counte-
nance a state debtor relief statute because it violated the Contracts Clause of the Constitution.
See id. at 482-83 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
37. For example, Thomas Cooley, arguably the leading constitutional commentator of the
late nineteenth century, wrote:
A principal share of the benefit expected from written constitutions would be lost if the
rules they established were so flexible as to bend to circumstances or be modified by
public opinion. It is with special reference to the varying moods of public opinion, and
with a view to putting the fundamentals of government beyond their control, that these
instruments are framed ....
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 54 (1868).
38. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 560 (1923).
39. See Gillman, supra note 33, at 198; see also Samuel R. Olken, Justice George
Sutherland on Economic Liberty: Constitutional Conservatism and the Problem of Factions, 6
WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1, 53 (1997) ("Sutherland's strict construction of constitutional
limitations reflected his conviction that the meaning of the Constitution must remain the same
over time in order to preserve individual rights and liberties from transient democratic
majorities.").
40. COOLEY, supra note 37, at 54-55.
806 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:797
the people as to the provisions and restraints which, firmly and fully
enforced, will secure to each citizen the greatest liberty and utmost
protection. They are rules proscribed by Philip sober to control Philip
drunk."
'41
While traditionalists may have agreed that courts must en-
force constitutional limitations on government power, they did not
necessarily agree on the scope of those limitations. The vague
Fourteenth Amendment, which does not describe what is meant by
"privileges or immunities," "equal protection," or "due process," was
particularly problematic. Many judges informed their readings of
these provisions by invoking longstanding American intellectual tra-
ditions that heavily influenced American thought in the nineteenth
century: the natural rights ideology, including the "free labor" tradi-
tion of the abolitionists; 42 and the traditional opposition to "class legis-
41. David J. Brewer, An Independent Judiciary as the Salvation of the Nation, in NEW
YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 37, 37-
47 (1893), reprinted in 11 THE ANNALS OF AMERICA: AGRARIANISM AND URBANIZATION 1884-
1894, at 423, 428 (1968); see also William Graham Sumner, Advancing Social and Political
Organization in the United States, in 2 ESSAYS OF WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, 304, 349 (Albert
G. Keller & Maurice R. Davie eds., 1934) ("[W]hile [the institutions established in the
Constitution] ensure the rule of the majority of legal voters, they yet insist upon it that the will
of that majority shall be constitutionally expressed and that it shall be a sober, mature, and
well-considered will. This constitutes a guarantee against jacobinism.").
Brewer's philosophy was not a late nineteenth century invention, but went back to the
founding of the United States. In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton wrote that courts
should
guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of ill
humours ... which, though they speedily give place to better information, and more
deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous
innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the
community.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 508 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Federalists and Antifederalists all "wanted a constitution that would establish liberty and
republican government in spite of social change." Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution's
Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L. REV. 239, 271 (1989). Hamilton, for example,
stated that judges must engage in an "inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the
Constitution." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 510 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
Gillman provides many other examples of members of the founding generation arguing that
constitutional rights were fixed in the absence of formal amendment. See Gillman, supra note
33, at 198-203; see also FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 177-80 (1960)
(discussing the commitment of the Framers to a "fixed constitution").
42. See, e.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888-
1910, at 77 (1995) (suggesting that David Brewer, the most vigorous proponent of laissez-faire
jurisprudence on the Supreme Court, was influenced by natural rights precepts); Daniel R.
Ernst, Free Labor, the Consumer Interest, and the Law of Industrial Disputes, 1885-1900, 36 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 19, 19 (1992) (stating that Lochner era judges acted to "uphold a system of values
which they termed the free labor system"); William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor:
Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 782-86 (noting courts' reliance on
"free labor" ideology); White, supra note 33, at 99-100 (discussing the importance of the free
labor tradition in postbellum legal thought).
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lation" that benefited politically powerful interest groups at the ex-
pense of the general public.41
Incorporating these traditions into the Fourteenth Amendment
after the Civil War would have required substantial new limitations
on the states' police power, and the Supreme Court initially refused to
enforce such limitations. In the 1873 Slaughter-House Cases, a one-
vote majority of the Supreme Court adopted a narrow reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment and upheld an apparently monopolistic state
statute." The dissenters invoked the natural rights and anti-class
legislation traditions to no avail.45
During the Fuller years, the Supreme Court was relatively
vigilant in preventing state interference with interstate commerce, 46
but remained reluctant to rely on the Fourteenth Amendment to
43. See MICHAEL J. BRODHEAD, DAVID J. BREWER: THE LIFE OF A SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE, 1837-1910, at 120 (1994) (reporting Justice David Brewer's recognition that state
legislation often benefited interest groups, not the public at large); White, supra note 33, at 88-
89 ("When courts used the Due Process Clauses to strike down 'social legislation' in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they were.., doing so because the legislation in
question had failed to demonstrate that it was an appropriately 'general' use of the police
powers, as distinguished from an inappropriately 'partial' one."); Olken, supra note 39, at 46-47
(discussing Justice Sutherland's hostility to class legislation). The anti-class legislation
tradition played a strong role in certain strands of Jacksonianism, which in turn influenced the
courts. See ELY, supra note 42, at 76-77 (attributing Chief Justice Melville Fuller's support of
laissez-faire ideas to Jacksonian influences and rejecting the hypothesis that Fuller was
strongly influenced by Darwinism); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE
AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 33-44 (1993) (discussing the
Jacksonian origins of laissez-faire jurisprudence); Michael Les Bendedict, Laissez-Faire and
Liberty: A Re-evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 L. &
HIST. REv. 293, 298 (1985) (recognizing the Jacksonian origins of laissez-faire
constitutionalism); Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-
Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM.
HIST. 970, 973-74 (1975) (describing the influence of Jacksonianism on Justice Field); Charles
W. McCurdy, The Roots of "Liberty of Contract" Reconsidered. Major Premises in the Law of
Employment, 1867-1937, 1984 SUP. CT. HIST. Soc'Y Y.B. 20, 26 (detailing the Jacksonian laissez-
faire influence on judges who protected liberty of contract); Melissa L. Saunders, Equal
Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REv. 245, 249-50 (1997) (arguing
that the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended it to be applied to stop
class legislation). For another perspective, see HERBERT HOvENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND
AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 99-101 (1991) (contending that economic theory was the primary
influence on judges espousing laissez-faire ideology).
44. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 60-62 (1873) (upholding a law granting a monopoly to a
slaughterhouse); Durbridge v. Slaughter-House Co., 27 La. Ann. 676, 676 (1875) (finding that a
slaughterhouse had achieved its legal monopoly through bribery and corruption).
45. See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 83-111 (Field, J., dissenting) (assailing the
Act for the "exclusive privileges" it granted); id. at 111-24 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (discussing
the natural rights tradition).
46. "[T]he Fuller Court relied on the Commerce Clause to strike down state laws in 56
cases, which constituted 31% of the cases raising Commerce Clause challenges." ELY, supra
note 42, at 141 n.39.
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invalidate this state legislation.47 By the late nineteenth century,
however, state courts invalidated economic legislation on class legisla-
tion and natural rights grounds with some regularity.48
In 1905, in Lochner v. New York, the Supreme Court finally
adopted a moderate laissez-faire jurisprudence under the Fourteenth
Amendment.49 The Court ruled that a maximum hours law for bakers
exceeded the states' police power and violated the right of liberty of
contract protected under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.50
Justice Peckham wrote for the majority that if the Court up-
held the regulation of bakers' hours, "it is not possible to say that an
act, prohibiting lawyers' or bank clerks, or others, from contracting to
labor for their employers more than eight hours a day, would be inva-
lid."51 If the New York law could be sustained, added Peckham, all
workers would be "at the mercy of legislative majorities."52 Peckham
added that, "it is impossible for us to shut our eyes to the fact that
many of the laws of this character, while passed under what is
claimed to be the police power for the purpose of protecting the public
health or welfare, are, in reality, passed from other motives."53 The
court decided that because the law at issue in Lochner was not passed
47. See Warren, supra note 20, at 669 (noting the paucity of cases in which the challengers
of state legislation successfully relied on the Fourteenth Amendment). The Court implicitly
repudiated Slaughter-House in Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884),
though with little practical effect before Lochner. Roscoe Pound later referred to Butchers'
Union as the "fountain head" of the liberty of contract line of cases. See Roscoe Pound, Liberty
of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 470 (1909) [hereinafter Pound, Liberty of Contract].
48. See, e.g., Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, 186-87 (1892) (finding statute outlawing "truck
stores" unconstitutional and void because law cannot assume a class of people are incompetent
to contract for own wages without proof of incapacity); Millet v. People, 117 IlM. 294, 301-05
(1886) (striking down a law requiring mine owners to have scales for weighing coal based on
rights of miners to contract for price of their labor); In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 112-15 (1885)
(holding a law prohibiting the manufacture and preparation of tobacco in tenement houses void
because application to classes showed it was not really a public health measure); Godcharles &
Co. v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431, 437 (1886) (declaring an act that made a ton equal to 2000 pounds
unconstitutional because it infringed on the rights of both employers and employees to contract
for wages). See generally GILLMAN, supra note 43, at 86-99 (listing examples).
49. See 198 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1905) (invalidating a law limiting the hours of bakers),
overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
50. See id. Arguably, Lochner was implicitly overruled by Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S.
426, 429-30 (1917) (upholding a state law limiting hours of work as a public health measure),
but was revived in Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 561 (1923) (invalidating the
District of Columbia's minimum wage law because it interfered with individual freedom to
contract), and survived until West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937)
(overrulingAdkins, and with it Lochner).
51. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 60.
52. Id. at 59. It is worth noting Peckham's sophistication in implicitly distinguishing
"legislative majorities" from popular majorities, an insight crucial to modern public choice
theory. See id.
53. Id. at 64.
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to protect the public health, or even the health of bakers, it was there-
fore a form of unconstitutional class legislation.54
Progressives such as Roscoe Pound, Ernst Freund, Learned
Hand, and others accused the Lochner majority of engaging in
"mechanical jurisprudence"ss or abstract reasoning, instead of relying
on modern scientific knowledge about the health effects of long hours
on bakers. 56 In fact, however, the Lochner majority had some scien-
tific evidence in its favor. The brief for Joseph Lochner contained in
its appendix what Professor Stephen Siegel has called an "incipient
'Brandeis brief compilation of medical, scientific, and statistical
data,"57 demonstrating that baking was not an especially unhealthful
profession.58
Justice Harlan's dissent, joined by two other Justices, agreed
that class legislation was unconstitutional but argued that the Court
should have given more deference to the New York legislature's
54. See id. at 62-63; see also White, supra note 33, at 98-99 n.28 ("Peckham's majority
opinion in Lochner found the legislative judgment about 'general' burdens following from labor
conditions in the baking industry to be either unfounded or pretextual. He therefore concluded
that the statute was 'partial' and violated the anticlass principle.").
Sidney Tarrow has argued persuasively that the maximum hours provision was the product
of an attempt by unionized bakers to force non-unionized bakeries to reduce their hours to union
ones to eliminate the non-unionized bakeries' competitive advantage. See Sidney G. Tarrow,
Lochner v. New York. A Political Analysis, 5 LABOR HIST. 277, 290-98 (1964).
55. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLuM. L. REv. 605, 616 (1908)
[hereinafter Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence] (attacking the Court for invalidating laws based
on logical deduction rather than the effect the law had on a specific factual situation).
56. See id. ("The conception of freedom of contract is made on the basis of a logical
deduction. The court does not inquire what the effect of such a deduction will be, when applied
to the actual situation."); see also Ernst Freund, Limitation of Hours of Labor and the Federal
Supreme Court, 17 GREEN BAG 411, 416 (1905) (accusing the majority of relying on common
sense at the expense of scientific evidence); Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight
Hour Day, 21 HARV. L. REV. 495, 507 (1908) (claiming that changed conceptions of rights should
lead to an expanded scope for the police power); see also Felix Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and
Realism in Constitutional Law, 29 HARV. L. REv. 353, 364 (1916) (accusing courts of relying on
"a priori theories" and "abstract assumptions" in liberty of contract cases); George Gorham
Groat, Economic Wage and Legal Wage, 33 YALE L.J. 489, 496 (1924) (contrasting Justices who
were concerned with "what is logical" with those who were concerned with "what is scientific").
57. See Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional
Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1, 18-19 n.77 (1991). Professor Siegel provides the following sum-
mary:
Included in that material is a chart of comparative mortality figures from England in
1890 through 1892, which gave bakers a score of 920. Dock laborers scored highest at
1829, and clergymen scored lowest at 533. Railway engine drivers scored 810; barristers
and solicitors scored 821; commercial clerks scored 915; publishers scored 833; master
musicians scored 1214; and general laborers scored 1221. The residual category of
"other occupied males" scored 847.
Id. (citations omitted).
58. Cf. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59 ("We think there can be no fair doubt that the trade of a
baker, in and of itself, is not an unhealthy one .... ).
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finding that the law was a public-spirited health measure.59 Harlan
cited several studies that supported this interpretation of the hours
law.6O
With the exception of Justice Holmes, who wrote a separate
dissent, all of the Lochner Justices shared the traditional view that
the judiciary must scrutinize legislation, including "Progressive" labor
legislation, to ensure that it met constitutional norms.6' Traditional
jurisprudence thus became associated with support for at least the
mild version of laissez-faire jurisprudence consistently favored by
Harlan.62
59. See id. at 72-73 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan wrote:
We are not to presume that the State of New York has acted in bad faith. Nor can we
assume that its legislature acted without due deliberation, or that it did not determine
this question upon the fullest attainable information, and for the common good. We
cannot say that the State has acted without reason nor ought we to proceed upon the
theory that its action is a mere sham. Our duty, I submit, is to sustain the statute as
not being in conflict with the Federal Constitution, for the reason-and such is an
all-sufficient reason-it is not shown to be plainly and palpably inconsistent with that
instrument. Let the State alone in the management of its purely domestic affairs, so
long as it does not appear beyond all question that it has violated the Federal
Constitution. This view necessarily results from the principle that the health and safety
of the people of a State are primarily for the State to guard and protect.
Id. at 73 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
60. See id. at 70-72 (Harlan, J., dissenting). One could argue, based on the studies cited
by both the majority and Harlan's dissent, that baking was not an especially unhealthful
profession, but that the marginal benefit to bakers' health from a reduction in their hours was
relatively greater than a similar reduction in the hours of other workers. I thank Richard
Friedman for raising this point.
61. See Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness:
The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 RES. L. & Soc. 3, 9-14 (1980)
(arguing that the Justices, minus Holmes, agreed that the Court's main function was a limited
one, to "carry out the objective task of classification").
As G. Edward White has noted: "[T]he distinction between 'general' and 'partial' legislation
was the focus of all the Justices who decided Lochner except Holmes. It also informed the
discussion of 'liberty of contract' that featured prominently in the opinion of the majority which
invalidated the New York statute." White, supra note 33, at 97. White also noted that "[t]he
framework from which Holmes approached Lochner, as well as other cases that have come to be
called 'substantive due process,' was not taken seriously in orthodox legal circles." Id. at 87.
62. Lochner represented a victory for a more vigorous version of laissez-faire jurispru-
dence than Harlan supported. A more extreme version was rejected by the Court in Holden v.
Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398 (1898) (rejecting a challenge to a law limiting the working hours of
miners).
Holden itself implicitly repudiated Slaughter-House, because the majority agreed that class
legislation was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority stated, "[t]he
question in each case is whether the legislature has adopted the statute in question in the
exercise of a reasonable discretion, or whether its action be a mere excuse for an unjust dis-
crimination, or the oppression, or spoliation of a particular class." Id.
However, the majority in Holden was more willing to give state legislation the benefit of the
doubt than were more radical jurists such as Justices Brewer and Peckham, each of whom
dissented. See Siegel, supra note 57, at 8-23 (distinguishing among various schools of laissez-
faire jurisprudence).
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B. The Rise of Sociological Jurisprudence
Concomitantly with the rise of traditionalistic laissez-faire
jurisprudence, jurisprudential theories that challenged the bases of
traditional jurisprudence emerged as an intellectual force in constitu-
tional law.63 These theories eventually coalesced into what became
known as sociological jurisprudence.64 Sociological jurisprudence
holds that the purpose of law is to achieve social aims, and that legal
rules, including constitutional rules, cannot be deduced from first
principles.6-5 Accordingly, sociological jurisprudes believed abstract
notions of rights should not bind judges.66
Sociological jurisprudes also believed that judges should not
strictly rely on traditional analytical tools such as analysis of the
Framers' intent, natural rights, or precedent when deciding
63. See, e.g., John C. Gray, Some Definitions and Questions in Jurisprudence, 6 HARV. L.
REV. 21, 24 (1892) (contending that law is the rules of conduct societies create to govern them-
selves); cf. William D. Lewis, Civil Liberty and a Written Constitution, 41 AM. L. REG. (O.S.)
1064, 1070-71 (1893) (arguing that some powers naturally belong to the legislature and should
be considered granted if not expressly withheld).
64. According to G. Edward White, the first explicit use of the term "sociological jurispru-
dence" was made by Roscoe Pound in The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence. G. Edward
White, The American Law Institute and the Triumph of Modernist Jurisprudence, 15 LAW &
HIST. REv. 1, 25 n.70 (1997) (citing Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19
GREEN BAG 607 (1907) [hereinafter Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence]).
65. See Pound, Liberty of Contract, supra note 47, at 464. Pound defined "the sociological
movement in jurisprudence" as:
the movement for pragmatism as a philosophy of law, the movement for the adjustment
of principles and doctrines to the human conditions they are to govern rather than to as-
sumed first principles, the movement for putting the human factor in the central place
and relegating logic to its true position as an instrument.
Id.; cf RUDOLPH VON JHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END 328 (Joseph H. Drake et al. eds. &
Isaac Husik trans., 1913) ("A universal law for all nations and times stands on the same line
with a universal remedy for all sick people. It is the long sought for philosopher's stone, for
which in reality not philosophers but only the tools can afford to search.").
In this context, one should consider Herbert Hovenkamp's claim that the rise of sociological
jurisprudence, and ultimately legal realism, was dependent on the formulation by legal
Progressives of the false hypothesis that courts applying the principles of laissez-faire jurispru-
dence were "formalist." See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due
Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379, 382-83 (1988). That is, that they mechanically deduced first
principles from existing precedents and applied them to the case at hand. See id. Hovenkamp
suggests that while Langdellian common law jurisprudence was clearly formalist, there was no
analogous public law jurisprudence. See id. at 383.
66. See Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L. REV. 463, 467 (1916) (bemoaning
the alleged abstract reasoning and legal formalism that led judges to invalidate reform legisla-
tion). One advocate of sociological jurisprudence described his school's view of rights this way:
[In the viewpoint of the Sociological School... the inquiry should first be, what are the
claims, the wants, the demands which the social group may make in order for its contin-
ued existence; and next, how far may the individual interests be recognized as appro-
priate thereto; the latter become legal rights if they should be recognized as appropriate.
E.F. Albertsworth, Program of Sociological Jurisprudence, 8 A.B.A. J. 393, 395 (1922).
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constitutional cases with social import.67 Instead, judges should
consider the public interest and modern social conditions or "social
facts" when interpreting the Constitution.68 Advocates of sociological
jurisprudence also argued that the rule of law itself would sometimes
need to be sacrificed to extralegal concerns.69
One advocate of sociological jurisprudence defined it as "a
square recognition by the courts that the constitutionality of social
and economic legislation depended in the last analysis upon the ac-
tual existence or nonexistence of social or economic conditions justify-
ing such legislation."70 Traditionalists mocked this approach. Faced
with an extensive "Brandeis Brief' supporting the constitutionality of
minimum wage laws for women, Supreme Court Chief Justice
Edward D. White remarked, "'[w]hy, I could compile a brief twice as
thick to prove that the legal profession ought to be abolished.' "71
In stark contrast to traditional theories that relied on immuta-
ble principles such as natural rights, sociological jurisprudence de-
pended on the theory that law was tied to the evolving nature of soci-
67. See, e.g., Albertsworth, supra note 66, at 396 ("Precedents should be guides to decision,
rather than harsh unyielding masters."); Pound, Liberty of Contract, supra note 47, at 467
(suggesting that courts should not rely so heavily on the intent of the Framers because they
only established general principles, not rules).
68. See, e.g., Albertsworth, supra note 66, at 395-96 (suggesting that courts should de-
emphasize precedent as a basis for their decisions); Brandeis, supra note 66, at 464
(complaining that "the law has everywhere a tendency to lag behind the facts of life"); Roscoe
Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 706 (1913) [hereinafter Pound,
Justice] (arguing against using inflexible jurisprudential theories because they fail to respond to
changing times); Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, Part III,
25 HARV. L. REV. 489, 515 (1912) [hereinafter Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological
Jurisprudence, Part III] (contending that legal rules should be a mere "general guide" to the
judge, who should be free "within wide limits" to deal with the individual case as justice de-
mands).
69. The leading publicist for sociological jurisprudence, Roscoe Pound, wrote that from
time to time more or less "reversion to justice without law" becomes necessary in order to bring
the administration of justice into touch with new moral ideas or changed social or political
conditions. Pound, Justice, supra note 68, at 705-07; see also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 65 (1921) ("When the social needs demand one settlement
rather than another, there are times when we must bend symmetry, ignore history, and
sacrifice custom in pursuit of other and larger ends.").
70. Robert Eugene Cushman, The Social and Economic Interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 20 MICH. L. REv. 737, 756 (1922). Cushman's belief was derived, in part, from the
work of Rudolph von Jhering, who asserted that "[1]egislation will, in the future as in the past,
measure restrictions of personal liberty not according to an abstract academic formula, but
according to practical need." VON JHERING, supra note 65, at 409.
71. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN 31 (1968).
White, it should be noted, dissented in Lochner. That even he scoffed at the scientific preten-
sions of the legal Progressives demonstrates the extent to which the Supreme Court was filled
with traditionalists until the New Deal. See generally White, supra note 33, at 118-20 (noting
that as late as 1923, Holmes, and perhaps Brandeis, were the only Justices who shared the
radical view that courts must defer to the legislature with regard to social legislation).
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ety because society determined people's rights. 72  Sociological juris-
prudes believed that courts should consider public opinion when
interpreting the Constitution because such opinion represented the
evolving social mores of the community.73 Justice Holmes, for exam-
ple, wrote that the police power "may be put forth in aid of what is
sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and
preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the
public welfare."74
While sociological jurisprudence ultimately came to be associ-
ated with legal Progressivism, its underlying rationale did not inher-
ently require judicial deference to the legislature. Christopher G.
Tiedeman, considered the most pro-laissez-faire of all nineteenth-
century constitutional treatise writers, shared many intellectual
influences and philosophical positions with the proponents of
sociological jurisprudence.75 Perhaps most surprisingly, Tiedeman
eschewed the notion that the Constituiton had a fixed meaning.
Instead, he shared the sociological view that constitutional law could
and should evolve by judicial decisionmaking based on public
opinion.76  Nevertheless, Tiedeman vigorously argued that the
Fourteenth Amendment required courts to invalidate all manner of
class legislation, from labor legislation favoring trade unions to anti-
miscegenation laws. 77
72. See Gray, supra note 63, at 22-24 (stating that the power to seek court action consti-
tutes legal rights). Oliver Wendell Holmes put it this way: "[11f the will of the majority is
unmistakable, and the majority is strong enough to have a clear power to enforce its will, and
intends to do so, the courts must yield... because the foundation of sovereignty is power, real
or supposed." Book Notices, 6 AM. L. REV. 132, 141 (1871).
73. See, e.g., N.E.H. Hull, Reconstructing the Origins of Realistic Jurisprudence: A
Prequel to the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange over Legal Realism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1302, 1307-08
(noting that Roscoe Pound argued that judicial decisionmaking should be sensitive to public
opinion); William Draper Lewis, The Social Sciences as Basis of Legal Education, 61 U. PA. L.
REV. 531, 532-34 (1913) (arguing that because law reflects social ideas, it must change with
those ideas).
74. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911) (Holmes, J.).
75. See Thomas C. Grey, Introduction to CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES at iii, iii-vii (photo. reprint 1974) (1890) (noting that
Tiedeman's jurisprudential theories resembled those of Roscoe Pound).
76. See Gillman, supra note 33, at 217-18 (noting that Tiedeman argued for judicial opin-
ions to "obey 'the stress of public opinion or private interests' "); Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in
Late Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Thought, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1431, 1528-30 (stating that
Tiedeman believed constitutional rules should change according to public opinion).
77. See generally David N. Mayer, The Jurisprudence of Christopher G. Tiedeman: A
Study in the Failure of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 55 Mo. L. REV. 93 (1990) (explaining
that Tiedeman's laissez-faire constitutional theory failed because it did not deal adequately with
the problem of protecting unenumerated constitutional rights). As political progressives began
to dominate public opinion at the beginning of the twentieth century, however, Tiedeman's
position became less tenable. Having no universalizable constitutional theories to rely on,
Tiedeman got swept up in the agitation against big business. By 1900, Tiedeman favored
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Tiedeman's pro-laissez-faire views were perfectly consistent
with the methodology of sociological jurisprudence. He examined
social conditions and public opinion and determined that enforcement
of laissez-faire and the sic utero principle78 would be in the public
interest. Tiedeman sought to encourage courts to invalidate "class
legislation" so that special interests would not use the political proc-
ess to benefit themselves at the expense of the general public.7 9 In the
long-run, as the American political center shifted from the laissez-
faire outlook of the two Cleveland administrations to the aggressive
statism of Progressives Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, the
statist version of sociological jurisprudence emerged dominant. 80
The influence of the Progressive movement solidified the sta-
tist bent of the emerging sociological school of jurisprudence among
legal scholars81 Progressivism emphasized collective action through
government action,82 and promoted the belief that efficient social
engineering could lead to societal improvement. 83
government ownership of the banks, railroads, insurance companies, public utilities, and means
of communications. See Louise A. Halper, Christopher G. Tiedeman, 'Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism' and the Dilemmas of Small-Scale Property in the Gilded Age, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1349, 1383-84 (1990) (concluding that Tiedeman's philosophy changed from opposing
government regulation to supporting it as the best means to preserve private property).
78. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non l-des means "use [your] own property in such a manner
as not to injure that of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1380 (6th ed. 1990).
79. Many years later, Felix Frankfurter revisited the principle of laissez-faire legislation.
He recognized that most of society held the view that "arbitrary restriction of men's activities,
unrelated in reason to the 'public welfare,' offends the Fourteenth Amendment." Frankfurter,
supra note 56, at 369. However, Frankfurter also recognized that there was significant dispute
about how to apply this principle. See id.
80. See ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 77-122 (1987) (explaining that by 1917 big government was firmly
entrenched in America).
81. See ARTHUR A. EKIRCH, JR., THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 171 (1955)
(discussing the nationalism of the Progressive movement).
82. See id.
83. See JOHN W. JOHNSON, AMERICAN LEGAL CULTuRE, 1908-1940, 130 (1981) ("The
Progressives were not afraid to distinguish good from bad, even to the degree of foisting their
own moral standards on society as a whole.") Progressives could tout the benefits of social
engineering because:
progressivism began with the assumptions that society was in a constant state of flux
and that man had the capacity to progress by directing this inevitable change toward
beneficial ends. Consequently it affirmed the worth of evaluating social theories on the
basis of contemporary experience. Such testing of the allegedly universal laws that gov-
erned intellectual disciplines often demonstrated their fallacy. The rules of the mar-
ketplace produced extreme poverty and outrageous wealth; they did not further pro-
gress.... In order to achieve progress government paternalism was needed to promote
the common good.
G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social
Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999, 1003 (1972).
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By the turn of the century, Progressivism dominated American
intellectual and political life.8 Maximum hours laws, regulation of
public utilities, pro-union legislation, and residential segregation laws
were among the plethora of purportedly public-spirited legislation
championed by mainstream Progressives. In the South, the racist
and segregationist agenda was a crucial element of Progressivism.s5
In the legal world, Progressive social thought combined with
the emerging sociological school to form a powerful school of constitu-
tional jurisprudence that challenged the foundations of traditional
jurisprudence. Legal Progressives were sometimes overtly hostile to
the Constitution because they believed that it represented the dead
hand of the distant past. They argued that the Constitution should be
amended, or, if that were not possible, ignored.86  Other legal
Progressives argued that legislatures, rather than courts, were in the
best position to balance constitutional rights against the needs of the
community. Legislatures, they argued, could fully take into account
"social facts," whereas courts did not have the proper resources to do
so, or, if they did, they were not so inclined.87
84. See EKIRCH, supra note 81, at 171 (stating that the Progressive movement "dominated
the American scene in the years from the turn of the century to United States entrance into
World War I).
85. Arguably, southern Progressivism was inextricably linked with southern racism. Jack
Kirby has argued that disfranchisement and segregation were the "seminal" progressive reforms
of the era. See KIRBY, supra note 5, at 4. Similarly, Pete Daniels has asserted that the main
purpose of southern Progressivism was to enact a racist agenda. The Progressive reforms
passed in the South, such as child labor laws and prohibition, were simply a "veneer of progress"
designed to hide "the racism, peonage, lynching, race riots, illiteracy, disease, and other ills that
characterized the region." PETE DANIELS, STANDING AT THE CROSSROADS: SOUTHERN LIFE
SINCE 1900, at 37 (1986). Thus, instead of uniting reformers in the South, Progressivism
"became a major component in promoting white supremacy and solidarity and in maintaining
African-American subordination and intimidation." NORALEE FRANKEL & NANCY S. DYE,
GENDER, CLASS, RACE, AND REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 12 (1991). Some Progressives, of
course, supported civil rights, but they had relatively little influence on Progressive Era politics.
86. See, e.g., Groat, supra note 56, at 500 ("An eighteenth century constitution cannot,
without change, be fitted to these twentieth century conditions.").
The hostility of legal Progressives toward the Constitution reflected general Progressive
attitudes. See Herman Belz, The Realist Critique of Constitutionalism in the Era of Reform, 15
AM. J. LEG. HIST. 288, 288 (1971) (noting that "scholars such as Woodrow Wilson, J. Franklin
Jameson, and Henry Jones Ford dissented from the reverential approval usually accorded the
American constitution" because they believed the Constitution did not adequately address
modern problems); David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Progressive Social Thought, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 951, 954-55 (1996) (noting that Progressives saw the Constitution as the root of liberal
individualism, which they believed caused inequality and division in society). Progressive
hostility to the Constitution was given intellectual respectability by Charles Beard, who argued
that the Framers of the Constitution intentionally favored the class interests of property-
holders over the interests of the masses. See CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 15-18 (1956).
87. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908)
[hereinafter Pound, Common Law]. Pound stated
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Either way, legal Progressives were inclined to argue in favor
of judicial deference to the legislature. They argued that traditional
notions of natural rights and opposition to class legislation should not
bind the states' police power. Rather, they contended, the scope of the
police power should change with the perceived needs of society.
Modern, industrialized society necessitated increased government
regulation, and the police power, therefore, needed to be expanded to
accommodate this need.8 As Progressives came to dominate socio-
logical jurisprudence, they expunged the influence of those who, like
Tiedeman, believed that courts should strictly enforce constitutional
limitations on government power.89 Ultimately, Progressive sociologi-
What court that passes upon industrial legislation is able or pretends to investigate
conditions of manufacture, to visit factories and workshops and see them in operation,
and to take the testimony of employers, employees, physicians, social workers, and
economists as to the needs of workmen and of the public, as a legislative committee may
and often does?
Id. at 405; Pound, Liberty of Contract, supra note 47, at 470 ("More than anything else,
ignorance of the actual situations of fact for which legislation was provided and supposed lack of
legal warrant for knowing them, have been responsible for the judicial overthrowing of so much
social legislation."). Elsewhere, Pound explained that legislatures are better at balancing rights
than courts who had "no machinery for getting at the facts." Courts did not have the advantage
of reference bureaus, hearings before committees, or detailed expert testimony; only the
legislature did. See Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, supra note 55, at 621-22.
Felix Frankfurter argued that, at the very least, courts must consider the relevant social
science data before overruling a legislature that had access to such data. See Frankfurter,
supra note 56, at 365; see also Gillman, supra note 33, at 220 (noting that "[o]ne of the tenets of
'sociological jurisprudence' was that legislatures were in the best position to collect the social
data that was necessary to ensure that law would be adjusted so that it might contribute to
developing social needs").
88. Cf Albertsworth, supra note 66, at 394 (arguing that sociological jurisprudence had its
origins in the courts' indifference to the upheavals caused by industrialization); see also MARK
GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM 51
(1991) (stating that leading progressive thinkers such as Roscoe Pound and John Dewey
"insisted that public policy should promote the social interests of the community and that these
interests could best be determined by elected officials and social science experts").
89. Tiedeman himself fell under the influence of Progressivism in the waning years of his
career. See Halper, supra note 77, at 1353 (explaining Tiedeman's shift from an anti-govern-
ment regulation stance to a pro-regulation stance).
The statism of sociological jurisprudence was influenced not only by Progressivism, but by
lingering Darwinism. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TE.
L. REV. 645, 677-78 (1985) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models] (discussing the effect
of Edward Ross's Darwinian ideas on Pound). These categories are not mutually exclusive. As
historian Arthur Ekirch explains, Darwinism exercised considerable influence over many
Progressives:
Darwinism, interpreted by Herbert Spencer as a justification of laissez faire, with gov-
ernment refraining from interference with the normal evolution of society, was rede-
fined in terms of Darwinism as social control. According to reformers, evolution was not
primarily a story of individuals in a 'dog-eat-dog' competition with each other, but it in-
dicated rather the success of individuals in a struggle with their environment. The les-
son it taught was not laissez faire but social control. Instead of individuals being forced
to adapt themselves to their environment, governments and reform agencies, the pro-
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gressives believed, could help reshape the environment to meet the needs of individuals
or of the species.
EKIRCH, supra note 81, at 180-81; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Cultural Crisis of the Fuller
Court, 104 YALE L.J. 2309, 2311-12 (1995) (reviewing OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF
THE MODERN STATE (1994)) (discussing the statism of Progressive Darwinists).
Darwinism influenced sociological jurisprudence via three routes. First, two of Roscoe
Pound's mentors, Edward Alsworth Ross and Lester Frank Ward, were Progressive Darwinists
who believed in using law as an instrument of social control. See Hovenkamp, Evolutionary
Models, supra, at 678. Hovenkamp has noted that "[i]n one of his more expansive moments
Pound defined jurisprudence as a 'science of social engineering.'" Id. at 679.
Second, Progressives who were not lawyers applied Darwinism to constitutional theory.
Woodrow Wilson, for example, wrote that while the Framers believed in mechanical, natural
law theories, modern people recognize that "[slociety is a living organism and must obey the
laws of life, not of mechanics." WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM 48 (1913). He added:
"All that progressives ask or desire is permission-in an era when 'development,' 'evolution,' is
the scientific word-to interpret the Constitution according to the Darwinian principle .... " Id.
Wilson also wrote that "government is not a machine, but a living thing.... It is accountable
to Darwin, not to Newton." WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 56 (1908).
Third, Oliver Wendell Holmes shaped sociological jurisprudence to a significant degree. See
Pound, Liberty of Contract, supra note 47, at 464 (stating that the best exposition of sociological
jurisprudence Pound had seen was found in Holmes's dissenting opinion in Lochner); Roscoe
Pound, Sociology of Law and Sociological Jurisprudence, 5 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 2-3 (1943)
[hereinafter Pound, Sociology of Law] ("Sociological jurisprudence is in another line of develop-
ment. It proceeds from historical and philosophical jurisprudence to utilization of the social
sciences, and particularly of sociology, toward a broader and more effective science of law. It
begins with Holmes .... "); cf. CARDOZO, supra note 69, at 138 ("It is the dissenting opinion of
Justice Holmes, which men will turn to in the future as the beginning of an era. In the
instance, it was the voice of a minority. In principle, it has become the voice of a new
dispensation, which has written itself into law.").
The influence of Darwinism on Holmes was manifest from the early stages of his career.
See Book Notices, supra note 72, at 141 ("[If the will of the majority is unmistakable, and the
majority is strong enough to have a clear power to enforce its will, and intends to do so, the
courts must yield... because the foundation of sovereignty is power, real or supposed.");
Summary of Events: The Gas Stokers'Strike, 7 AM. L. REV. 558, 583 (1873) ("The more powerful
interests must be more or less reflected in legislation; which, like every other device of man or
beast, must tend in the long run to aid the survival of the fittest."). Holmes's writing during his
time on the Supreme Court continued to show the influence of Darwinism. See J. W. Burrow,
Holmes in His Intellectual Milieu, in THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 17, 25
(Robert W. Gordon ed., 1992) (explaining the origins of Holmes's Darwinian attitudes); Yosel
Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 213, 251 (1964) (finding that Holmes was a
strong adherent to Darwinian doctrines); cf. HOVENKAMP, supra note 43, at 99 (denying Holmes
was a social Darwinist, but conceding that Holmes was influenced by evolutionary theory, i.e.,
Darwinism).
Holmes's Darwinism led to his belief that if judges interfered with legislation, they illegiti-
mately interfered with natural societal evolution. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 873, 880 (1987) (noting that Holmes "treat[ed] the political process as an un-
principled struggle among self-interested groups for scarce social resources").
The Darwinian influence on Holmes was apparent when he took issue with the Lochner
majority's view that liberty included the liberty of the worker to contract freely. He stated that
the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment "is perverted when it is held to prevent the
natural outcome of a dominant opinion." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes,
J., dissenting), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). The only
exception to this rule, added Holmes, is if"a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that
the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by
the traditions of our people and our law." Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). This
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cal jurisprudence, while purporting to be scientific, in effect stood for
statism in the form of judicial acquiescence to the whims of the legis-
lature.
Justice Holmes's radical dissent in Lochner exemplifies the
statism of sociological jurisprudence. In contrast to the traditional
view that the Constitution was intended to limit government, 90
Holmes argued that "a Constitution is not intended to embody a par-
ticular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic rela-
tion of the citizen to the state or of laissez faire."91 Holmes, in con-
trast to his eight Supreme Court colleagues, simply did not believe
that liberty of contract was a constitutionally protected value.92 The
Fourteenth Amendment, Holmes famously wrote, "does not enact Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."93
exception is almost meaningless. If a law represents the "natural outcome of a dominant
opinion," it seems impossible that a rational person could believe the law was definitely
inconsistent with the fundamental traditions of the nation.
Ironically, promoters of sociological jurisprudence accused their opponents of being
Darwinists. Roscoe Pound wrote that "[rievolt of the social conscience against such [Darwinian]
theories" was an important factor in the development of the movement for the "socialization of
law." Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, Part III, supra note 68, at
496.
90. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
91. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
92. Cf. White, supra note 33, at 111 ("For Holmes 'liberty of contract,' itself a judge-made
doctrine, was held subject to almost limitlessly broad police powers.").
93. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see White, supra note 33, at 93 ("The
revolutionary feature of Holmes's Lochner dissent was his suggestion that, in most cases
involving isssues of political economy, foundational constitutional principles are not impli-
cated.").
Spencer favored the "law of equal freedom" as an overriding principle of political economy.
The law of equal freedom holds that each person may use her faculties and property as she
chooses, so long as she does not interfere with the equal right of other people to use their
faculties and property. See HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS 92-93 (1965). The pronoun "she"
is used intentionally here, as Spencer believed that the law of equal freedom applied to women
as much as to men. See id.
Beginning with Pound, generations of scholars have asserted that Holmes was accusing the
Court of subtly following Social Darwinism. See Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological
Jurisprudence, Part III, supra note 68, at 494 n.18. In fact, many scholars seem to rely on
Holmes's dictum and scant other evidence in arguing that the entire jurisprudence of the
Lochner era Court was heavily influenced by Social Darwinism. See, e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, JR.,
RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 42 (3d ed. 1980) (observing that in the late nineteenth
century the Supreme Court became "the major protector of propertied interests" at the expense
of individual liberties); PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING 228 (2d ed. 1983) (noting that laissez-faire economics and Social Darwinism
were "in vogue among American intellectuals in the mid-nineteenth century"); RICHARD
HOFSTATER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 5-6 (rev. ed. 1955) (stating that Social
Darwinism was used by "laissez-faire conservatives" to defend their opposition to social reform);
CLYDE E. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THOMAS E. COOLEY,
CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, AND JOHN F. DILLON UPON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 24
(1954) (noting that the Holmes dissent was a critique of the transformation of due process into
the protection of private economic power); PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS:
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Holmes also eschewed traditional principles of American juris-
prudence by consciously refusing to consider the issue of whether the
statute at issue in Lochner was class legislation. Holmes acknowl-
edged that if the law was justified as an appropriate first step toward
regulating the hours of all workers, it may "be open to the charge of
inequality."94  Nevertheless, he thought it "unnecessary to discuss"
this issue.9
5
Holmes's opinion became a statist shrine for Progressive legal
theorists. Roscoe Pound glorified Holmes's opinion as the best exposi-
tion of sociological jurisprudence he had seen.96 Pound and other
Progressives reserved their praise for Holmes and largely ignored
Harlan's dissent, even though Harlan's dissent was far more
"scientific," than Holmes's. What Pound chose to celebrate was not a
truly sociological opinion that grappled with the question of whether
the maximum hours law in question was an appropriate health meas-
ure rather than class legislation, but a statist opinion which ignored
constitutional protections entirely in favor of extreme deference to the
legislature.
Meanwhile, Pound vigorously attacked the anti-statism of the
majority opinion in Lochner. Not only did the Court misinterpret the
relevant facts, according to Pound,97 but it had a warped conception of
THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER V. NEW YORK 3-5 (1990) (asserting that the Lochner decision was
important "because it signaled the Court's adoption of... laissez faire-social Darwinism");
ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH,
1887-1895, at 235-37 (1960) (explaining that Social Darwinism became popular in the law after
it was already in retreat in other disciplines); BENJAMIN TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE
CONSTITUTION: How LAISSEZ FAiRE CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 154 (1942); MORTON G.
WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM 104 (1949). In fact,
when read in context, the Social Statics remark says only that the sic utero principle could not
be the basis of American constitutional law. Holmes was simply using Spencer as an example of
a prominent intellectual who believed the sic utero principle should be the basis of law. Holmes,
however, was not accusing the Court of believing in Social Darwinism or of otherwise being
influenced by Spencer, whose works Holmes had never read. See PHILIP P. WIENER, EVOLUTION
AND THE FOUNDERS OF PRAGMATISM 173 (1949) (noting that Holmes had never read Spencer).
Whether Spencer can even be considered a "Social Darwinist" is itself questionable. See
JOHN GRAY, LIBERALISM 31 (1986) (describing Spencer as a classical liberal).
94. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
95. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
96. See Pound, Liberty of Contract, supra note 47, at 464. Charles Beard, meanwhile,
stated that Holmes's opinion was "a flash of lightning [in] the dark heavens of judicial logic."
CHARLES BEARD, THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 148 (Max Lerner ed., 1943); see also
supra note 89 and accompanying text (recounting other Progressives' praise of Holmes's
dissent). Holmes was more of a majoritarian than a statist, but his views were appropriated by
statists. I thank John Wertheimer for raising this point.
97. See Pound, Liberty of Contract, supra note 47, at 480 (asserting that study of the social
situation at the time of Lochner shows that Congress interpreted the facts correctly); Pound,
Mechanical Jurisprudence, supra note 55, at 616 (noting that the majority never inquired into
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liberty. Pound had the intellectual's contempt for the ability of the
layman to pursue his own ends appropriately. Freedom of contract in
the hands of "weak and necessitous" bakers, wrote Pound, "defeats
the very end of liberty."1s
Traditionalists, by contrast, criticized Holmes's opinion. One
author wrote that if Holmes's views were to prevail, "constitutional
government, in the sense in which it has been understood for a cen-
tury and a half, will be at an end, and the doctrine of the police power
will have been swallowed up in the capacious maw of unrestrained
democracy."99
Most Justices on the Supreme Court apparently agreed.
Despite Holmes's Lochner dissent, the incipient rise of Progressivism,
and the publication of a major treatise on the police power adopting
the sociological view, 1°° the Supreme Court mostly adhered to tradi-
tional constitutional jurisprudence and generally ignored the emerg-
ing sociological school and its emphasis on deference to the legisla-
ture. Only Holmes continued to insist that the Constitution was
sufficiently malleable that the Court could and should almost always
defer to the policy judgments of the legislature. 101
the factual results of its rule). In fact, Holmes paid far less attention to the facts than did either
the majority or the other dissenting Justices.
98. Pound, Liberty of Contract, supra note 47, at 484. Pound's contempt for the liberty of
contract doctrine can be found later in the same article:
The attitude of many of our courts on the subject of liberty of contract is so certain to be
misapprehended, is so out of the range of ordinary understanding, the decisions them-
selves are so academic and so artificial in their reasoning, that they cannot fail to en-
gender such feelings .... The evil of those cases will live after them in impaired author-
ity of the courts long after the decisions themselves are forgotten.
Id. at 487.
99. George W. Wickersham, The Police Power, A Product of the Rule of Reason, 27 HARV.
L. REV. 297, 316 (1914).
100. See generally ERNST FREuND, THE POLICE POWER (1903). Freund defined the police
power as "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of
liberty and property." Id. at iii. An exercise of the police power was legitimate if it aided the
public welfare, which he described as "the improvement of social and economic conditions
affecting the community at large and collectively, with a view to bringing about 'the greatest
good for the greatest number.' "Id. at 5.
Justice Brewer, in contrast, argued that the "timid judge" would invoke the police power "to
escape the obligations of denouncing a wrong." BRODHEAD, supra note 43, at 117.
101. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 191-92 (1908) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Supreme Court should uphold a pro-labor union statute because Congress and
others had concluded that unionization should be encouraged).
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III. RACE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE POLICE POWER
BEFORE BUCHANAN
After Lochner, opponents of segregation hoped that Jim Crow
laws, at least as applied to the private sector, could be successfully
challenged on liberty of contract grounds.12 Civil rights advocates
hoped that the traditionalism and anti-statism of Lochner would
counteract the statism and the sociological reliance on racism of
Plessy v. Ferguson.10
A. Plessy v. Ferguson: The Sociological Jurisprudence of Race
Plessy involved a Louisiana statute that required railroads to
enforce racial segregation.'0 4 When the Plessy segregation ordinance
was passed, segregation, by law or custom, was common throughout
the South.10 5 On the other hand, segregation was far from univer-
sal,106 and it was under pressure from increased black assertiveness,
urbanization, and the anti-caste influence of the market economy.
10 7
By the 1890s, there was growing African-American resistance
to de facto segregation. The common law required either integration
or separate but equal accommodations, and African-Americans be-
came increasingly aggressive about enforcing their rights in the
courts. 0 8  Streetcar companies, train companies, and other enter-
prises sometimes found it more profitable to have integration than to
102. See, e.g., 9 BICKEL & ScHMiDT, supra note 4, at 731 (noting that Berea College hoped
to draw support for continued integration from Lochner).
The several cases challenging state-imposed segregation to reach the Supreme Court dealt
with transportation and education. None of them involved, as Lochner did, liberty of contract
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, those cases challenged
segregation regulations based on either the Commerce Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and were uniformly unsuccessful. See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v.
Kentucky, 179 U.S. 388, 390 (1900) (unsuccessful commerce clause challenge); Cumming v.
Richmond Co. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 544 (1899) (unsuccessful equal protection challenge);
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896) (unsuccessful equal protection challenge);
Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Ry. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587, 592 (1890) (unsuccessful
commerce clause challenge).
103. 163 U.S. at 551.
104. Id. at 540-41.
105. See Howard N. Rabinowitz, More Than the Woodward Thesis: Assessing The Strange
Career of Jim Crow, 75 J. AM. HIST. 842, 850 (1988) (contending that de jure segregation arose
in response to black challenges to de facto exclusion and segregation).
106. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response
to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1882 n.7 (1995) (listing and describing sources that
discuss the extent of integration in the South when Plessy was decided).
107. See Rabinowitz, supra note 105, at 850.
108. See EDWARD L. AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOuTH 141-42 (1992).
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maintain separate but equal accommodations.109 Streetcar systems,
therefore, were often integrated, as were some trains."10
In an attempt to win support from their white constituents,
politicians began to propose laws requiring separate public accommo-
dations.", The Louisiana segregation law at issue in Plessy was one
of the first fruits of this flurry of legislative activity. The American
Citizens' Equal Rights Association of Louisiana vigorously opposed
the segregation statute while it was pending.112 The Association de-
nounced the bill as "class legislation.""' When it became law anyway,
the Association set out to challenge its constitutionality. With the
cooperation of the local train company, which also opposed the stat-
ute, the Association arranged Homer Plessy's arrest for violating the
law to create a test case." 4
The Plessy majority argued that the Louisiana statute did not
violate Plessy's rights under the Equal Protection Clause."1 The
Court reasoned that segregation, while creating a distinction between
the races, was not discriminatory. 1 6 The statute restricted whites to
the same degree as African-Americans; African-Americans could not
choose to sit with whites, and whites could not choose to sit with
109. See Jennifer Roback, The Political Economy of Segregation: The Case of Segregated
Streetcars, 46 J. ECON. HIST. 893, 899 (1986) (noting that streetcar companies frequently com-
plained about forced segregation because of lost profits).
110. See id. (discussing the integration of streetcars).
111. See Rabinowitz, supra note 105, at 850. Some of the earliest train segregation laws
also received some support from African-Americans because they purported to prevent train
companies from providing African-Americans with inferior accomodations. See AYERS, supra
note 108, at 143-44.
Ayers lucidly explained the impetus behind white support for railroad segregation laws. In
essence, upper-class whites who rode in the railroads' first-class cars could not tolerate associat-
ing with African-Americans in mixed-sex company. See id. at 140-41.
112. See AYERS, supra note 108, at 144. African-American support for such laws had
apparently declined when it became clear that the equal part of separate but equal was rarely
enforced. See id. at 145.
113. See Donald Nieman, From Slaves to Citizens: African Americans, Rights
Consciousness, and Reconstruction, 17 CARDOzO L. REv. 2115, 2135 (1996). African-American
leaders often criticized train segregation laws as examples of "class legislation." CHARLES A.
LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 28 (1987). For example, an
1891 meeting attended by some 600 Little Rock, Arkansas, blacks passed resolutions that
denounced a proposed separate coach bill as "caste and class legislation, which has no place in
our country." Nieman, supra, at 2136.
114. See LOFGREN, supra note 113, at 43 (describing the details of Homer Plessy's prear-
ranged arrest).
115. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896).
116. See id. at 543 ("A statute which implies merely a legal distinction ... has no tendency
to destroy the legal equality of the two races.").
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African-Americans. If African-Americans believed this arrangement
to be subordinating, that was no concern of the Court.
11 7
Plessy's counsel, Albion Tourg6e, apparently anticipated that
the Court might find that "mere" segregation did not violate African-
American rights. Tourg6e therefore seized upon Plessy's legal status
as a "Negro" with mostly Caucasian ancestry, and argued that the
statute violated Plessy's property right in his reputation as a white
man. 18 The Court rejected this argument. The Court reasoned that if
Plessy was in fact white, and was assigned to the "colored coach," he
would have a cause of action against the company. If, on the other
hand, he was "a colored man," there was no property deprivation
"since he [was] not lawfully entitled to the reputation of being a white
man."119
The holding that mere segregation did not create a cause of
action under the Fourteenth Amendment is unremarkable. The
Court's distinction between social rights, which were not protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment, and civil rights, which were protected,
was arguably consistent with the intent of the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 120 Moreover, given the Court's general reluc-
tance to overturn state legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment
at this time, it would have been surprising, though hardly illogical, if
the Court had followed dissenting Justice Harlan's lead and found
that railroad segregation laws inherently amounted to illicit class
legislation. 12
1
117. See id. at 551-52 (noting that any "badge of inferiority" is present "solely because the
colored race chooses to put that construction on it").
118. Plessy was one-eighth "Negro," and had a Caucasian appearance. See LOFGREN, supra
note 113, at 32 ("[T]he mixture of colored blood [was] not discernible.").
119. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 549.
120. See id. at 551-52 (distinguishing social rights from civil rights). Justice Brown,
writing for the Court, argued that the Fourteenth Amendment "could not have been intended to
abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political,
equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either." Id. at 544.
Justice Brown noted that Congress had authorized segregated public schools in the District of
Columbia. See id. at 545. Several modern sources discuss the historical distinctions between
civil rights, political rights and social rights. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 43, at 93-94
(distinguishing between the right to equal treatment under civil procedure and economic civil
rights); HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLiAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW:
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875, at 299-300, 395-97 (1982) (distinguishing civil
rights from civil liberties, political rights, and social rights); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism
and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1014-23 (1995) (distinguishing between
political rights and social rights).
121. One scholar has argued that "Ti]f the Supreme Court had taken the same laissez-faire
attitude toward race relations that it took in economic affairs in these decades, voluntary
integration would have survived as a counter tradition to Jim Crow." Alan F. Westin, The Case
of the Prejudiced Doorkeeper, in QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE CONSTITUTION 139, 155-56
(John A. Garraty ed., rev. ed. 1987). This claim is anachronistic, because the major transporta-
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The Court, however, also gratuituously implied that segrega-
tion laws were always constitutional if reasonable 122 and seemingly
endorsed such laws on policy grounds. Even if segregation laws did go
beyond "mere" legal distinction and violated the rights of African-
Americans, the Court found they were well within the police power.
123
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied less on traditional legal
analysis and more on its perception of social reality. The Court had
apparently assimilated the contemporary social science notion that
blacks and whites, as members of distinct races, were instinctively
hostile to one another.124 Justice Henry Billings Brown wrote for the
majority: "Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts, or to
abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt
to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present
situation."1125
The Court also argued, contrary to traditional theory, that
courts should consult public opinion and public mores when determin-
ing the constitutionality of legislation. "In determining the question
of reasonableness," Justice Brown wrote, "[the legislature] is at lib-
erty to act with reference to the established usages, customs, and
traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their
tion segregation cases were decided between 1890 and 1900, before the Lochner Era began;
between 1887 and 1900, over 90% of the Court's Fourteenth Amendment decisions favored the
state. See LOFGREN, supra note 113, at 80. Lofgren noted that "the approach that the Court
took to state economic and social regulations paralleled and anticipated its treatment of
restrictions on blacks." Id.
122. In fact, this is how contemporary commentators understood Plessy. Charles W.
Collins, author of The Fourteenth Amendment and the States, stated that under Plessy "[there
seems to be no limit to which a State may go in requiring the separation of the races." CHARLES
W. COLLINS, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE STATES 72 (1912).
123. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544.
124. See PAUL L. ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 29 (1972) ("In the
Plessy case, which became the constitutional foundation of racial segregation for fifty-eight
years, the Court used extralegal facts implicitly derived from the current popularized
understanding of social science."). See generally THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEGREGATIONIST
THOUGHT 29-62 (I. A. Newby ed., 1968) (collecting primary sources reflecting theories of black
inferiority and the existence of a natural racist instinct); STEPHEN J. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE
OF MAN 1 (1996) (same); 1 LOUIS RUCHAMES, RACIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA 441-97 (1969) (same).
125. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551. The Court's emphasis on racial instincts was consistent with
contemporary social thought. See, e.g., HENRY M. FIELD, BRIGHT SKIES AND DARK SHADOwS 153
(1890). Field explains:
It is not that one race is above the other, but that the two races are different, and that,
while they may live together in the most friendly relations, each will consult its own
happiness best by working along its own lines. This is a matter of instinct, which is
often wiser than reason. We cannot fight against instinct, nor legislate against it; if we
do, we shall find it stronger than our resolutions and our laws.
Id. Alfred H. Stone, Is Race Friction Between Blacks and Whites in the United States Growing
and Inevitable?, 13 AM. J. SOC. 676, 677 (1908) (arguing that there is a "natural contrariety,
repugnancy of qualities, or incompatibility between individuals or groups which.., we call
races.").
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comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order." 26
The Court contended, no doubt correctly, that white public opinion
was hostile to integration. Justice Brown stated that the plaintiffs
argument assumed "that social prejudices may be overcome by legis-
lation, and that equal rights cannot be secured to the negro except by
an enforced commingling of the two races." 27 Focusing again on pub-
lic opinion, the Court found that laws enacted contrary to public opin-
ion could not achieve or promote "social equality."
128
One can easily forget when reading Justice Brown's opinion in
Plessy that the plaintiff was not asking for state-"enforced commin-
gling of the races," but for a ban on government compelled segrega-
tion. 29 Apparently, Louisiana whites were not sufficiently hostile to
mingling with African-Americans to engage in voluntary non-statist
collective action to persuade train companies to voluntarily enforce
segregation. 30 If whites, for example, had boycotted integrated
trains, or demonstrated a willingness to pay higher prices for tickets
in whites-only cars, train companies would likely have enforced segre-
gation because the losses from integration would have been greater
than the expenses of enforcing segregation.
31
Faced with the problem that most whites favored segregation,
but not strongly enough to overcome market pressures that some-
times led to integration, the Court chose to ignore the distinction
between state action and private action. 32 The Plessy Court implicitly
reasoned that allowing train companies to maintain integrated trains
by failing to require segregation, would be the equivalent of legisla-
tion forcing whites and blacks to commingle. 33 By requiring segrega-
126. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550.
127. Id. at 551.
128. Justice Brown wrote that social equality could neither "be accomplished nor
promoted by laws which conflict with the general sentiment of the community upon whom they
are designed to operate.'" Id. (quoting People v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 448 (1883)).
129. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS 107 (1992); see JOHN E. SEMONCHE,
CHARTING THE FuTuRE: THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS TO A CHANGING SOCIETY 1890-1920, at
83 (1978) (discussing the "fuzzy" reasoning used in the Plessy opinion).
130. See Mark Tushnet, Plessy v. Ferguson in Libertarian Perspective, 16 LAW & PHIL. 245,
248-49 (1997).
131. For an elaboration of this argument, see EPSTEIN, supra note 129, at 102-03. These
costs included the potential loss of African-American patronage, the maintenance of separate
facilities, and lawsuits by whites mistaken for African-Americans.
132. Many years later, of course, ignoring this distinction became fashionable among legal
realists, and, ultimately, adherents of Critical Legal Studies. For an extreme example, see
MORTON J. HORwITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1870-1960, at 206-08 (1992).
133. It is true, of course, that if a white person needed to ride on a particular railroad, and
that railroad permitted integration, the white traveller was in a sense "forced" to mingle with
African-Americans. My point here is that it was not state action that created this situation,
unless one considers inaction by the state to be state action.
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tion, Louisiana simply restored the natural social order in defiance of
the unnatural interference of the free market and the profit motive. 134
Given its reliance on social science and public opinion and its
disavowal of the state action distinction, the majority opinion in
Plessy is at least in part an example of sociological jurisprudence run
amok, of drunk Philip getting his way." 5 In contrast, Justice Harlan's
famous dissent relied on traditional jurisprudential reasoning. 36
Harlan argued that public opinion and public policy considerations
should not affect the constitutionality of legislation;137 and, once one
Ironically, by the 1940s civil rights activists who favored public accomodations laws were
making arguments regarding state action analogous to those made by the Plessy Court. See,
e.g., Carey McWilliams, Race Discrimination and the Law, 9 SCd. & SocY 1, 15 (1945) ("Civil
rights acts undoubtedly have the effect of coercing those persons who like to attend places of
public accommodation and amusement into what is to some of them distasteful contact. But
non-action on the part of a legislature is equivalent to sanctioning the existing state of
affairs. ... ").
134. One cannot help but notice the similarities between the Court's reasoning in Plessy
and the Court's reasoning in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), the case that
marked the demise of traditional jurisprudence in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment
and economic regulation. For the majority in West Coast Hotel, a government's failure to enact
a minimum wage law results in a subsidy for "unconscionable employers." Id. at 399. A mini-
mum wage law, then, rather than being illicit government intervention in the marketplace,
actually restores neutrality to an economy corrupted by the profit motive. Analogously, in
Plessy, a segregation law, rather than being illicit government intervention in the marketplace,
actually restores neutrality to an economy corrupted by the profit motive. See Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896).
135. Barton J. Bernstein came very close to understanding this point. See Barton J.
Bernstein, Plessy v. Ferguson: An Example of Conservative Sociological Jurisprudence, 48 J.
NEGRO HIST. 196, 196-97 (1963) (discussing the influence of "social theories" on the Plessy
court).
136. Justice Brewer did not participate in Plessy, leaving open the intriguing question of
whether he would have followed his jurisprudential philosophy and joined Harlan's opinion,
joined the majority opinion, or written his own opinion. Brewer wrote the opinion holding that
a Mississippi statute that required segregated trains did not unconstitutionally burden inter-
state commerce, Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890), as
well as the opinion in Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908), see infra notes 143-76 and
accompanying text, which certainly suggests that he was not unalterably opposed to segregation
laws. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine that Brewer would have been comfortable with
Justice Brown's sociological majority opinion in Plessy, and his refusal to decide Berea College
on police power grounds suggests that he may not have been willing to concede that segregation
ordinances fall within the police power. For further speculations on how Brewer would have
voted in Plessy, see J. Gordon Hylton, The Judge Who Abstained in Plessy v. Ferguson: Justice
David Brewer and the Problem of Race, 61 MISS. L.J. 315, 336-44 (1991).
137. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 558 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("But I do not understand that the
courts have anything to do with the policy or expediency of legislation."). A valid statute,
according to Harlan, may be unreasonable, just as an invalid statute may represent sound
public policy. See id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan expressed sinlilar sentiments in
his dissent in Lochner: "Whether or not this be wise legislation it is not the province of the
court to inquire. Under our systems of government the courts are not concerned with the
wisdom or policy of legislation." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 68 (1905) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting), overruled by West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 379. Justice Peckham also expressed
similar sentiments in the majority opinion in Lochner:
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ignored public policy considerations, the segregation statute was
clearly invalid as a gross example of illicit class legislation.138
Harlan was on particularly firm ground in arguing that the
majority opinion endorsed class legislation because that opinion was
based entirely on an endorsement of separation with no concern for
equality. Although the statute at issue required equal accommoda-
tions for each race, the majority opinion never mentioned this re-
quirement, and it appears to have played little role in the majority's
reasoning.139
If the act be within the power of the state it is valid, although the judgment of the court
might be totally opposed to the enactment of such a law. But the question would still
remain: Is it within the police power of the state? And that question must be answered
by the court.
Id. at 57.
138. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
But in view of the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior,
dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution is color-
blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights,
all citizens are equal before the law.
Id. Fiss noted the connection between Harlan's majority opinion in Adair v. United States, 208
U.S. 161 (1908), invalidating a ban on yellow dog contracts, and his opinion in Plessy. See OWEN
M. FIss, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED
BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 365-66 (1993). In Adair, the government was
trying to enhance the power of one group, labor, at the expense of another, employers. See
Adair, 208 U.S. at 175. The Louisiana statute similarly favored one group, whites, over
another, blacks. See FISS, supra, at 363. Fiss does not use the term, but both statutes were
examples of "class legislation."
139. See Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in
the Progressive Era Part 1: The Heyday of Jim Crow, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 468-69 (1982)
(stating that while " 'separate but equal' was the style of the later apologetics of constitutional
racism, it cannot be found in the rationale of Plessy v. Ferguson"); see also Michael Klarman, An
Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 230 (1991) (noting the
absence of an explicit "separate but equal" rationale in Plessy).
The Plessy Court stated that "[i]f one race be inferior to the other socially," the Constitution
had nothing to say about it. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552. Thus, it is entirely possible that if a
challenge had been brought to a segregation statute that allowed unequal accommodations in
1896, the majority would have found that the law appropriately prevented the "enforced
commingling" of the races, and also appropriately left it up to the train companies to decide
privately how luxurious the white and "Negro" cars should be. It is true that regardless of the
constitutional issues involved, unequal railroad accomodations may have been illegal under the
Interstate Commerce Act. See, e.g., Edwards v. Nashville C. & St. L. Ry., 12 I.C.C. 247, 249
(1907) (holding that the failure to provide African-Americans with equal first-class facilities
violated the Act). On the other hand, by 1910 the Interstate Commerce Commission was
deferring "almost entirely" to railroad policies that were flagrantly unequal. Kiarman, supra
note 14, at 936. Klarman argues that the Plessy Court believed that separate-but-unequal was
constitutional as long as the inequality was reasonable. See id. at 897-98; cf. Cumming v.
Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 544 (1899) (upholding a Georgia county's decision
to fund a white high school, while closing down an African-American high school).
Interestingly, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the Louisiana Supreme Court emphasized
that the statute guaranteed equal accommodations when it upheld the Plessy segregation
statute. See Ex parte Plessy, 11 So. 948, 950 (La. 1892) ("[The statute] impairs no right of
passengers of either race, who are secured that equality of accommodations which satisfies
every reasonable claim."), affd, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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Thus, contrary to the opinions of some commentators, 140 Plessy
did not represent traditional jurisprudence of the type that carried
the day in Lochner, particularly when the Court discussed why segre-
gation statutes come within the police power.14' Instead, the opinion's
reliance on social science and public opinion was an example of an
early triumph of the emerging sociological school of jurisprudence.142
In fact, Lochner served as the springboard for the next major chal-
lenge to a segregation ordinance.
140. Owen Fiss has argued that the Supreme Court upheld the segregation statute at issue
in Plessy because it "codified and strengthened existing social practices." FISS, supra note 138,
at 362. The Court invalidated the statute at issue in Lochner because that law, by contrast,
"tried to reverse social practices that were driven by market competition." Cass Sunstein has
made the similar argument that Lochner and Plessy were consistent in that both "relied on a
conception of neutrality taking existing distributions as the starting point for analysis."
Sunstein, supra note 89, at 48. Along the same lines, Derrick Bell has contended that the
decisions were consistent because they both "protected existing property and political
arrangements, while ignoring the disadvantages to the powerless caught in those relationships:
the exploited whites (in Lochner) and the segregated blacks (in Plessy)." Derrick Bell, Does
Discrimination Make Economic Sense?, 15 HuM. RTS. 38,42 (1988).
Bruce Ackerman has alluded to "Plessy's deep intellectual indebtedness to the laissez-faire
theories express one decade later in cases like Lochner." BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE
147 (1991). In support of his thesis, Ackerman relies on the Court's statement that if the two
races are to mingle, it must be "the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each
other's merits and a voluntary consent of individuals." Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551. Brook Thomas
has also blamed the Plessy ruling on laissez-faire ideology. He has argued that laissez-faire
theory led the Court to seek to encourage the "natural" forces of segregation. See Brook
Thomas, Introduction: The Legal Background, in PLESSY V. FERGUSON: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH
DOCUMENTS 1, 34 (Brook Thomas ed., 1997).
141. While the intellectual acrobatics described in the previous footnote warm the hearts of
modern Progressives who wish to decry both Plessy and Lochner, the Plessy Court was objecting
to the integrating function of the market. The Plessy Court believed that the Louisiana
segregation law simply restored things to their natural, pre-market state. See supra notes 132-
34 and accompanying text. Surely this view, that the results of unregulated market processes
are somehow unnatural and should therefore be corrected by state action, is not reflected in
Lochner. See EPSTEIN, supra note 129, at 91-115; Tushnet, supra note 130, at 250-54 ("A decade
after Lochner ... its libertarianism seems to have become rather full-fledged with respect to
African-Americans. A decade before Lochner, libertarianism did not have as much bite. Had it
been deployed in Plessy, the result would have been different."); cf. Michael J. Klarman,
Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of
Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759, 787 (1992) ("The outcome in Plessy is mainly
attributable to the virulent racism of the Gilded Age, not to the era's skepticism of activist
government."); Silas Wasserstrom, The Empire's New Clothes, 75 GEO. L.J. 199, 303 (1986)
(comparing the activism of Lochner with the passivism of Plessy). Thus, Lochner and Plessy are
jurisprudentially at odds.
142. Cf. Bernstein, supra note 135, at 198-99 (noting the Plessy court's reliance on social
science and the "Folkways of the people"). Years later, Charles Collins defended Plessy on the
ground that the opinion "enunciate[d] sound principles of political science and [was] justified by
the logic of history and of fact." COLLINS, supra note 122, at 72.
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B. Berea College v. Kentucky: Lochner vs. Plessy
In 1904, Kentucky State Representative Carl Day introduced
a bill into the legislature that prohibited African-American and white
students from attending the same school, public or private.143 The bill
was clearly aimed at Berea College, a small, private, racially inte-
grated school 44 and the only institution of higher learning in
Kentucky that accepted blacks other than the all-black Kentucky
State Industrial College.
145
Day's bill was a politically entrepreneurial venture; few if any
of his constituents had any contact with distant Berea College.146 The
bill was nevertheless a politically savvy ploy, as opposition to racial
equality had become a popular political platform throughout the
South.147 Dominant white opinion opposing integration was reflected
in the Louisville Courier-Journal, which complained that at Berea
"white and colored girls and boys associate together in class-rooms,
dining halls, in dormitories and on playgrounds, as well as in social
entertainment." 148 Day may have decided to capitalize on the growing
Southern opposition to racial integration by introducing the bill after
President Theodore Roosevelt shocked and appalled Southern whites
by dining with Booker T. Washington at the White House.49
The Day bill was unstoppable in the election year of 1904. The
New York Evening Post stated that "any man who voted in opposition
would have the 'n ---- r question' brought up against him in all his fu-
ture career." 50 Even legislators personally opposed to the law felt
obligated by political considerations to vote for it.' 5' Some legislators
expressed concern that the law violated Berea's property rights, but
political expediency overcame that concern. 5
2
143. Richard A. Heckman & Betty J. Hall, Berea College and the Day Law, 66 REGISTER KY.
HIST. SOc'Y 35,35 (1968).
144. Some of Berea College's fascinating history is recounted in Jacqueline G. Burnside,
Suspicion Versus Faith: Negro Criticisms of Berea College in the Nineteenth Century, 83 REG.
Ky. HisT. Soc'Y 237 (1985).
145. See Jennifer Roback, Rules v. Discretion: Berea College v. Kentucky, 20 INT'L J.
GROUP TENSIONS 47, 51 (1990). Tennessee had recently passed a similar law forcing Maryville
College to end its policy of integration. See Scott Blakeman, Night Comes to Berea College: The
Day Law and the African-American Reaction, 70 FILSON CLUB HIST. Q. 3, 26 n.45 (1996) (noting
that Maryville College became segregated in 1903 as a result of the Tennessee statute).
146. See Heckman & Hall, supra note 143, at 38-42.
147. See id. at 35-37.
148. Id. at 42 (quoting LOUISVILLE COURIER-JouRNAL (Feb. 2, 1904).
149. See id. at 38 (discussing this hypothesis).
150. Id. at 37.
151. See id. at 37-38.
152. See id. at 40 (noting that many were unconvinced by these legislators' concerns).
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Berea College first challenged the law unsuccessfully in the
Circuit Court of Madison County.153 On appeal, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals upheld the law as a valid police power measure. 14 The court
reasoned that the law was a valid exercise of the state's well
established power to prohibit miscegenation. Even a prejudicial
motivation would not make a law invalid because prejudice was
deemed "nature's guard to prevent the amalgamation of the races." 155
The court also argued that the law was valid because it would prevent
the violence that integration of the races would inevitably produce.156
The Kentucky court added that the rights of private property
and private association could not overcome the state's right to exer-
cise its police power to enforce segregation. True to the Progressive
spirit of the times, the court gave short shrift to autonomy claims by
private institutions against the force of the state. 157
Despite the incredibly poor racial climate,158 the college decided
to take its case to the Supreme Court. In its brief, Berea focused on
the College's right and the right of its employees to be free from un-
reasonable interference by the state in pursuing their business and
occupations. 159 Berea noted that the Supreme Court recognized such a
153. The court stated that the law came within the state's police power because of the
inherent tensions of interracial education. See Commonwealth v. Berea College, No. 6009
(Madison Cty. Cir. Ct. Feb. 7, 1905). The court added that segregation would prove to be "a
blessing to Berea College, and to the colored as well as to the white youth of Kentucky." Id. at
18-19.
154. See Berea College v. Commonwealth, 94 S.W. 623, 628-29 (Ky. 1906). The court did
invalidate a clause prohibiting the college from opening a branch within 25 miles of the main
campus. See id. at 628.
155. Id. at 626.
156. See id. at 626-27 (discussing the likely violence that would result if the races are not
kept separate).
157. We cannot agree that the ground of distinction noted [i.e., voluntary association]
could form a proper demarcation between the point where the [police] power could form
a proper demarcation between the point where the power might be exercised, and the
one where it might not be.... All this legislation was aimed at something deeper and
more important than the matter of choice. Indeed, if the mere choice of the person to be
affected were the only object of the statutes, it might well be doubted whether that was
at all a permissible subject for the exercise of the police power.
Id. at 626.
158. For example, in well-publicized remarks, the president of Harvard University urged
Berea College President William Frost to yield to the Day Law. Amorig other pro-segregation
comments, Eliot stated:
Perhaps if there were as many Negroes here as there, we might think it better for them
to be in separate schools. At present Harvard has about five thousand white students
and about thirty of the colored race. The latter are hidden in the great mass and are not
noticeable. If they were equal in numbers or in a majority, we might deem a separation
necessary.
THOMAS F. GOSSETT, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA 285-286 (1963).
159. See Brief of Plaintiff in Error at 5, Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908)
[hereinafter Berea Plaintiffs Brief].
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right in Lochner and other cases. 160 Specifically, Berea argued that "a
private school stands upon exactly the same footing as any other pri-
vate business [and that the] statute is... an arbitrary interference
with the rights of the people in the conduct of their private business
and in the pursuit of their ordinary occupations."161
The college then turned to the argument that the statute con-
stituted illicit class legislation. Berea claimed that "[t]he Constitution
makes no distinction between the different races or different classes
of the people" and that any such distinction "must be done by the
legislature in the exercise of the police power."162 Although Berea
acknowledged that certain segregation laws had been held to be
within the police power, the college distinguished Plessy and other
segregation cases on the ground that the laws in question in those
cases had the purpose of preventing whites from involuntarily associ-
ating with African-Americans in trains and other places of public
accommodation. 163 No whites, however, needed to come in contact
with African-Americans at Berea College, since white students could
easily attend another college that was not integrated.64 Once the
Court recognized that any association between whites and African-
Americans at Berea College was voluntary, the statute could not be
justified under the police power. 65
Overall, Berea's brief is an excellent example of legal argument
relying on traditional jurisprudential notions. By contrast,
Kentucky's brief manifested the statist influence of Progressivism and
sociological jurisprudence: "The welfare of the State and community
is paramount to any right or privilege of the individual citizen. The
rights of the citizen are guaranteed, subject to the welfare of the
State."166
Kentucky spent significant effort attempting to persuade the
Court to take judicial notice that African-Americans are mentally
160. See id. at 11.
161. See id. at 10. It is worth noting that a similar argument emerged victorious in Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (McReynolds, J.), a case decided at the height of the
Lochner era.
162. Berea Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 159, at 15.
163. See id. at 25.
164. See id.
165. [N]or can the voluntary association of persons of different races, or persons of the
same race, be constitutionally prohibited by legislation unless it is shown to be immoral,
disorderly, or for some other reason so palpably injurious to the public welfare as to jus-
tify a direct interference with the personal liberty of the citizen; and even in such a case
the restriction should go no further than is absolutely necessary.
Id. at 25.
166. Brief for Defendant in Error at 1, Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
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inferior to whites. "This is not the result of education," Kentucky
argued, "but is innate and God-given; and therein lies the supremacy
of the Anglo-Saxon-Caucasian race."167 To uphold liberty of contract
in the context of education, the state suggested, would be to ignore
obvious social facts.168
The Court was faced with a stark choice between the principles
of Lochner and the principles of Plessy, and, more broadly, between
traditional jurisprudence and sociological jurisprudence. In the end,
the Court chose to evade the dilemma by upholding the Day law on
the narrowest possible grounds. 69 It sidestepped the contradictions
between forced segregation and freedom of contract by ruling that be-
cause Berea College was established under state charter, the state
could regulate it in any way it chose as long as it did not violate the
original wording of the charter--"the education of all persons who
may attend."170 Justice Brewer, writing for the Court, pointed out
that the college could still educate all persons if African-Americans
and whites were separated. 17'
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Day, dissented. Harlan
argued that the statute violated the college's and its employees' rights
to freedom of contract and occupational liberty. He wrote:
The right to impart instruction .... is, beyond question, part of one's liberty as
guaranteed against hostile state action by the Constitution of the United
States. This court has more than once said that the liberty guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment embraces "the right of the citizen to be free in the en-
joyment of all his faculties," and "to be free to use them in all lawful ways."
172
Unlike Justices Harlan and Day, the legal academy applauded
the decision. 173 The law review commentary on Berea College reflected
the strong influences racism and Progressivism exerted on the legal
academy by this time. Several authors praised the Court for allowing
167. Brief of Commonwealth of Kentucky at 40, Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45
(1908).
168. See id. at 41-42 (discussing rationales for separate racial education).
169. See Schmidt, supra note 139, at 452 (noting that the Lochner/Plessy dialectic was
maintained by the narrow holding in Berea).
170. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 56 (1908). Despite Berea's direct challenge,
the Court did not mention Lochner at all.
171. See id. at 57 (stating that it was not unlawful to require the teaching of different races
at different times).
172. Id. at 67-68 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589
(1896)).
173. See Andrew A. Bruce, The Berea College Decision and the Segregation of the Colored
Races, 68 CENTRAL L. J. 137, 137-38 (1909); Editorial, The Berea College Decision, 14 VA. L.
REG. 643, 643 (1908); Note, Constitutionality of a Statute Compelling the Color Line in Private
Schools, 22 HARV. L. REV. 217, 217 (1909).
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states the authority to prohibit integration and avoid its perceived
negative consequences. 1'7 4 Commentators also praised the Court for
affirming that states had broad regulatory authority. Law Notes, for
example, applauded the Berea College Court for reigning in "corporate
aggression."175
Fortunately for opponents of segregation, the opinion in Berea
College was not a complete disaster. It did not endorse the racism of
the Kentucky Supreme Court's opinion or that of Plessy. Nor did the
Court hold that under Plessy the Day law came within the police
power. Moreover, although the opinion upheld the segregation ordi-
nance at issue, the holding only applied to regulations aimed at corpo-
rations. The Court hinted that the segregation law would have been
unconstitutional as beyond the police power had it been applied to an
individual or to an unincorporated business. 176 The narrowness of the
Court's holding perhaps explains why Justice Holmes, always eager to
expand the scope of the police power, concurred in the judgment
without opinion rather than joining Justice Brewer's opinion.'
77
Brewer's opinion, while disheartening to civil rights advocates,
practically invited legal attacks on state enforcement of segregation
174. An article in the Central Law Journal, for example, argued that the Day Law appro-
priately defended "race purity and race virility." Bruce, supra note 173, at 142. The author
added that "the mingling of the races in the past on terms of social intimacy has invariably led
to illicit intercourse and to intermarriage, and that the results have not been satisfactory to
either race." Id. The Virginia Law Register hailed the opinion for destroying a "freak institu-
tion" where "negroes and whites were educated together without distinction of race." Editorial,
supra note 173, at 643. A Harvard Law Review note stated that given that the government
clearly has the right to prohibit miscegenation, "to prohibit joint education is not much more of
a step." Note, supra note 173, at 218.
175. Editorial, 12 LAw NOTES 163, 163 (1908). The Virginia Law Register applauded the
decision "not so much for the set back it gives the Negrophile, but for the salutary doctrine laid
down as to the right of a State to control its creation, the corporations." Editorial, supra note
173, at 643. According to the Register, the opinion ensured that "the so-called dangers of
corporate aggression will be easily met." Id. at 644. The Central Law Journal contended that
the statute "was essentially a police regulation, adopted for the purpose of protecting the morals
and the general welfare of the people of the state," and therefore constitutional. Bruce, supra
note 173, at 141.
A few years later, Charles Warren cited Berea College while defending the Court from its
Progressive critics. See Warren, supra note 20, at 672 n.14. Warren pointed out that the Court
upheld most of the regulations that came before it, including "negro-segregation laws," by giving
wide scope to the police power. Id. at 695. Warren called this judicial blind eye to various
economic regulations "wise policy." Id.; see also Charles Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431, 451 (1926) (criticizing Harlan's attempt to
expand the constitutional definition of "liberty" in his Berea College dissent).
176. See Berea, 211 U.S. at 54 ("In creating a corporation a state may withhold powers
[that] cannot be denied to an individual.").
177. See id. at 58.
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laws against private parties. 178 Such attacks soon arose against resi-
dential segregation laws.
IV. RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION LAWS
By the 1910s, tens of thousands of African-Americans were
migrating from rural areas to southern cities. 179  Many of these
African-Americans took up residence in or near areas which were
primarily occupied by whites.180 Whites, meanwhile, feared their
property values would decline if African-Americans moved into their
neighborhoods, or worse, onto their streets. 181 In some cities, whites
used violence to keep African-Americans out of their neighborhoods.182
However, "white terrorism" could not defeat the combined purchasing
power of blacks in their pursuit of housing.3 Whites, therefore
turned to the government for assistance. Politicians, in turn,
recognized that residential segregation ordinances would be popular
with their constituents.84
178. Perhaps that was the intent of Justice Brewer, a strong proponent of laissez-faire
constitutionalism. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1910-1921,
1985 DuKE L.J. 1111, 1136 (noting that Berea seemed to encourage attacks on residential
segregation); see also 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 736 (noting that Berea was "upheld
on the narrowest possible grounds). Justice Brewer did not participate in Plessy, even though
he was on the Court at that time, so it is hard to gauge his views on the constitutionality of
segregation.
179. See 2 NoRMAN WILLIAMs, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN PLANNING LAw § 59.03,
at 736 n.8 (1987).
180. See id.
181. See OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD, SEGREGATION IN BALTIMORE AND WASHINGTON 3
(1913); see also Daniel T. Kelleher, St. Louis' 1916 Residential Segregation Ordinance, 26 THE
BuLLETIN-Mo. HIST. SOC'Y 239, 240 (1970) ("[The segregationists'] basic appeal.., was
economic. The law would stop the real or threatened influx of Negroes who caused handsome
neighborhoods to go to ruin.").
182. See Kiarman, supra note 14, at 945.
183. See Garrett Power, Apartheid Baltimore Style: The Residential Segregation
Ordinances of 1910-1913,42 MD. L. REV. 289, 298 (1983).
184. Bookei T. Washington, in fact, argued that the impetus for the laws came almost en-
tirely from politicians.
I have never yet found a case where the masses of the people of any given city were in-
terested in the matter of segregation of white and colored people; that is, there has been
no spontaneous demand for segregation ordinances. In certain cities politicians have
taken the leadership in introducing such segregation ordinances into city councils, and
after making an appeal to racial prejudices have succeeded in securing a backing for or-
dinances which would segregate the Negro people from their white fellow citizens.
Booker T. Washington, My View of the Segregation Laws, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 24, 1915, at 113;
see also Charles E. Wynes, The Evolution of Jim Crow Laws in Twentieth Century Virginia, 28
PHYLON 416, 417 (1960) (finding that political considerations, rather than overwhelming racism,
were behind the spread of Jim Crow laws in Virginia).
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In 1910, Baltimore promulgated the first ordinance requiring
African-Americans and whites to live in separate areas. According to
a contemporary article by W.E.B. DuBois, successful Baltimore
African-Americans had been moving out of the back alleys of the city
and on to major streets.185 When African-Americans began to buy
homes on McCulloh Street, the white residents of that street "rose in
indignation" and demanded that the City Council pass an ordinance
prohibiting African-Americans from "'invading"' white neighbor-
hoods.18 Mayor J. Barry Mahool, a leading member of the "social
justice" wing of the Progressive movement, strongly supported the
ordinance. 187
In December, the City Solicitor issued an opinion that the
ordinance was within the state's police power and therefore constitu-
tional. The Solicitor relied on Progressive arguments in favor of racial
zoning. He stated that
because of irrefutable facts, well-known conditions, inherent personal
characteristics and ineradicable traits of character perculiar [sic] to the races,
close association on a footing of absolute equality is utterly impossible between
them, where negroes exist in large numbers in a white community, and
invariably leads to irritation, friction, disorder and strife.
8 s
Segregation was constitutional because "the failure to separate the[m]
injuriously affects the good order and welfare of the communit."189
The Baltimore ordinance was imitated throughout the South.
Between 1911 and 1913, Richmond, Norfolk, Ashland, Roanoke, and
Portsmouth, Virginia, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, Greenville,
South Carolina, and Atlanta, Georgia, all passed residential
segregation ordinances. 9o These ordinances either: (1) prohibited
whites from moving to all-Negro blocks and Negroes from moving to
all-white blocks; (2) divided the city into segregated districts and
designated a district for each race; or (3) restricted new residences in
185. See W.E.B. DuBois, Baltimore, in A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 5, at 23, 23-
24.
186. See id.
187. See Silver, supra note 12, at 192 (quoting Mayor Mahool as saying "blacks should be
quarantined to isolated slums ... to prevent the spread of communicable disease into the
nearby white neighborhoods").
188. Power, supra note 183, at 300.
189. Id.
190. See Roger L. Rice, Residential Segregation by Law, 1910-1917, 34 J. So. HIST. 179, 181
(1968).
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mixed blocks to the racial group which had established most of the
residences on the block.191
When challenged in state courts, residential segregation laws
met with some initial resistance, but on very narrow grounds. 192 The
laws, meanwhile, continued to spread. By 1916, Louisville, St. Louis,
Oklahoma City, and New Orleans all had residential segregation
laws. 193 These ordinances were extremely popular among whites; St.
Louis's ordinance, for example, passed in a referendum by a margin of
approximately three to one.
94
Legal commentators were nearly unanimous in their belief
that such laws were constitutional, 195 just as they had unanimously
supported the constitutionality of the statute at issue in Berea.196 The
first and most detailed consideration of the constitutionality of resi-
dential segregation ordinances appeared in the Columbia Law Review
in 1911.19 The author, Warren B. Hunting, cited Gilbert
191. See BERNARD H. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE NEGRO SINCE 1920,
at 23 (1946).
192. The Maryland and Georgia Supreme Courts held that specific local segregation laws
were unconstitutional because they applied retroactively. See State v. Gurry, 88 A. 546, 552-53
(Md. 1913) (invalidating a segregation law because it could have affected the rights of current
property owners to occupy their property); see also Carey v. City of Atlanta, 84 S.E. 456, 460
(Ga. 1915) (finding that a segregation law violated rights of current property holders to occupy
their property). In State v. Darnell, 81 S.E. 338, 339 (N.C. 1914), the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that a local segregation law was unconstitutional because it was beyond the power
granted to municipalities by the state constitution. However, the North Carolina court did
evince some sympathy with African-Americans in this case by noting the unfortunate history of
the forced segregation of the Irish and Jews in Europe. See id. at 339-40.
Two other state courts held that segregation laws were constitutional as reasonable exer-
cises of the police power because they would prevent race friction, disorder, and violence. See
jarden v. City of Atlanta, 93 S.E. 401, 402-03 (Ga. 1917) (noting a desire to "prevent conflicts
between [the races] resulting from close association"), overruled by Glover v. Atlanta, 96 S.E.
562 (Ga. 1918); Hopkins v. City of Richmond, 86 S.E. 139, 143 (Va. 1915) (noting the "grave
danger liable to ensue from racial intermingling" (quoting opinion of the lower court)). The
latter decision was "a paean to judicial restraint and progressive breadth for the police power."
9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 794.
For a detailed discussion of state court opinions on residential segregation laws, see A. Leon
Higginbotham, Jr., et al., De Jure Housing Segregation in the United States and South Africa:
The Difficult Pursuit for Racial Justice, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 763, 807-62.
193. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 41.
194. See Kelleher, supra note 181, at 239. This statistic understates white support since
some African-Americans voted, presumably against the ordinance.
195. Indeed, while obviously some lawyers, such as Moorfield Storey of the NAACP,
believed that residential segregation laws were unconstitutional, I did not find a single article
written by a legal scholar making such an argument.
196. Nor were law review authors unique. One treatise author approvingly noted in 1912
that "[t]here seems to be no limit to which a State may go in requiring the separation of the
races." COLLINS, supra note 122, at 72.
197. See Warren B. Hunting, The Constitutionality of Race Distinctions and the Baltimore
Negro Segregation Ordinance, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 24, 35 (1911) (stating that the laws seem "fair"
on their "face," and "probably are so in fact").
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Stephenson,198 an expert in American race law, in distinguishing be-
tween a legal "distinction" and a "discrimination." "A race distinction
connotes a difference and nothing more," Stephenson wrote. 199
Whereas "a discrimination necessarily implies partiality and
favoritism." 200 According to Hunting, segregation statutes were a
distinction, not a discrimination, if they restricted both races
equally. 201 Because the Baltimore ordinance restricted both whites
and African-Americans from moving to blocks where the other race
predominated, there was no discrimination.202 Although white blocks
may be generally more desirable places to live than negro blocks,
"[t]here is nothing to prevent the improvements in the negro sections
from being made the finest in the city."
20 3
Hunting acknowledged that exercises of the police power,
including segregation laws, had to be reasonable and could not be
enacted for the oppression of a particular class. 204 Hunting concluded
that given the Plessy precedent, Baltimore's ordinance could hardly be
said to be unreasonable as a matter of law.205 Moreover, while the
right to live where one wanted could be deemed fundamental, under
the Baltimore ordinance "neither the whites' nor the negroes' right to
live where they [wanted was] curtailed any more than [was] abso-




Other authors also rejected the idea that residential segrega-
tion laws were illicit, discriminatory class legislation. An Ohio Law
Reporter author observed that the laws applied equally to whites and
blacks. "Could anything [have been] fairer, or more impartial, in its
operation than this?," he asked rhetorically.207 An article in the
Virginia Law Review stated that segregation ordinances were both
reasonable and nondiscriminatory, because "[t]he liberty of both races
were restricted to the same extent."208 A note in the University of
198. See Gilbert T. Stephenson, Race Distinctions in American Law, 43 AM. L. REV. 29
(1909), quoted in Hunting, supra note 197, at 28. Stephenson also authored a book with the
same title that was published in 1910.
199. Id. at 31.
200. Id.
201. See Hunting, supra note 197, at 28.
202. See id. at 34-35 (stating that "[a] somewhat microscopic search for technical discrimi-
nations in the proposed ordinance, has, we think, failed to disclose them").
203. Id. at 35.
204. See id. at 28-29 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886)).
205. See id. at 29 (citing the reasonableness test developed in Plessy).
206. Id. at 32.
207. Chicago Legal News, Separating Residences of White and Colored Races, 11 OHiO L.
REP. 353, 355 (1914). But cf McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 235 U.S. 151, 161-62
(1914) ("It is the individual who is entitled to the equal protection of the laws.").
208. Recent Decisions, Police Power-Segregation of Races, 1 VA. L. REV. 333, 334 (1914).
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Pennsylvania Law Review rejected the argument that the Louisville
ordinance violated the Constitution because it restricted blacks to the
less-desirable sections of the city. After all, stated the author, "they
could render those portions more desirable through their own efforts
as the white race has done."20 9 The note criticized anti-segregation
dicta in a North Carolina Supreme Court opinion invalidating a resi-
dential segregation ordinance on narrow grounds.210 The author com-
plained that "the court seems to have been impressed by the time-
worn sophistry that, if the power exist[ed] to segregate whites and
blacks, then the power must likewise exist to segregate Republican
and Democrat, persons of Irish descent and those of German descent,
Protestant and Catholic."211  The author added that this argument
was "conclusively disposed oF' in Plessy.21
2
Commentators also disputed the notion that residential
segregation laws unconstitutionally interfered with property rights.
A Virginia Law Register author concluded that residential segregation
ordinances were well within the police power, despite their effects on
property rights.213 An article in the Virginia Law Review stated that
the "object of race segregation statutes is to preserve the peace and
prevent conflict and ill-feeling, which experience has often shown to
result from too close contact of the races."214 The author admitted that
such statutes take property without due process "to a certain extent,"
but "no more so than countless other police regulations."215
A student note in the Michigan Law Review examined the
Maryland case that overturned a segregation ordinance because it
interfered with vested rights.21 6  The author noted that the court
stated in dicta that residential segregation ordinances would gener-
ally be lawful, a statement that the author found to be "thoroughly
sound."217 The author added that there seemed to be a clear trend in
courts favoring an increase in the scope of the police power.218 The
author wondered whether "[w]ith racial conditions in our large cities
becoming more and more acute" the Maryland opinion might eventu-
209. Note, Constitutional Law-Segregation Ordinance, 63 U. PA. L. REV. 895, 897 (1915).
210. See id. at 896 (criticizing State v. Darnell, 81 S.E. 338 (N.C. 1914)).
211. Id.
212. See id.
213. See James F. Minor, Constitutionality of Segregation Ordinances, 18 VA. L. REG. 561,
574 (1912).
214. Recent Decisions, supra note 208, at 335.
215. Id.
216. See Note, The Constitutionality of Segregation Ordinances, 12 MICH. L. REV. 215, 217
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ally be "denounced as ultra-conservative" for putting any restrictions
on segregation ordinances.219 In other words, this student thought
that forbidding a city from uprooting existing homeowners who lived
on racially-mixed blocks imposed irresponsibly conservative limita-
tions on progressive policy goals.
V. BUCHANAN V. WARLEY
The residential segregation case that eventually reached the
Supreme Court originated in Louisville, Kentucky. Beginning in
1908, wealthy black businessmen and professionals in Louisville be-
gan to buy houses in white residential neighborhoods.220 Apparently,
this caused a great deal of alarm and consternation among whites.
Many whites began to rent homes to avoid the possibility of being
"trapped" next to black neighbors.
221
Public agitation for a segregation ordinance began in
November 1913. W.D. Binford of the Louisville Courier-Journal and
Times advocated a segregation ordinance in a speech to the Louisville
Real Estate Exchange. 222 He argued that such an ordinance would
protect "the property owners of Louisville who have sacrificed so
much in the past from the effects of the negro's presence."223 The
Courier-Journal was neutral on the ordinance, but the Times sup-
ported it. An editorial in the Times reported that property values in
many sections of the city declined by half after blacks had moved in.
224
Binford's speech encouraged whites who lived near black
neighborhoods to lobby their councilmen for a segregation ordi-
nance.2 5 In January of 1914, a councilman introduced such a bill.226
A group of prominent blacks, meanwhile, formed a branch of the
NAACP to fight the proposed ordinance.227
Despite the best efforts of the NAACP, the City Council voted
21-0 in favor of the ordinance in March.228 The ordinance then went
before the Board of Alderman, which also passed the ordinance
219. Id.
220. See George C. Wright, The NAACP and Residential Segregation in Louisville,
Kentucky, 1914-1917, 78 REG. KY. HIS. SOc'Y39, 41 (1980).




225. See id. at 43.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See id. at 44.
839
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
unanimously. On May 11, 1914, Mayor John Bushmeyer signed the
ordinance into law.229
According to its preamble, the ordinance was passed
to prevent conflict and ill-feeling between the white and colored races in the
city of Louisville, and to preserve the public peace and promote the general
welfare, by making reasonable provisions requiring, as far as practicable, the
use of separate blocks for residences, places of abode and places of assembly by
white and colored respectively.
230
The body of the ordinance forbade "any colored person to move into
and occupy as a residence.., any house upon any block upon which a
greater number of houses are occupied... by white people than are
occupied.., by colored people."231 The opposite restriction applied to
whites. Anyone violating the ordinance was subject to a fine of no less
than five nor more than fifty dollars per day of violation.
232
The national NAACP helped the local branch plan a challenge
to the ordinance. 233 Backed by local real estate operators, 234 they soon
organized a test case.
William Warley, an active African-American member of the
Louisville NAACP, signed an agreement to purchase a lot on a major-
ity-white block from Charles Buchanan, a white real estate agent who
opposed the segregation ordinance. 235 The contract between the two
parties specified that the transaction would not be consummated
unless Warley had "the right under the laws of the state of Kentucky
and the city of Louisville to occupy said Property as residence.
'236
Warley refused to complete the transaction when he "discovered" that
the Louisville segregation law would prohibit his residing in a house
on the lot he was to purchase.237 Buchanan, represented by NAACP
lawyer Clayton Blakley, then sued Warley in local court.28
Blakley argued that the law illicitly reduced the value of a
white man's property by preventing him from selling his property to
blacks. The law therefore violated his client's Fourteenth
229. See id.
230. Id. at 45.
231. Id.
232. See id. at 46.
233. Meanwhile, two blacks were arrested and found guilty of violating the ordinance for
moving into houses on blocks occupied primarily by whites. See id. at 46-47.
234. See MARY WHITE OVINGTON, THE WALLS CAME TUMBLING DOWN 116 (1947).
235. See Wright, supra note 220, at 47.
236. Id.
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Amendment right not to be deprived of property without due process
of law. Yet in a "burst of progressive spirit,"239 the law was upheld
throughout the Kentucky court system as a statute designed to ad-
vance civilization and promote the public welfare.
240
The NAACP had little reason to be sanguine about its pros-
pects before the U.S. Supreme Court. American racism was at its
post-Civil War height, and the Court rarely strongly challenged pre-
vailing social trends.241 Moreover, Lochner-style traditional jurispru-
dence, with its sympathy for individual property rights and narrow
interpretation of the police power, seemed to be on the retreat. Just
three years after Lochner, Muller v. Oregon had limited Lochner's
scope and appeared to many to give sociological jurisprudence a toe-
hold in the Supreme Court.242 Even non-Progressives had adopted the
expansive Progressive view of the police power, and abandoned tradi-
tional jurisprudence in favor of sociological jurisprudence.243
By 1916, Lochner seemed to represent not an era but a mo-
ment. Felix Frankfurter confidently argued that courts had perma-
239. 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 794.
240. The Kentucky Court of Appeals wrote:
The advance of civilization and the consequent extension of governmental activities
along lines having their objective in better living conditions, saner social conditions, and
a higher standard of human character has resulted in a gradual lessening of the domin-
ion of the individual over private property and a corresponding strengthening of the
regulative power of the state in respect thereof.
Harris v. City of Louisville, 177 S.W. 472, 476 (Ky. 1916). The court added that the individual's
right to liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment is subordinate to the interests of the com-
munity: "[Fourteenth Amendment] guaranties are not absolute guaranties, but are subordinate
to the paramount right of government to impose reasonable restraints thereupon when the
public welfare renders such legislation expedient." Id.; see also Harden v. City of Atlanta, 93
S.E. 401 (Ga. 1917) (upholding racial segregation as permissible under the police power),
overruled by Glover v. Atlanta, 96 S.E. 562 (Ga. 1918).
241. See Klarman, supra note 106, at 1930-35.
242. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). In upholding a maximum hours law for female
laundry workers, the Court referred to and discussed the brief for the State written by Louis
Brandeis. See id. at 419-20. Brandeis spent the vast majority of his brief discussing social
science relating to women's hours of labor, rather than on legal argument. While the Court did
seem to give some weight to Brandeis's work, Justice Brewer, who wrote the majority opinion,
made it clear that he thought that such sociological briefs were ultimately of limited utility:
Constitutional questions ... are not settled by even a consensus of present public opin-
ion, for it is the peculiar value of written constitution that it places in unchanging form
limitations upon legislative action, and thus gives a permanence and stability to popular
government which otherwise would be lacking.
Id. at 420.
243. Charles Warren, for example, wrote:
The foundation of the doctrine of the State police power is that every man must hold his
property and conduct his life to a certain reasonable extent in trust for the benefit of the
public; and that such a trust, if reasonable, may be enforced by the legislature by
appropriate legislation passed under its general police power. What is reasonable may
vary at different eras and under different conditions.
Warren, supra note 20, at 667-68.
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nently abandoned the lijerty of contract doctrine in favor of a sympa-
thetic judicial attitude toward "community interest" in property and
employment regulation.244 If so, the Buchanan plaintiffs were des-
tined to lose.
A. The Plaintiffs Briefs
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, two briefs
were filed on behalf of Buchanan, the plaintiff in error. The first
brief, written by NAACP president Moorfield Storey, began by argu-
ing that the Louisville segregation statute took property without due
process. 245 Storey quoted Lochner for the proposition that the purpose
of a law must be judged by the "natural and legal effect of the lan-
guage employed."246 While the Louisville law was drafted "to preserve
the semblance of equality among the races" that could not disguise
the law's purpose, "which [was] to establish a Ghetto for the colored
people of Louisville."247 Storey concluded this section of his brief with
an emotional appeal to the Court not to let the discriminatory atti-
tudes of the day determine the constitutional status of African-
Americans.
248
r Storey next argued that the Louisville statute was a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. He contended that
[T]he ordinance cannot be upheld except on the theory that the equality
required by the Fourteenth Amendment is attained by imposing a penalty
upon negroes for doing something which white citizens are left free to do [i.e.,
purchase property on a block where most homeowners are white], provided
negroes are left free to do some entirely different thing which is forbidden to
white persons [i.e., purchase property on a block with mostly African-American
homeowners] .
249
244. See Frankfurter, supra note 56, at 367; see also Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 437-
39 (1917) (upholding an Oregon law imposing a maximum number of working hours per day).
245. See Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 12, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)
[hereinafter Storey Plaintiff Brief].
246. Id.
247. Id. at 14.
248. Storey wrote:
After white and colored people have lived side by side all over the country for nearly fifty
years since the Civil War, there has come an outbreak of race prejudice, and legislation
like the ordinance under consideration has been attempted in various cities. It is a dis-
ease which is spreading as new political nostrums constantly spread from State to State.
249. Id. at 26.
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Such a theory, continued Storey, could not possibly be countenanced
by the Supreme Court.25) Storey did not cite any cases to support his
argument and did not cite or attempt to distinguish Plessy, which
seemed to rely on the very theory that Storey was urging that the
Court must reject.
Storey's brief also argued that segregation laws impeded the
right to travel interstate, though he styled this argument as another
Equal Protection claim. If the Court permitted Louisville to enforce a
residential segregation law, northern cities could also enforce such
laws. Unlike in Louisville, however, where blacks were well-estab-
lished, blacks in northern cities represented a small proportion of the
population. If northern cities passed residential segregation laws, it
would be next to impossible for the growing number of black migrants
to the North to find housing.2 51
Overall, Storey's brief seems to be weak and unpersuasive.
Kentucky was clearly going to rely on Plessy, and Storey's failure to
distinguish it left his clients with a serious problem that Storey did
not attempt to remedy.
Clayton Blakely, who had argued for the plaintiff in the lower
courts, wrote the other plaintiffs brief, which fortunately distin-
guished Plessy.252 First, Blakely noted that the Court in Plessy found
the statute to be constitutional because it avoided the enforced asso-
ciation of whites and African-Americans on trains. The Louisville
ordinance, by contrast, affected the right of a person to live wherever
he chose. Unlike the train situation, no one needed to associate with
his neighbor.2
53
Second, the Court held in Plessy that the separate coach laws
did not deprive any citizen of his property. The Louisville ordinance,
however, would "deprive the plaintiff and thousands of other property
owners of their property, [and] deprive the negroes of the City of
Louisville of their inalienable right to acquire and enjoy property."24
This argument ultimately prevailed before the Supreme Court.
250. See id.
251. See id. at 28-29.
252. It is possible that the two plaintiffs' attorneys decided that Blakely, and not Storey,
would deal with Plessy.
253. See Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 33, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)
[hereinafter Blakely Plaintiff Brief] ("If a white man did not wish to live on a block with a negro,





Kentucky responded with an extraordinary brief, notable for
its length (one hundred and twenty-one pages), its appeal to the socio-
logical view of constitutional law, and its racism, which was particu-
larly apparent in the introductory section of the brief. The State ar-
gued that Louisville's law "only seeks to regulate that natural and
normal segregation which has always existed and to prevent a few of
each race from overstepping the racial barriers which Providence and
not human law has erected."255 "Can it be," asked the State rhetori-
cally, "that a negro has the constitutional right.., to move into a
block occupied by white families," even though this would lower the
value of property owned by whites and create racial tension "simply to
gratify his inordinate social aspirations to live with his family on a
basis of social equality with white people?"256
The state claimed that "philosophy, experience and legal deci-
sion, to say nothing of Divine Writ" show that the races should live
apart to "preserve their racial integrity."257 According to the State,
the average person finds such race-mixing "repugnant."258 Those who
do not share this prevailing view and choose to live in proximity to
members of the other race threaten "the peace and good order of
society."259 The State concluded that it is neither a natural nor a
constitutional right to live in "social intimacy" with members of a
different race.260
In response to the plaintiffs argument that segregation laws
would restrict African-Americans to Louisville's worst sections,
Kentucky argued that "negroes carry a blight with them wherever
they go... on what theory do they assert the privilege of spreading
that blight to the white sections of the city?"261 A few pages later, the
State, with unintended irony, claimed that segregation laws "do not
spring from hatred or enmity to the negro, but from a sincere desire to
preserve, as far as possible, the cordial relations that should exist
between the races."262 Then, after making a gratuitous reference to
255. Brief for Defendant in Error at 10, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)
[hereinafter Kentucky Brief].





261. Id. at 13.
262. Id. at 18.
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"negroes' limitations,"263 the State just two pages later acknowledged
that the Louisville segregation law was "an outgrowth of an instinc-
tive race consciousness often expressing itself in the strongest social
or racial antipathy between the white and negro."
264
After concluding its discourse on race, the State turned to its
legal argument. Kentucky asserted that the Court should defer to the
legislature's finding that the segregation law was necessary to pre-
vent breaches of the peace. The State added that courts had uni-
formly found segregation laws to be within the police power.265 Not
surprisingly, Plessy played a large role in this argument. The State
attempted to persuade the Court that Plessy "simply recognize[d]
those social barriers which nature itself has long ago erected between
the white and colored races."266
After further legal argument, 267 Kentucky concluded by urging
the Court to take a sociological approach to its decision. The State
quoted political scientist E.R.A. Seligman for the proposition that
"'[i]n the long run the economic interests of a community must
prevail; for law is nothing but the crystallization of economic and
social imperatives.' ,268  The state added that Buchanan involved
"social and economic imperatives of the most solemn and impressive
character" that would lead to violence and lawlessness "if they are not
crystallized into law."269
C. The Briefs on Reargument
Buchanan was initially argued in April 1916. Justice Day
missed the argument because of illness. A month later the Court
ordered a reargument, so that all nine Justices could be present.20
263. Id. at 20.
264. Id.
265. See id. at 22-32.
266. Id. at 38.
267. Part III of the legal section of Kentucky's brief consisted of arguments that unequal
legal privileges did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Privileges
and Immunities Clauses, and that the Constitution did not attempt to guarantee social or
economic equality. See id. at 53-80. In Part IV, the State argued that the segregation law did
not violate property rights because the very purpose of the law was to preserve property values,
much like other zoning laws that the Court had upheld. See id. at 80-108. Among other things,
Kentucky cited excerpts from the record discussing declines in the value of property owned by
whites when African-Americans move nearby. See id. at 84-85. In Part V of its brief, the State
reviewed several cases in which state courts had upheld residential segregation ordinances. See
id. at 108-18.
268. Id. at 118.
269. Id. at 119.
270. See C. B. BLAKELY, THE HISTORY OF THE LOUISVILLE SEGREGATION CASE 12 (1917).
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1. The Storey and Blakely Brief
Storey and Blakely filed a new, joint brief for the plaintiff.
They first emphasized that the ordinance would not in fact prevent
whites and African-Americans from living in close proximity. For
example, Storey and Blakely noted that whites were often in the
majority on the front of a street, but the back alley was inhabited by
African-Americans. The whites on each side of the street lived closer
to the African-Americans behind them than to the whites across the
street.27
1
Storey and Blakely next recounted some of the racist state-
ments in the state's brief. They noted that these statements sup-
ported their argument that the purpose of the ordinance was to dis-
criminate against African-Americans. Storey and Blakely mocked the
notion that segregation was Divine Will: If "Providence [had] in fact
erected a barrier between the races, it would be impassable and no
human law would be needed" to enforce it.272 The statute was itself
evidence that its authors were not willing to trust the Providence
which they invoked.
Storey and Blakely then turned to the issue of property rights
and the Equal Protection Clause. They reiterated the arguments
from Storey's initial brief that the Louisville ordinance violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. They quoted language from Carey v. City of
Atlanta, stating that residential segregation ordinances unconstitu-
tionally deprived individuals of property without due process.273 The
Supreme Court ultimately adopted this position, quoting the same
language from Carey 274
Although Storey and Blakely did not discuss Plessy in their
rehearing brief, they did attempt to distinguish state cases upholding
ordinances requiring railroad segregation. They argued that common
law requires every common carrier to provide reasonable facilities at
reasonable rates. Once the carrier did so, however, it had the peroga-
tive to determine which car each passenger could occupy. African-
Americans had no right at common law to demand integrated accom-
modations, so they had no basis on which to challenge a segregation
271. See Brief for Plaintiff in Error on Rehearing at 12-15, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S.
60 (1917) [hereinafter Blakely & Storey Brief].
272. Id. at 22-23.
273. See id. at 26-27 (quoting Carey v. City of Atlanta, 84 S.E. 456 (Ga. 1915), a case in
which the Georgia Supreme Court found that an Atlanta segregation law violated the right of
current property holders to occupy their property).
274. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 80 (1917).
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ordinance.275 Thus, railroad segregation ordinances were constitu-
tional "since such a statute does not impair any right that would oth-
erwise exist."276 By contrast, both whites and African-Americans
clearly had the common law right to alienate property.
Storey and Blakely next distinguished Berea College on the
grounds that the Court considered the segregation law at issue to be
an amendment to Berea's corporate charter. If the challenger of the
law had been an individual, however, "it is plain that the statute
must have been declared void.., for the reasons cogently stated in
the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan."277 Thus, Berea College
was not an impediment to relief in this case.
Storey and Blakely concluded their brief by reiterating the
argument that if the government could constitutionally segregate
African-Americans and whites in order to separate potentially hostile
groups, it would also be constitutional to segregate Irish from Jews,
foreign citizens from native citizens, and Catholics from
Protestants.78
2. Kentucky's Brief
Kentucky also filed a brief on rehearing. According to the
State, the "chief purpose" of its brief on rehearing was to respond to
Storey's claims during the initial oral argument that to the extent
that the purpose of Louisville's segregation law was to prevent the
amalgamation of the races "it is unconstitutional because such amal-
gamation is highly desirable, and therefore not a proper subject of
police regulation. ''279
Before making its case against miscegenation, the State reiter-
ated its arguments from its initial briefs and responded to the argu-
ment in the plaintiffs rehearing brief that the Louisville ordinance
would not in fact cause the races to be separated. The State admitted
that "negroes living in alleys are nearer their white neighbors than if
they were living on some other block."280 But Louisville had to "draw
275. See Blakely & Storey Brief, supra note 271, at 38.
276. Id. The same argument applied to public school segregation, according to Storey and
Blakely. Statutes creating segregated public schools did not reduce rights that previously
existed but granted privileges which would not otherwise exist. So long as the privileges
granted to each race were similar, neither had cause for complaint. See id.
277. Id. at 39.
278. See id. at 46-47.
279. See Supplemental and Reply Brief for Defendant in Error on Rehearing at 123,




the line somewhere" and chose to segregate by street rather than
engage in the more drastic measures such as "an absolutely sweeping
and universal removal" of African-Americans encroaching on white
neighborhoods.281 Simply because Louisville could not fully accom-
plish its aim did not mean that the law was not useful and impor-
tant.282
The State then turned to its argument that amalgamation of
the races is undesirable. The State claimed that Storey was correct
when he conceded that there would have to "be either social separa-
tion or else amalgamation" of the races. 283 However, the State added
that to its knowledge Storey was the only white American to
"advocate amalgamation [of the races] as... the more desirable al-
ternative" to segregation.284 The State argued that Storey's advocacy
of race-mixing supported the State's contention that Louisville's
segregation law met "a very real danger which threatened the racial
integrity of the white race."285
The State argued that the consistent policy of the United
States regarding the various races within its borders had been "[flor
races of the same color, amalgamation or fusion; for races of different
color, whether Indian, Mongolian or Negro, social separateness or
segregation."286 According to the State, a legal precedent showed that
the police power could be used to support a policy widely accepted by
public opinion and held by prevailing morality. However, in the event
the Court was too obtuse to rely on its precedents or to understand
the importance of race segregation, the State provided a voluminous
appendix consisting of excerpts of books and articles that supported
its position.28 7 The State claimed that the excerpts proved, "first, that
281. See id.
282. See id. at 129.
283. Id. at 142.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 143. The State contended that Storey's views should be given great weight be-
cause he was president of the NAACP. After all, argued the State, the NAACP has branches in
more than 60 cities, and one can assume that Storey's views "represent the views of at least a
part of that organization, if indeed they do not represent a distinct propaganda." Id. "We do not
for a moment believe that Mr. Storey, or any member of his family, practices what he preaches
to others on this subject," the State continued, "but the point we wish to emphasize is that there
is always danger that others may in good faith follow the advice rather than the example of such
teachers." Id.
286. Id. at 145.
287. See Appendix to Supplemental and Reply Brief for Defendant in Error on Rehearing at
123, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) [hereinafter Buchanan Appendix]. Unfortunately,
this appendix is not reprinted in the standard reference, Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law, though it is available on microfilm.
Perhaps this is why it is has not been written about elsewhere.
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there is a negro problem... further, that amalgamation offers neither
a practical nor a desirable solution; and, finally, that the only other
possible solution is through the various forms of segregation of the
white and negro races."
88
While each excerpt was placed under one of these three head-
ings, the excerpts can analytically be divided into four categories:
apologies for southern treatment of African-Americans, claims that an
inherent racial instinct exists, opposition to miscegenation, and belief
in African-American inferiority. In support of the proposition that the
South treated its African-Americans kindly, or at least as kindly as
could be expected, the State quoted the remarks of Charles Eliot, a
leading Progressive and president of Harvard,289 legal scholar Gilbert
T. Stephenson,290 and several other authors.291 To demonstrate the
existence of inherent racial instincts, Kentucky relied on the well-
known Mississippi planter and amateur anthropologist and economist
Alfred H. Stone,292 among others. 293 Along with other opponents of
miscegenation,294 the State cited British historian James Bryce,
288. Buchanan Appendix, supra note 287, at 145.
289. Eliot wrote that northern whites have stronger antipathies to African-Americans than
do Southerners. See id. at 181. The only reason that segregation laws were not common in the
North was because so few African-Americans settled there. See id.
For more on Eliot, see THE DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 71-78 (Allen Johnson ed.,
1956), and 1 WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA: BIOGRAPHIES OF THE NON-LIVING WITH DATES OF DEATHS
APPENDED 364 (5th ed. 1962).
290. In Race Distinctions in American Law, see Stephenson, supra note 198, at 33,
Stephenson wrote that race distinctions were not confined to any one section of the country, nor
were they confined to any one race. See Buchanan Appendix, supra note 287, at 174-76. He
argued that race distinctions were caused by conditions and environment, rather than by the
character of the people involved, thus absolving Southerners of guilt for their actions.
291. See Buchanan Appendix, supra note 287, at 159 (quoting William Archer for the
proposition that social equality never arises when whites and blacks live together); id. at 165
(quoting Edgar Murphy for the propostion that African-Americans are treated better in the
South than in the North); id. at 178 (quoting James E. Cutler); id. at 181 (quoting Dr.
Washington Gladden for the proposition that northern labor unions exclude African-Americans);
id. at 183 (quoting Frank U. Quillin for the proposition that the average African-American in
the South is better off than the average African-American in the North).
292. Among other things, Stone wrote that "[r]acial antipathy... is practically universal on
the part of the white race toward the Negro." Id. at 171; see also id. at 170-72 (elaborating on
his racist comments).
293. See id. at 174 (quoting John J. Vertres for the proposition that racial prejudice is a
natural sentiment which stems from the instinct of racial purity); id. at 180 (quoting William P.
Pickett for the proposition that white hatred for African-Americans "is founded upon such
fundamental, primitive instincts that its eradication is absolutely impossible").
294. See id. at 203-07 (quoting William Archer's impassioned and racist opposition to
"racial almagamation"); id. at 220 (quoting John J. Vertes) ("If the civilization wrought by our
race is to be preserved unharmed, neither amalgamation nor social equality should ever be
permitted to exist."); id. at 208-09 (quoting William B. Smith's "scientific" view that physically
different races produce inferior, unhealthy offspring); id. at 211 (quoting A. H. Shannon's claim
that racial amalgamation creates "a mongrel race whose origin is sin, and which represents the
worst of all races").
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author of the classic The American Commonwealth.29 Finally, the
State quoted a respected descendant of two presidents, Charles
Francis Adams, 296 and others297 to demonstrate African-American infe-
riority.
D. The Supreme Court Opinion
Justice Day ultimately wrote an opinion for a unanimous
Court holding that the Louisville ordinance and, by implication, all
residential segregation ordinances, were unconstitutional. 2 s  The
opinion noted that the law did not directly implicate the right to
purchase and sell property, because it regulated occupancy, not sale.
Nevertheless, the Court found that the law did in practice restrict
alienation because given the occupancy restrictions, in practice no
African-American person would be able to purchase a house on a
"white" block. Thus, the property rights of both the African-American
purchaser and the white seller were at issue.
The Court then summarized three police power justifications
for the law put forth by Kentucky: (1) that it promotes public peace
by preventing racial conflicts; (2) that it tends to maintain racial pu-
rity; and (3) that it prevents the decline in the value of white-owned
property that follows when blacks occupy adjacent premises. 299  The
Court acknowledged that states have "very broad" authority to pass
laws under the police power to protect public health, safety, and wel-
fare and that property rights are subject to that police power.30 0 The
Court added, however, that these principles do not answer the ques-
tion of whether the purchase and sale of property may be inhibited
"solely because of the color of the proposed occupant."301
295. Bryce wrote that interracial marriages would produce a new inferior race and that it
was important to the "future of mankind" that interracial offspring not be produced. See id. at
199-200.
296. Adams strongly implied black inferiority by contrasting London with African cities in
the course of discussing racial differences. See id. at 152.
297. See id. at 179, 214 (quoting William P. Pickett for the propositions that white and
black men are opposites physically, mentally, and morally and that blacks are destined for
menial labor); id. at 211-14 (quoting Edgar Gardner Murphy's argument that unlike the
Japanese or the Russians, the "negroes do not have any cultural achievements and are truly an
inferior race"); id. at 215 ("[T]he Negro has remained a savage."); id. at 229 (quoting John
Temple Graves's reference to blacks as "an inferior race" who need to learn from whites from a
distance (quoting John J. Vertes)).
298. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917).
299. See id. at 74.
300. See id.
301. Id. at 75.
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The Court recounted the history of the Fourteenth Amendment
and discussed the Slaughter-House Cases in some detail. The Court
concluded that while a principal purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to protect African-Americans, the broad language
used had been "deemed sufficient to protect all persons, white or
black, against discriminatory legislation."302 The Court stated that
this was now "settled law."303 In other words, the Court found that
the Fourteenth Amendment broadly protected the public from class
legislation.3o4
The Court then proceeded to tackle the most vexing issue
facing it: whether its holdings in Plessy, and, to a lesser extent, Berea
College, required it to uphold the Louisville ordinance. The Court was
clearly not going to overrule Plessy, particularly since the plaintiffs
briefs did not ask it to do so. Instead, the Court chose to distinguish
Plessy.
Justice Day's opinion failed to acknowledge that the Plessy
Court explicitly ruled that segregation laws were well within the
scope the police power.3 5 Nor did the Court acknowledge, much less
adopt, the blatant racism underlying the Plessy opinion. Instead,
Justice Day concluded that in Plessy "there was no attempt to deprive
persons of color of transportation in the coaches of the public carrier,
and the express requirements were for equal though separate accom-
modations for the white and colored races."30 6 At first blush, this
statement seems to be a nonsequiter. Buchanan could just as easily
be seen as a separate but equal case as Plessy. The Louisville ordi-
nance restricted whites from occupying property on majority-African-
American blocks, just as it restricted African-Americans from occupy-
ing property on majority-white blocks. 30 7
302. Id. at 76.
303. Id.
304. In fact, contrary to the analysis in Buchanan, the Slaughter-House majority rejected
the theory that the Fourteenth Amendment broadly prohibited discriminatory or "class" legisla-
tion. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872). For example, with regard to
the Equal Protection Clause, the Court stated: "Ve doubt very much whether any action of a
State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their
race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision." Id. at 81.
305. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544-58 (1896); cf. 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra
note 4, at 813 (noting that "[t]he opinion makes no serious effort to reconcile its holding with
Plessy or to suggest a coherent theory of equal protection principles in relation to racial
segregation").
306. Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 79.
307. Cf. 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 813 ("On its face, the Louisville ordinance no
more deprived blacks of the right to own and enjoy property than separate car laws deprived
them of the right to public transportation.").
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Despite the artlessness of Day's prose, the Court was adopting
the legally significant distinction between Plessy and Buchanan sug-
gested by the plaintiffs reply brief.308 According to Justice Day, in
Plessy the Court held that African-Americans had no property or
liberty right to sit where they chose in a public coach, so as long as
they were provided with separate but equal accommodations. 309 The
right to sit with whites would be a right to mere social equality, which
the Fourteenth Amendment did not protect. However, according to
Day, if African-Americans had been excluded entirely from trains or
been provided with unequal accommodations, the Plessy Court would
have found the statute unconstitutional.
Fourteenth Amendment property rights, by contrast, could not
be similarly unbundled. The Court concluded that the Fourteenth
Amendment protected the right to acquire, use, and dispose of real
property.310 While African-Americans did not have a common law
right to sit with whites on trains, they did have a right to purchase
and occupy property.
311
The Court also distinguished Berea College. That case, noted
the Court, dealt with the power of the state to amend or repeal its
corporations' charters. The question of the scope of the police power
regarding segregation "was neither discussed nor decided."31
2
To bolster its attempt to distinguish Plessy and Berea College,
the Court quoted "apposite" language from Carey v. City of Atlanta.3
13
In Carey, the Georgia Supreme Court stated that all that was re-
quired of Homer Plessy was "to conform to reasonable rules in regard
to the separation of the races."314 Residential segregation ordinances,
by contrast, deny "the right to use, control, or dispose of... prop-
erty."3 15 Carey distinguished between the right of the state "to regu-
late a business or the like," as in Plessy and Berea College, and its
308. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
309. Justice Day was once again engaging in a bit of revisionist history. The Court's hold-
ing in Plessy did not rely upon the separate but equal doctrine. See supra note 139 and accom-
panying text.
310. See Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 74 ("Property is more than the mere thing which a person
owns. It is elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it. The
Constitution protects these essential attributes of property.").
311. The ultimate disposition of Buchanan shows the logic of Albion Tourg~e's much-
maligned strategic decision to argue in his Plessy brief that the Louisiana separate coach law
deprived Homer Plessy of a property interest in his reputation as a white man. See supra notes
118-19 and accompanying text.
312. Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 79.
313. 84 S.E. 456 (Ga. 1916).
314. Id. at 459.
315. Id.
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lack of power "to destroy the right of the individual to acquire, enjoy,
and dispose of his property."
316
Carey's distinction between the permissible regulation of busi-
nesses and of private property owners does not sound persuasive to
modern ears, but as a historical matter, it had some force. Railroads,
the subject of the Plessy case, were the most unpopular and most
regulated industry in late nineteenth century America and were often
treated as quasi-public utilities. To many whites of that era, it would
have been considered terribly chutzpahdik317 for the railroads to
flaunt their disregard for (white) public opinion and permit integra-
tion. In fact, state legislatures often passed Jim Crow railroad legis-
lation as part of a broader package of railroad regulations.318
Moreover, during the Progressive era, when fear that corporations
would destroy traditional American values was commonplace, distin-
guishing between individual freeholders and corporations seemed to
make some sense.3 9 One needs only recall, for example, that one
commentator praised the Berea College Court for reining in "corporate
aggression."320
Despite the Buchanan Court's rather Talmudic attempt to
distinguish Plessy based on the nature of the rights involved in each
case, Justice Day did not base his opinion solely on the primacy of
individual property rights. As the Court acknowledged, even property
rights were subject to the police power.32' Plessy seemed to hold that
any arguably reasonable segregation law would come within the
police power. Buchanan, by contrast, explicitly rejected all of the
police power rationales that Kentucky argued supported state-
enforced segregation.
First, the Court dismissed the argument that existing "race
hostility" was an appropriate rationale for narrowing the scope of
citizens' constitutional rights.322 The Court also rejected the argument
that the segregation law came within the police power because it
316. Id. at 460.
317. Yiddish for "extremely brazen and nervy." FRED KOGAS, A DICTIONARY OF YIDDISH
SLANGS & IDIOMS 28 (1967).
318. See LOFGREN, supra note 113, at 27-29.
319. Justice Brewer, in fact, believed this distinction to be of crucial importance, which
perhaps explains his opinion in Berea College. See Hylton, supra note 136, at 335.
320. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
321. Indeed, after Carey, the Georgia Supreme Court held that segregation laws were
constitutional as reasonable exercises of the police power because they would prevent race
friction, disorder, and violence. See Harden v. City of Atlanta, 93 S.E. 401, 402-03 (Ga. 1917)
(upholding a segregation ordinance prohibiting "colored persons" from residing in predomi-
nantly white neighborhoods), overruled by Glover v. Atlanta, 96 S.E. 562 (Ga. 1918).
322. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 80-81 (1917).
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would promote the public peace by preventing race conflict. While the
Court acknowledged that this was a desirable goal, it could not be
accomplished "by laws or ordinances which deny rights created or
protected by the Federal Constitution."3 2 3
The Court found also that a segregation law could not be justi-
fied as promoting the "maintenance of the purity of the races."24 The
Court noted that the law did not directly prohibit the "amalgamation
of the races."325 The law did not even prohibit African-Americans from
working in white households. Rather, the right at issue, according to
the Court, was "the civil right of a white man to dispose of his prop-
erty if he saw fit to do so to a person of color and of a colored person to
make such disposition to a white person."126
Finally, the Court spurned the claim that the law was neces-
sary to prevent the depreciation in the value of property owned by
white people when African-Americans became their neighbors.327 The
Court noted that property owned by undesirable white people or used
in legal but offensive ways could similarly depreciate property. The
Court implied that African-Americans had to be treated as rights-
bearing individuals and not as members of a subordinate class.328
The Court concluded that the Louisville law "was not a legiti-
mate exercise of the police power of the State" and directly violated
the "fundamental law" of the Fourteenth Amendment "preventing
state interference with property rights except by due process of
law."329
Interestingly enough, Justice Day failed to cite Lochner in his
opinion. Moderate traditional jurists such as Day had recently won a
victory in Bunting v. Oregon, which upheld a maximum hours statute
and seemed to repudiate Lochner.330 Day apparently chose to protect
that victory by ignoring Lochner. He did, on the other hand, cite
Justice Brown's majority opinion in Holden v. Hardy.331 As discussed
previously, Holden rejected the more consistent and extreme version
of laissez-faire jurisprudence advocated by Justices Brewer and
323. Id.; see 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 814 (noting that this part of Buchanan
was "a flat repudiation of the vague and flaccid Plessy standard of reasonableness as the govern-
ing constitutional sanction for legalized racism").
324. Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 81.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. See id. at 82.
328. The Court thus picked up a theme from McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe
Railway, 235 U.S. 151, 161-66 (1914).
329. Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 82.
330. See Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
331. See 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
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Peckham, but also stated that class legislation was unconstitu-
tional.3 2 Since Brown also wrote Plessy, by citing Holden, Day was
apparently making it clear that his opinion in Buchanan was not
intended to challenge the legitimacy of Plessy's holding that segrega-
tion laws do not inherently constitute class legislation.
33
Justice Holmes drafted a dissent in Buchanan that he ulti-
mately chose not to deliver.33 4 Holmes was a leading light of socio-
logical jurisprudence and had been a campaigner for a broad concep-
tion of the police power since his dissent in Lochner. He had also
never been sympathetic to African-Americans' claims against hostile
state action.
335
Holmes had once declared that the police power "may be put
forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing
morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and imme-
,diately necessary to the public welfare."3 6 As Kentucky's briefs
pointed out, both the "prevailing morality" and the "predominant
opinion," among both intellectuals and average Americans, was that
forced segregation was socially beneficial and perhaps necessary.
37
Not surprisingly, Holmes's draft dissent asserted that the segregation
statute did not take property without due process of law because the
law was completely within the police power.
338
The most likely reason Holmes did not deliver his dissent is
that he could not get a second vote.339 The two most promising candi-
dates to join his dissent were Wilson appointees Louis Brandeis and
James McReynolds. Brandeis was a Progressive skeptic of substan-
tive due process and a leading advocate of sociological jurisprudence,
but he was also a liberal Jew from Louisville, 340 who apparently could
not countenance the establishment of de jure segregation in his home
332. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
333. See Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 74, 79. An opinion adopting the stronger laissez-faire view
of Lochner would have been more of a potential challenge to Plessy. I thank Richard Friedman
for raising this aspect of the opinion with me.
334. See 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 592.
335. See Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1642-44 (positing that Holmes's racial views exerted
some influence on his decisions).
336. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911) (Holmes, J.).
337. See supra notes 257-64 and accompanying text.
338. See 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 4, folio (providing a copy of Holmes's undelivered
dissent in Buchanan). Holmes also questioned whether the Court had jurisdiction to hear the
case, given that it was obviously a set-up test case, and there was really therefore no case or
controversy between the putative parties. See id. (referring to Buchanan as a "manufactured
case").
339. See 9 BICKEL& SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 805 n.255.
340. See PHILLIPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 6-10 (1984)
(discussing Brandeis's childhood, societal, and religious influences).
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city, even as an experiment in one of the "laboratories of democ-
racy."341 McReynolds was a virulent racist,342 but also an exponent of
property rights and skeptic of government power.U3 Despite his
racism, he was unlikely to join a Holmesian tribute to a broad police
power.344
E. The Reaction to Buchanan
Civil rights advocates were overjoyed with the result in
Buchanan. Moorfield Storey wrote to Nation editor and NAACP co-
founder Oswald Garrison Villard that Buchanan was " 'the most im-
portant decision that has been made since the Dred Scott case, and
happily this time it is the right way.' "345 Buchanan also received an
enthusiastic reception in the African-American media 346 and in jour-
nals sympathetic to civil rights, such as the New Republic347 and the
Nation.348
Law review commentators, by contrast, were generally dis-
pleased with the Court's decision in Buchanan. As discussed previ-
ously, pre-Buchanan law review commentators unanimously believed
that residential segregation laws were constitutional.349 The Court's
contrary ruling in Buchanan did little to influence prevailing
sentiment.
A note in the Columbia Law Review approved of the Court's
ruling,350 but all other law review commentary was hostile to the deci-
sion. For example, a student comment in the Yale Law Journal at-
tacked the Court for implicitly holding that property rights were more
341. The allusion is to New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
342. See Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1641.
343. See JAMES E. BOND, I DISSENT: THE LEGACY OF CHIEF JUSTICE JAMES CLARK
MCREYNOLDS 1 (1992).
344. McReynolds did not always vote with his prejudices. For example, as Barry Cushman
has pointed out, despite his virulent anti-Semitism, McReynolds voted in 1939 to overturn a
mail fraud conviction of several defendants with obviously Jewish surnames. See Weiss v.
United States, 308 U.S. 321, 331 (1939); see also Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four
Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV. 559, 573 (1997) (arguing that the Four Horsemen "actually supported
liberal case outcomes" despite their conservative stance in "celebrated cases").
345. HIXSON, supra note 237, at 142.
346. See 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 801-02.
347. See William H. Baldwin, Jr., Unconstitutional Segregation, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 19,
1918, at 345.
348. See A Momentus Decision, 15 THE NATION 526 (1917).
349. See supra notes 195-219 and accompanying text.
350. See Note, Constitutionality of Race Segregation, 18 COLuM. L. REV. 147 (1918).
856 [Vol. 51:797
BUCHANAN IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
important than the public's interest in segregation.351 The student,
obviously influenced by Progressivism and sociological jurisprudence,
argued that "[r]ights, etc., cannot be immutable or absolute. They are
creations of society, exist only where and while society exist, and
change with society's changing complexion."352 In a similar vein, a
Michigan law student complained that the Supreme Court declared
the Louisville ordinance to be unconstitutional despite "all this direct
and emphatic expression of opinion that the ordinance was reasonably
necessary and conducive to public welfare."
53
A Harvard Law School student wrote a case note on Buchanan
that was more sympathetic to the case's result than was the Yale
writer's, but not to the Court's reasoning and especially not to its pro-
tection of property rights.35 The author began by acknowledging that
overturning a segregation law was probably a desirable political re-
sult. However, like the Yale student, the Harvard writer proceeded to
criticize the Court for failing to consider the relevant social science
evidence regarding the desirability of segregation. The student de-
cried a "rule or system which permits of the entertaining and deter-
mination of legal and political questions of the most profound impor-
tance to the entire country, upon such a casual, oblique and unscien-
tific presentation of the real interests involved."355 The Court, the
author reasoned, should not have rested its decision on formalistic
rights-based reasoning but should have come to its decision only
351. See Comment, Unconstitutionality of Segregation Ordinances, 27 YALE L.J. 393, 397
(1918). The student argued that:
Where a segregation ordinance is drawn... and where public policy justifies its
passage, analogy would seem to show that no undue strain on the police power is
required to sustain such restriction of rights, privileges, and powers as is occasioned by
the ordinance .... None the less the decision in the principal case is, unfortunately,
conclusive that for the time being the interests of the public in race segregation are in
law outweighed by those of landowners whose power of alienation segregation would
restrict ....
Id.
352. Id. at 396 n.20.
353. Note, Constitutionality of Segregation Ordinances, 16 MICH. L. REV. 109, 111 (1917).
The student added:
When both the legislative and judicial departments of four states have explicitly de-
clared it reasonable, one can not pretend that it is "arbitrary" or "palpably and unmis-
takably in excesss of any reasonable exercise of authority," or even that it is "clearly"
unreasonable. In declaring the ordinance void without such obvious unreasonableness,
the court has exceeded the limits of its privilege as fixed by judicial declaration ever
since the right of review has been exercised.
Id.
354. See Note, Race Segregation Ordinance Invalid, 31 HARV. L. REV. 475, 476 (1917)
(referring to the decision as the "desirable result" but one not reached by "sound canons of
judicial review").
355. Id. at 477 (emphasis added).
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"after careful consideration of the facts, as to the effect of propinquity
and intermingling of the races."356
Ten years after the Court decided Buchanan, at least one law
review author still could not accept the Court's disregard for what
appeared to him to be the obvious public interest in residential segre-
gation:
Commingling of the homes and places of abode of white men and black men
gives unnecessary provocation for miscegenation, race riots, lynchings, and
other forms of social malaise, existent when a child-like, undisciplined, inferior
race is living in close contact with a people of more mature civilization.
357
Several years later, an article in the Michigan Law Review criticized
Buchanan because "there should have been some conscious appraisal
of the social desirability of segregation by legal device."a5 Given the
consensus in the law reviews that residential segregation ordinances
were constitutional, the rise of sociological jurisprudence, and the
racial climate of the time, one can dismiss the views of those who
argue that Buchanan was a pedestrian decision, involving a law so
blatantly unconstitutional that the result was almost inevitable3
59
VI. THE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF BUCHANAN
While Buchanan represented a great moral victory for African-
Americans, the practical effect of the decision on the rights of African-
Americans has never been fully explored. It is well known that
Buchanan caused the end of explicit de jure residential segregation 30
356. Id. at 479.
357. George D. Hott, Constitutionality of Municipal Zoning and Segregation Ordinances, 33
W. VA. L.Q. 332, 348-49 (1927).
358. Arthur T. Martin, Segregation of Residences by Negroes, 32 MIcH. L. REv. 721, 731
(1934).
359. See 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 744 (explaining that this is one way to look
at the case); DONALD W. JACKSON, EVEN THE CHILDREN OF STRANGERS: EQUALITY UNDER THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION 74 (1992) (describing the decision in Buchanan as the result of a law "so
blatantly discriminatory and so clearly antithetical to the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment that sometimes even the most reluctant Justices... could see the contradictions");
Klarman, supra note 14, at 898 (arguing that, along with other cases of the era, the racial
practices at issue in Buchanan "were so obviously unconstitutional" that "even a Court
relatively unsympathetic toward racial equality might feel bound to invalidate them").
360. Relying on Buchanan, the NAACP persuaded the Supreme Court to invalidate segre-
gation ordinances in New Orleans, see Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S 668 (1927), and Richmond, see
City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930). Local branches of the NAACP successfully
challenged laws passed in Indianapolis, Norfolk, and Dallas. See VOSE, supra note 6, at 51-52
(discussing various successful challenges of segregation ordinances brought by the NAACP). By
the 1930s, laws mandating residential segregation were rare. See id. at 52.
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but had little effect on housing segregation. After Buchanan, most
whites continued to flee from their neighborhoods when a significant
number of African-Americans moved in. Buchanan did not and could
not affect the strong preference for segregation among whites.361
Nevertheless, Buchanan was an important decision. First,
Buchanan limited the ability of whites to prevent African-Americans
from moving into white neighborhoods, and discouraged whites from
denying public services to African-American neighborhoods. Second,
though it was not used to its full potential, Buchanan almost certainly
prevented governments from passing far harsher segregation laws
than Buchanan itself involved. Buchanan also prevented residential
segregation laws from being the leading edge of broader anti-negro
measures. Finally, the NAACP's victory in Buchanan helped assure
the future of that crucial organization, and also represented an ex-
tremely positive turning point in the Supreme Court's reaction to
discriminatory legislation.
A. Effects on Housing Opportunities for African-Americans
The fact that Buchanan did not affect housing segregation does
not mean that the opinion lacked economic significance. Rather, the
opinion forced racist whites to pay some of the costs of their discrimi-
natory attitudes rather than imposing them on African-Americans
and helped assure that African-American urban neighborhoods re-
ceived appropriate public services.
During the 1910s, substantial numbers of southern African-
Americans moved from rural areas to cities. As the African-American
population of cities increased, African-American migrants moved into
older white neighborhoods.3 62 When whites panicked at the prospect
of having African-American neighbors and sold to incoming African-
Americans at fire-sale rates, African-Americans benefited from white
Despite the general demise of residential segregation ordinances, a state court invalidated a
Winston-Salem ordinance as late as 1940. See Gardner Major, Race Segregation in Cities, 29
Ky. L.J. 213, 213 (1941). Oklahoma City passed a residential segregation law in 1935. This law
survived a court challenge because the complaint was flawed. See Jones v. Oklahoma City, 78
F.2d 860, 861 (10th Cir. 1935).
361. Nor could any other court policy reasonably attainable in the 1910s, such as a ban on
the enforcement of restrictive covenants. Even future Nobel Prize winning economist Gunnar
Myrdal did not understand this dynamic. Myrdal incorrectly believed that if the Supreme Court
declared restrictive covenants illegal, "segregation in the North would be nearly doomed, and
segregation in the South would be set back slightly." GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA
624 (1944).
362. See William A. Fischel, Why Judicial Reversal of Apartheid Made a Difference, 51
VAND. L. REV. 977, 981-84 (1998).
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racism by acquiring inexpensive property. Whites, by contrast, payed
for their discriminatory attitudes in lost property values.363 Thus, a
primary motive behind residential segregation laws was to prevent
African-Americans from buying into white neighborhoods at low
prices .3
64
While the absence of artificial barriers to African-American
housing compelled whites to pay the price for their racism, segrega-
tion laws raised the price of housing for African-Americans above
normal market levels. When African-Americans could not move into
older white neighborhoods, the supply of housing for African-
Americans was restricted, at the same time demand was increasing
with the arrival of migrants. The combination of restricted supply
and increased demand forced African-Americans to pay above-market
rates for housing, at least in the short term.365  In other words,
segregation laws shifted the economic cost of white racism from
whites to African-Americans.
Moreover, the presence of segregation laws allowed politicians
to discriminate in the provision of public services with impunity.
African-American areas were typically denied sewers, parks, road
paving, and other public services routinely provided to white areas.3 6
In the absence of segregation laws, however, if African-American
neighborhoods were continually denied necessary public investments,
their residents would be inclined to try to move to white neighbor-
hoods. But for segregation laws, therefore, self-interested whites
concerned about their property values would be inclined to support
363. In fact, one of the plaintiff's briefs in Buchanan made this argument, albeit obliquely:
As a rule the negro does not move into a neighborhood where only white people reside.
He establishes his residence on a block where one or more negroes live, and in this way
the less desirable white blocks gradually become occupied by negroes. For a certain pe-
riod the property in such a block becomes less valuable, but when entirely converted into
a negro block it becomes more valuable than before.
Storey Plaintiff Brief, supra note 245, at 41.
364. See Wright, supra note 220, at 42. W.D. Binford, the leading proponent of the
Louisville segregation law, claimed that some African-Americans even moved into white neigh-
borhoods to extort money from their neighbors to leave. See id. at 42. Kentucky's initial
Buchanan Supreme Court brief discussed in some detail the bargains that Louisville African-
Americans received because of white prejudice. Several white residents and real estate experts
had testified in the trial court that whites had sold their homes for about half their prior market
value after African-Americans moved into the neighborhood. See Kentucky Brief, supra note
255, at 85-90.
365. In the longer run, real estate developers would probably create new housing for
African-Americans, helping to stabilize prices.
366. See William Pickens, The Ultimate Effects of Discrimination and Segregation, in A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 5, at 78, 81.
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more equitable public spending for African-American neighbor-
hoods. 36
7
With all this in mind, one should not judge the success of
Buchanan in aiding African-Americans solely by whether segregation
decreased, but also by whether white neighborhoods were opened up
to African-American residency, even if the neighborhoods went from
all-white to all-black. By this standard, Buchanan was a qualified
success, as it immediately opened certain white neighborhoods to
African-Americans in Louisville, Richmond, and other cities where
African-Americans had been shut out by segregation laws.368 The
Virginia Municipal Review complained that because Richmond could
not regulate its housing market, there was "a gradual and natural
encroachment of the colored population into white neighborhoods."
369
Richmond, according to the Review, was "face to face with a problem
of increasing significance whose solution deserves the thought and
discussion of leaders of both races."370 The author of a study of
African-American housing in urban Virginia lamented the inability of
state and local governments to use zoning to separate black and white
residential areas 1.37  He stated that this led to an increase in "friction
between the white race and the black" and exacerbated the deplorable
housing conditions in certain areas.
372
While Buchanan opened up white neighborhoods to African-
Americans in the short run, the longer term effects of the ruling are
less clear. Whites eventually learned to use barriers other than ex-
plicit racial zoning to keep African-Americans out of their neighbor-
hoods. Two of the most prominent tactics were facially-neutral zoning
laws and restrictive covenants.
367. A more subtle factor was also at play. If certain areas could be designated as "whites-
only" by law, whites could be assured that any public investments in those areas would accrue
only to them and not to African-Americans. If African-Americans could move into white neigh-
borhoods, however, the investments made in those neighborhoods when whites inhabited them
might eventually benefit African-Americans, lessening the incentive to discriminate in the
provision of public services. Cf. id.
368. See Wright, supra note 220, at 52.
369. VA. MUN. REv., Nov. 1925, at 253.
370. Id. Ultimately, Richmond attempted to solve this "problem" by enacting a new resi-
dential segregation ordinance it hoped would pass constitutional muster. It did not. See City of
Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930) (affirming the Fourth Circuit's finding that Richmond's
racial segregation ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
371. See CHARLES L. KNIGHT, NEGRO HOUSING IN CERTAIN VIRGINIA CITIES 49 (1927).
372. See id. at 50. Knight concluded that "[tihe only feasible solution to this problem is to
provide new residential areas for Negroes in suitable locations." Id.
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1. Facially-Neutral Zoning Laws
Municipal authorities, especially in the South, turned to fa-
cially-neutral zoning laws to restrict African-American residence.373
Racial zoning continued to operate in practice and "was reinforced by
a planning process that accepted the primacy of establishing a ra-
cially-bifurcated society." 74
Progressive city planners were particularly ardent proponents
of racial zoning.375 For example, Robert Whitten, one of the leading
city planners of his day, designed a 1922 Atlanta scheme that desig-
nated the unofficial white districts R1, the unofficial black districts
R2, and the unofficial mixed districts R3.376 In defense of his plan,
Whitten stated that "race zoning is essential in the interest of the
public peace, order and security and will promote the welfare and
prosperity of both the white and colored race."377 The state supreme
court, however, declared the Atlanta scheme unconstitutional. 378
Despite this decision, racial zoning "still prevailed, either in
other attempts to pass laws or, more often, in the sense that city offi-
cials remained cognizant of what sections had been designated as
appropriate for black use."379 In many cities, the awareness of racial
boundaries informed road placement, as planners attempted to cut off
African-American areas from white areas.380
Birmingham and Charleston are just two examples of cities
that unofficially zoned by race after Buchanan. In 1926, Birmingham
passed a zoning ordinance which reinforced segregated residential
patterns,381 and racial zones dictated Birmingham's residential devel-
opment patterns from 1926 to 1949.382 Birmingham actually bought
and demolished several black-owned houses to create a buffer zone
373. See MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, THE POLITICS OF ExCLUSION 13-14 (1976); Norman
Karlin, Back to the Future: From Nollan to Lochner, 17 Sw. U. L. REV. 627, 636 (1988); Silver,
supra note 12, at 196; Norman Williams, Jr., Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 317, 336 (1955).
374. Silver, supra note 12, at 196.
375. See id.
376. See ATLANTA CITY PLANNING COMMISSION, THE ATLANTA ZONE PLAN: REPORT
OUTLINING A TENTATIVE ZONE PLAN FOR ATLANTA 10 (1922).
377. Id.
378. See Smith v. City of Atlanta, 132 S.E. 66, 70 (Ga. 1926).
379. Ronald H. Bayor, Roads to Racial Segregation, J. URBAN HIST. 3, 5 (1988).
380. See id.
381. See Harris, supra note 2, at 571 n.10.
382. See Silver, supra note 12, at 197.
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between the white and black sections.383 Implicit racial zoning,
meanwhile, was "integral" to Charleston's comprehensive city plan.384
Discriminatory zoning practices spread to the North as well.
Municipalities commonly engaged in the tactic of passing very strict,
expensive zoning laws, but only enforcing them against blacks, while
giving whites variances. 3 5 Another tactic was to zone for industrial
use only land that African-Americans seemed likely to use for resi-
dences. One town in Michigan prohibited building on parcels of less
than twenty acres after African-Americans bought land there.3 6 Such
uses of zoning laws were not seriously challenged until well into the
modem civil rights era. Charles Abrams found in 1955 that "[als long
as the officials do not openly give the reason for their [discriminatory]
action, recourse to the courts is often futile."38 7
Initially, some courts invalidated residential zoning on consti-
tutional grounds. In Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, a federal
district court relied on Buchanan in declaring residential zoning to be
unconstitutional. 388 The court noted that while Kentucky defended
the Buchanan ordinance as necessary for the preservation of the
public peace and the protection of local property values, no such cru-
cial interests were asserted in Euclid.389 The result of Buchanan
therefore, according to the court, mandated that the Euclid ordinance
be invalidated. 390
The court added that the result of the Buchanan case pre-
vented racial zoning from spreading "from city to city throughout the
breadth of the land."3 91 The court prophetically predicted that if
courts upheld residential zoning, municipalities would eventually
"classify the population and segregate them according to their income
or situation in life."392
383. See id.
384. See id. at 198.
385. See CHARLES ABRAMs, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS: A STUDY OF PREJUDICE IN HouSING
210 (1955).
386. See id. at 211.
387. Id. at 210.
388. See 297 F. 307, 312-13 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev'd, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
389. See id.
390. See id.; cf Comment, supra note 351, at 396 (arguing that the Court's reasoning in
Buchanan would necessarily lead it to question zoning more generally).
391. Euclid, 297 F. at 313.
392. Id. at 316; cf. Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513, 516 (Tex. 1921) (expressing the
fear that if residential zoning triumphed, a poor man who owned a lot in a wealthy neighbor-
hood would be told "that he could not erect an humble home upon it suited to his means").
Leading planner Robert Whitten admitted that "zoning tended inevitably toward the segre-
gation of the different economic classes," but he argued that this was a favorable effect of
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None of this persuaded the Supreme Court. The Court re-
versed the district court in a 6-3 opinion written by Justice
Sutherland. 393 Sutherland wrote that "[i]f the validity of the legisla-
tive classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legisla-
tive judgment must be allowed to control."314 Once the Supreme Court
gave this green light to residential zoning, zoning was easily used for
nefarious purposes, including implicit racial zoning.3 95 How much
effect implicit racial zoning had on African-American residential
patterns is a subject that deserves further study.
2. Restrictive Covenants
Another important mechanism whites used to impede African-
Americans from buying property in white neighborhoods was the
racially restrictive covenant. In 1926, the Supreme Court, in dicta,
unanimously stated that judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 396 This opinion has been
widely and unfairly397 criticized and has received far more attention
zoning. Robert H. Whitten, Zoning and Living Conditions, in NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CITY
PLANNING, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CITY PLANNING 22, 27 (1924).
393. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 379-87 (1926).
394. Id. at 388.
395. Several commentators noted the inconsistency between Euclid and Buchanan and
hoped that the logic of the Court's decision in Euclid would eventually lead to a reversal of
Buchanan. See Hott, supra note 357, at 349 ("If a municipality can prevent the establishment of
a 'Piggly-Wiggly' store in a residential section, without violating any of the constitutional pro-
hibitions, it should follow that an ordinance, excluding negroes from a 'white' zone and vice
versa, should, in the absence of infringement of existing property rights, be constitutional.");
F.D.G. Ribble, The Due Process Clause as a Limitation on Municipal Discretion in Zoning
Legislation, 16 VA. L. REV. 689, 699 (1930) (noting the inconsistency between the result of
Buchanan and the results of other zoning cases); Note, Race Segregation in Cities, 29 KY. L.J.
213, 218-19 (1941) (arguing that segregation ordinances should be upheld just like other zoning
ordinances that serve the public good).
396. See Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330-31 (1926) (stating that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not "in any manner prohibit or invalidate contracts entered into by private
individuals in respect to the control and disposition of their own property").
397. The appellant in Corrigan argued that judicial enforcement of a restrictive covenant
was state action that violated the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 328-29. The Court, in
dicta, rejected this argument. See id. at 330. But even if judicial enforcement of a restrictive
covenant were state action, it is not at all clear why this would violate the Equal Protection
Clause, so long as the restrictive covenants were enforceable against any group, and so long as
the judiciary did not selectively enforce them.
In my view, the Supreme Court could have properly invalidated racially restrictive
covenants on the ground that courts clearly treated restrictive covenants far more leniently
then other restraints on alienation. The Louisiana Supreme Court, for example, upheld a racial
restrictive covenant on the grounds that partial restraints on alienation are valid. See
Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 67 So. 641, 643 (La. 1915), overruled by Johnson v.
Campagna, 200 So. 2d 150 (La. Ct. App. 1967). The court failed, however, to mention that the
population of the county in which the property was located was 45% African-American, making
the restrictive covenant a severe restriction on alienation. See Martin, supra note 358, at 736.
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among legal scholars than has zoning as a cause of restrictions on
housing for African-Americans.3 98
Despite the disproportionate attention paid to restrictive
covenants relative to zoning laws, the comparative effectiveness of
restrictive covenants is open to debate. First, courts in several states
refused to enforce racial restrictive covenants because they were
unreasonable restraints on alienation.399  Second, restrictive
covenants needed to cover just about every property in A neighborhood
to be effective. While real estate developers were able to write restric-
tive covenants into the deeds of houses in new developments, in exist-
ing neighborhoods local activists had to persuade the existing resi-
Generally, the greater the restraint on alienation, i.e., the greater the percentage of African-
Americans in the local population, the less willing courts were to void restrictive covenants as
restraints on alienation. Compare Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Gary, 186 P. 596, 597 (Cal. 1919)
(refusing, in a jurisidiction with a relatively small black population, to enforce a restrictive
covenant because the covenants were restraints on alienation); Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v.
Garrott, 183 P. 470, 473-75 (Cal. Ct. App. 1929) (same); Porter v. Barrett, 206 N.W. 532, 536
(Mich. 1925) (same); Williams v. Commercial Land Co., 34 Ohio L. Rep. 559, 561-63 (1931)
(same); White v. White, 150 S.E. 531, 532-39 (W. Va. 1929) (same), with Cornish v. O'Donoghue,
30 F.2d 983, 984 (App. D.C. 1929) (same); Queensborough Land Co., 67 So. at 643 (same); Torrey
v. Wolfes, 6 F.2d 702, (App. D.C. 1925) (enforcing, in a jurisdiction with a relatively large
minority population, restrictive covenants). But see Koehler v. Rowland, 205 S.W. 217, 220-22
(Mo. 1918) (refusing, in a state with a relatively small black population, to enforce restrictive
covenants). See generally Martin, supra note 358, at 738-39 (discussing the significance of the
size of the excluded group upon the assessment of the degree of restraint caused by provisions
restricting alienation). The argument presented here does not seem to have been made to the
Supreme Court.
398. See, e.g., 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 817; A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, SHADES
OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 125 (1996)
("One could argue that the Buchanan case was of minimal importance because white owners
were still able to implement racist policies through restrictive covenants and other private
devices that precluded African Americans from moving into 'their areas.' "); RICHARD KLUGER,
SIMPLE JUSTICE 149 (1975) ("Voters who had been barred by the Court from passing laws to
ghettoize Negroes could achieve the same effect by drawing up private agreements with the
assurance that these would be upheld and enforced by the law of the land."); MASSEY & DENTON,
supra note 3, at 188 (arguing that restrictive covenants replaced explicit racial zoning as a
means of segregation); DONALD G. NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP: AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, 1776 TO PRESENT 129 (1991) ("[T]he victory [in Buchanan] was pyrrhic.
Buchanan broke the back of efforts to legislate residential segregation, but it said nothing about
the use of restrictive covenants, which were becoming an increasingly popular means of main-
taining segregated housing, especially in Northern cities."); JOHN E. SEMONCHE, CHARTING THE
FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS TO A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1890-1920, at 348 (1978)
("Unfortunately, [Buchanan] did not appreciably diminish segregated neighborhoods; the
private restrictive covenant that was made part of the deed would fill in the gap left by the
decision and survive for another generation."); WILLIAM FINDLEY SWINDLER, COURT &
CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE OLD LEGALITY 1889-1932, at 293 (1969)
(blaming restrictive covenants for creating segregation).
It is interesting to note that Swindler's book, which blames laissez-faire ideology for
virtually every societal ill, never mentions Buchanan, even in an appendix summarizing
important cases from 1889-1932 in chronological order.
399. See, e.g., Los Angeles Inv. Co., 186 P. at 597-98; Garrott, 183 P. at 471-75; Porter, 206
N.W. at 533-36; Williams, 34 Ohio L. Rep. at 561-63; White, 150 S.E. at 538.
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dents to sign such covenants. Because a certain percentage of resi-
dents of any given neighborhood at any given time planned to move in
the near future, and assumedly wanted as large a potential market
for their residence as possible, this could not have been an easy task.
Once a neighborhood was covered by restrictive covenants,
moreover, they were not self-enforcing. Rather, if an African-
American tried to move into a neighborhood, local residents needed to
hire an attorney to enforce the covenant, presenting a severe collec-
tive action problem. 400 By the time residents could organize a lawsuit,
changed conditions may have rendered the covenant unenforceable.401
Moreover, real estate agents sometimes aided white sellers in finding
African-American buyers willing to buy a property subject to a restric-
tive covenant.4 2 Restrictive covenants certainly played some role in
keeping African-Americans out of white neighborhoods, but perhaps
not as large a role as is commonly assumed. Surely, the Supreme
Court's decision in Shelley v. Kraemer barring judicial enforcement of
racial restrictive covenants did not create an open housing market for
African-Americans.
40 3
Indeed, even if zoning and restrictive covenants had been out-
lawed by the courts, the housing market would still not have been
completely open to African-Americans. Two of the most important
factors in closing residential housing markets to African-Americans,
local violence and discriminatory federal housing policies, were essen-
tially beyond the reach of federal courts until the 1960s. 40 4
400. See VOSE, supra note 6, at 56-59. In an effort to overcome the collective action
problem, Dallas, Texas, passed an ordinance making the violation of a restrictive covenant
agreement a crime. A state court of appeals held that the ordinance was unconstitutional. See
City of Dallas v. Liberty Annex Corp., 19 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
401. See VOSE, supra note 6, at 25 ("[Wlhere Negroes were free to purchase and occupy
homes in a restricted district and did so in such large numbers that the party seeking enforce-
ment of the covenant was already living under the very conditions it was designed to prevent,
no remedy was granted.").
402. See KNIGHT, supra note 371, at 36.
403. 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that granting judicial enforcement of restrictive
covenants based on race violated the Equal Protection Clause); see also BELL, supra note 93, at
477 (describing how segregationist whites took advantage of the Shelley decisions to exclude
blacks); VOSE, supra note 6, at ix (1959) (describing the limited success of the NAACP in
eliminating the judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants in residential
neighborhoods); Joe T. Darden, Black Residential Segregation Since the 1948 Shelley v.
Kraemer Decision, J. BLACK STuD. 680, 688 (1995) (discussing the limited progress made by
African-Americans in reducing segregation in housing since the Shelley decision).
404. See KING, supra note 13, at 189-99 (discussing the impact of federal housing policies);
Klarman, supra note 14, at 945 (discussing the impact of violence).
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B. Effects on Other Segregation Laws
Several common segregation laws described by C. Vann
Woodward in The Strange Career of Jim Crow-such as laws
requiring nurses to attend to patients of their own race only, laws
requiring fraternal societies to be segregated, and even laws
prohibiting integration in unincorporated private schools-seem to
have been constitutionally vulnerable after Buchanan.405
Surprisingly, however, Buchanan was not used to invalidate
segregation laws outside the residential housing context.
1. The Failure to Use Buchanan to Invalidate Segregation
One reason that Buchanan was not used outside of the reside-
ntial housing context was the narrowness of its holding. Mere de jure
segregation that did not amount to "discrimination" and that did not
impinge on other constitutional rights continued to be licit under
Plessy, and any segregation ordinance that restricted corporations'
activities apparently passed constitutional muster under Buchanan.
On the other hand, Buchanan seemed to deny that there were
any valid police power justifications for segregation laws, so that any
segregation law that impinged on the Fourteenth Amendment rights
of individuals was unconstitutional. One wonders, for example, what
would have been the outcome of a post-Buchanan lawsuit by a white
person who claimed that a Jim Crow railroad law of the Plessy type
violated his associational rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
because he wanted to associate with African-Americans on trains.40 6
The problem with testing the scope of Buchanan was that the
NAACP, the only active national organization fighting to expand the
constitutional rights of African-Americans, had extremely limited
resources.4 7 Organizing challenges to discriminatory statutes re-
quired money and willing plaintiffs, both of which were in short sup-
ply.
405. See WOODWARD, supra note 7, at 97-102.
406. This is a particularly interesting question because in the 1920s the Supreme Court
implicitly recognized a constitutional right to freedom of association in at least some contexts, a
right perhaps not recognized when the Court decided Plessy. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (McReynolds, J.) (invalidating a law banning children from
attending private schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402-03 (1923) (McReynolds, J.)
(holding unconstitutional a law banning the teaching of foreign languages in school). One also
wonders what the result of a challenge to the Day Law would have been under Pierce if a white
student had argued that he had the right to associate with African-American students for
educational purposes.
407. See VOSE, supra note 6, at 51-52.
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Money was a particular problem for the NAACP in its early
years. The NAACP might not have had the resources to challenge
Buchanan if its attorney, Moorfield Storey, had not offered his serv-
ices for free.4°8  Even after the favorable Buchanan decision, the
NAACP had to expend substantial resources to defeat the residential
segregation ordinances that cities continued to enact despite
Buchanan. Forced to combat opponents who had tax money at their
disposal, the NAACP had little money left to finance challenges to
segregation ordinances outside the residential context.40 9
Finding willing plaintiffs was also a challenge. Not long before
Buchanan was decided, Booker T. Washington organized a challenge
to a Tennessee Pullman car segregation law. One might assume this
challenge would have been fought on Buchanan-like due process
grounds, as Plessy already established the constitutionality of such
laws under the Equal Protection Clause. The prospective plaintiff lost
his nerve, however, and the case never made it to trial.410
Other obstacles stood in the way of using Buchanan to full
effect. Few white Southern lawyers were willing to take cases on
behalf of African-Americans, 4"1 few of those were trained to do so, and
there were even fewer black lawyers in the South competent to handle
civil rights cases. 41 2 Even those white lawyers who were sympathetic
to civil rights would not, for both social and professional reasons,
wage a consistent battle for the protection of the rights of African-
Americans. 4 3 It was not until the early 1920s that the civil rights
movement began to train a coterie of competent full-time civil rights
attorneys. By the time they were established in the 1930s, the hey-
day of laissez-faire jurisprudence had ended, and challenges based on
equal protection grounds seemed more propitious for the future than
substantive due process challenges based on Buchanan.414
408. See id.
409. See id. at 52.
410. See Louis R. HARLAN, BOOKER T. WASHINGTON: THE WIZARD OF TUSKEGEE 1901-1915,
at 248 (1983).
411. See id. at 247.
412. See NELSON, supra note 191, at 163.
413. See id. at 162-63.
414. There may also have been psychological and political barriers to using Buchanan to its
full effect. Most NAACP activists were politically left-wing. At W.E.B. DuBois's insistence,
every issue of the NAACP's magazine, The Crisis, had the printers' union's label displayed upon
its cover, despite the fact that the printers' union did not accept black members. See 15 THE
CRISIS 216 (1918). By 1935, the NAACP had moved so far left that it refused to criticize New
Deal policies that granted monopoly power to racist unions for fear of hurting the labor move-
ment. See RAYMOND WOLTERS, NEGROES AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 306-09 (1970). Surely, it
would have been quite ideologically uncomfortable for such people to attempt to use the
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Given all these obstacles, the NAACP had the choice of expend-
ing a substantial percentage of its limited financial resources on fight-
ing certain types of segregation, with the most important type, public
school segregation, almost certainly off-limits as a practical matter;415
or on other priorities, such as its push for federal anti-lynching legis-
lation and for equal resources for African-American public schools.416
If Buchanan had come out the other way, the NAACP may have had
no choice but to fight a rearguard action against new segregation
legislation. But Buchanan set a constitutional outer limit on segrega-
tion legislation, which allowed the NAACP to concentrate on its other
priorities.
2. The Road Not Taken
While Buchanan could not be used to roll back such estab-
lished forms of segregation as separate public schools, it also repre-
sented a firm warning to the nation that the Supreme Court would
not allow the spread of segregation laws into new areas of civil soci-
ety. An amicus brief in Buchanan, filed by attorneys challenging St.
Louis's residential segregation ordinances, presented a chilling pre-
diction of what would have happened if the Court upheld Louisville's
segregation ordinance:
[Djiscriminating legislation, once countenanced, may go to the exclusion of the
negro altogether. The prejudice of race grows by what it feeds upon. Its
appetite is insatiable. "The disposition of the whites to retire from the vicinity
of negro residences" will change to a determination to force the negro from the
vicinity of white residence, for the white man will make the law and the negro
must bear the hardships they impose.
One entered upon segregation will not be simply local, but it will be
industrial as well. The colored man will be restricted in the field of his labor
as well as in the field of his residence. Property values may not be so much
imperilled here, but the integrity of race is as much threatened. If they may
not live in the same block, they should not toil at the same tasks. The logical
outcome of it all, would be the existence among us .of millions of people, in a
Lochnerian arguments adopted in Buchanan to fight further segregation laws when success
would encourage legal attacks on other types of Progressive legislation.
415. This was confirmed by the Supreme Court's opinion in Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78,
85-87 (1927) (finding that a United States citizen of Chinese ancestry was not denied equal
protection when assigned to a segregated public school).
416. See generally ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRuSADE AGAINST LYNCHING,




degraded and hateful relation, a condition which can be productive only of evil
to both races.
417
The briefs vision of forced uprooting of African-Americans who
live near whites, and of de jure occupational segregation, seems per-
haps unduly alarmist. But then one remembers the alarmism of
Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy. In his dissent, Justice Harlan
suggested various segregation laws that would logically henceforth
pass constitutional muster:
Why may [a state] not, upon like grounds, punish whites and blacks who ride
together in street cars or in open vehicles on a public road or street? Why may
it not require sheriffs to assign whites to one side of a court-room and blacks to
the other? And why may it not also prohibit the commingling of the two races
in the galleries of legislative halls or in public assemblages convened for the
considerations of the political questions of the day? Further, if this statute of
Louisiana is consistent with the personal liberty of citizens, why may not the
State require the separation in railroad coaches of native and naturalized citi-
zens of the United States, or of Protestants and Roman Catholics? 418
Harlan clearly believed he was exaggerating for effect, and noted that
the likely response to his question would be that such regulations
"would be unreasonable, and could not, therefore, stand before the
law."419 Yet, in fact, of the parade of horribles listed by Harlan,
segregation of streetcars, courthouses, and public seating in
legislative assemblies all became common throughout the South.
After Plessy, what was once almost unimaginable became routine.
Once the Supreme Court accepted a certain type of segregation
ordinance in Plessy, broader restrictive laws followed. If the Supreme
Court had acquiesced to residential segregation laws, the same
pattern would likely have occurred.420 This almost certainly explains
why, twenty years after Buchanan, with de jure segregation
entrenched in public education, transportation, and elsewhere,
W.E.B. Du Bois credited Buchanan with " 'the breaking of the
backbone of segregation.' "421 Indeed, Buchanan may have saved the
417. Brief of Wells H. Blodgett & Frederick W. Lehmann as Amici Curiae at 8-9, Buchanan
v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
418. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 538 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
419. Id.
420. On the other hand, it is possible that World War I, urbanization, and the rise of socio-
logical explanations for observed differences in ethnic group behavior would have led to an
improved political climate for African-Americans regardless of the result in Buchanan. I thank
Michael KIarman for raising this point.
421. 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 4. at 816 (quoting W.E.B. DuBOIS SPEAKS, SPEECHES
AND ADDRESSES 1890-1919, at 52 (P.S. Foner ed., 1970)).
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United States, or at least the South, from instituting South-African-
style apartheid.
422
Moreover, de jure segregation was not the only government
policy that could threaten African-American welfare. In 1913, Oswald
Garrison Villard of the NAACP, reacting to the spread of residential
segregation laws and the segregation that President Wilson was in-
troducing into the federal workforce,423 warned that segregation laws
were a first step in a broader attack on African-Americans. Villard
compared the advocates of segregation laws to the anti-Semitic Black
One Hundreds in Russia.424 He warned that just as the Russians had
started by segregating the Jews and then moved on to even more
vicious anti-Semitic measures, segregation laws would be a first step
in a series of anti-negro measures. Villard wondered "to what lengths
despotic officials will take their way by means of discrimination, in-
timidation, by aboveboard or underhand methods."425  As Leon
Higginbotham has argued, "Buchanan was of profound importance in
applying a brake to decelarate what would have been run-away ra-
cism in the United States."426
C. Effects on Civil Rights More Generally
Buchanan affected the history of American race relations be-
yond the narrow context of segregation. First, the decision was suffi-
cient, and perhaps necessary, to establish the NAACP as an impor-
tant player on the American scene. The extent to which other
Supreme Court cases, including Brown v. Board of Education,427 mobi-
lized African-Americans to press for their civil rights is subject to
dispute. One can, however, confidently assert that Buchanan mobi-
lized large numbers of African-Americans and perhaps guaranteed
422. Higginbotham, et al., supra note 192, at 770, argue that if Buchanan had come out the
other way, in many southern states and perhaps many other parts of America the living
conditions of black Americans could have been almost akin to that of black South Africans.
423. See VILLARD, supra note 181, at 8. For more on Wilson and segregation, see generally
Osborn, supra note 14 (observing that African-Americans stumbled in their quest for equal
recognition during Wilson's presidency); Weiss, supra note 14 (explaining why the Wilsonian
goals of broadened opportunities and social justice placed blacks on the "furthest fringe of that
[Progressive movement]").
424. See VILLARD, supra note 181, at 2.
425. Id. at 7.
426. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 398, at 126.
427. Compare Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement,
80 VA. L. REV. 7, 10-11 (1994) (arguing that Brown had little effect on the civil rights
movement), with David J. Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing of Brown
v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REv. 151, 151-60 (1994) (arguing that Brown was crucial to the
civil rights movement).
1998]
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the financial viability of the young, struggling NAACP. Before
Buchanan was decided in November 1917, the NAACP had only 9,866
members. A membership drive after Buchanan resulted in 35,888
new members by June 1918.428
Second, Buchanan, along with other Supreme Court decisions
on racial issues in the 1910s, 429 marked a turning point in Supreme
Court jurisprudence with regard to African-Americans. The Supreme
Court heard twenty-eight cases involving African-Americans and the
Fourteenth Amendment between 1868 and 1910. Of these, African-
Americans lost twenty-two. 430 However, between 1920 and 1943,
African-Americans won twenty-five of twenty-seven cases before the
Supreme Court.
431
VII. CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM BUCHANAN
I have argued elsewhere that because African-Americans had
disproportionately little political influence during the Lochner era,
they disproportionately suffered from the effects of government
regulation of the economy and disproportionately benefited from court
decisions that prevented governmental interference with the free
market.432  Thus, laissez-faire jurisprudence had positive effects on
428. See Wright, supra note 220, at 52. Klarman points out that some of this increase was
likely due to the impact of World War I. Nevertheless, he agrees that Buchanan played an
important role in increasing the membership of the NAACP. See Klarman, supra note 14, at
949-50.
For an argument that a litigation strategy can have far-reaching effects on the success of a
political movement well beyond the direct effects of any official legal change the movement
achieves, see MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQurTy REFORM AND THE POLITICS
OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 278-310 (1994).
429. See, e.g., McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry., 235 U.S. 151, 159-64 (1914)
(discussing the constitutionality of an Oklahoma law permitting carriers to provide segregated
rail cars); see also Klarman, supra note 14, at 919-32 (discussing other Supreme Court
decisions).
430. See NELSON, supra note 191, at 13-14.
431. See id. at 162-63.
432. See David E. Bernstein, The Law and Economics of Post-Civil War African-American
Interstate Migration, 76 TEX. L. REv. 781, 792-823 (discussing the effect of southern "emigrant
agent" laws on African-American migration after the Civil War); David E. Bernstein, The
Shameful, Wasteful History of New York's Prevailing Wage Law, 7 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J.
1, 8-13 (1997) (describing the devastating effects of prevailing wage laws on African-Americans);
David E. Bernstein, The Davis-Bacon Act: Vestige of Jim Crow, 13 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 276, 388-95
(1994) (chronicling the Davis-Bacon Act's discriminatory effects on black construction workers
from the Depression era to the post-World War II era); David E. Bernstein, Licensing Laws: A
Historical Example of the Use of Government Regulatory Power Against African-Americans, 31
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 89, 90-103 (1994) (discussing the negative impact of various facially neutral
licensing laws on blacks); David E. Bernstein, Roots of the "Underclass": The Decline of
Laissez-faire Jurisprudence and the Rise of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 85, 119-
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the welfare of African-Americans during the Lochner era. The history
of Buchanan lends further support to this conclusion and tends to
bely the received wisdom that economic Lochnerism represented a
victory for the privileged over the oppressed.
Buchanan should also lead legal scholars to reassess more
generally their view of the traditional jurisprudence of the Lochner
era. Traditional jurisprudes supported not only what is now called
economic liberty, but civil rights and civil liberties as well. Indeed,
they failed to distinguish among these categories. Buchanan itself
represented a victory not just for laissez-faire juriprudence, but also
for civil rights.
The trend toward protecting the constitutional rights of
African-Americans began under a post-Lochner traditionalist
Supreme Court in the 1910s. This was not a coincidence. 4 3 Lochner
signaled that traditionalists had adopted a theory of the Fourteenth
Amendment that construed liberty rights under that Amendment
rather broadly. And according to traditional theory, the very purpose
of the Constitution was to prevent temporary excitements from en-
croaching on American liberty,434 to allow Philip sober to control
Philip drunk.435  There is perhaps no better example of the
Constitution serving this prophylactic function than the Buchanan
decision. Enthusiasm for residential segregation laws quickly spread
through the United States. If the Supreme Court had held the law
was constitutional, the consequences would likely have been
devastating to African-Americans. Despite the widespread popular
and academic support for the segregation laws and the incredible
racism of the age, the Supreme Court chose to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment and invalidate the law.
There is also a clear connection between Lochner era tradition-
alism and Supreme Court protection of civil liberties. The Supreme
Court's vigorous protection of civil liberties began in the 1920s when
the Court supposedly reached its "conservative" zenith.436 Despite
35 (1993) [hereinafter Bernstein, Roots of the "Underclass'] (criticizing several New Deal labor
acts for contributing to the problem of persistent African-American unemployment); David E.
Bernstein, The Supreme Court and "Civil Rights," 1886-1908, 100 YALE L.J. 725, 742 (1990)
(collecting cases and concluding that the "neglect of... protection of economic liberty.., had
devastating consequences for disadvantaged individuals").
433. See supra Part II.A.
434. See COOLEY, supra note 37, at 54-55 (noting that "[t]he violence of public passion is
quite as likely to be in the direction of oppression as in any other").
435. See Brewer, supra note 41, at 428.




their reputation as reactionaries, all of the "Four Horsemen" contrib-
uted to the new civil liberties jurisprudence, sometimes in dissents
from majority opinions written or joined by "liberal" Justices Brandeis
and Holmes. 437  In a particularly impressive series of opinions
authored by Justice McReynolds in a four-year period, the Court
protected Catholics from the Ku Klux Klan revival of the 1920s, 438
Japanese from the anti-Asian hysteria of the 1920s, 439 and German-
Americans from the Nativism that arose during World War I and
continued into the 1920s.4° Sympathy for civil liberties from the likes
of McReynolds should not be surprising, as advocates of traditional
jurisprudence believed that courts had the duty to enforce constitu-
tional limitations on government power and were fierce opponents of
class legislation.441
Lochner era jurisprudence looks even better when one com-
pares it to the historical alternative. Most legal scholars write about
the Lochner era as if the choice at the time was between the tradi-
tional jurisprudence that ultimately dominated the era and a modern
liberal jurisprudence of the Earl Warren/William Brennan variety. In
fact, the Progressive intellectuals who advocated sociological juris-
prudence and despised traditional jurisprudence evinced little concern
for either individual rights or members of minority groups. Rather,
"Progressive intellectuals blamed excessive individualism" for the
problems of American society and objected to courts' use of the
Constitution to uphold individual rights.4
42
Progressive support for residential segregation laws is only one
example of the Progressives' contempt for civil rights and civil liber-
ties.443 Justice Holmes, the great representative of sociological juris-
437. See id. (collecting civil liberties opinions authored by the "Four Horsemen"); Cushman,
supra note 344, at 585 nn.9-12 (noting that two generations of scholars have viewed the Justices
as "far right, reactionary, staunchly conservative apostles" of laissez-faire policies).
438. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (McReyolds, J.) (protecting
the right to private school education from discriminatory legislation aimed at Catholics). For
background on this legislation, see generally WILLIAM G. Ross, FORGING NEW FREEDOMS:
NATIVISM, EDUCATION, AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1917-1927, at 148-73 (1994).
439. See Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298-99 (1927) (McReynolds, J.) (striking
down a law that banned private schools used by Japanese immigrants).
440. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402-03 (1923) (McReynolds, J.) (invalidating a
law banning the teaching of foreign languages, which was typical of laws passed throughout the
Midwest).
441. Unfortunately, McReynolds's crude racism often prevented him from applying these
principles in cases involving African-Americans. See Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1641
(portraying McReynolds as a "white supremacist" whose disdain for minority rights became
clear over time).
442. See Rabban, supra note 86, at 954-55.
443. Donald K. Pickens has noted:
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prudence on the Supreme Court throughout the Lochner era, had an
overall abysmal record on civil rights and civil liberties issues.444
Justice Brandeis's record on such issues is also disheartening.445
Thus, the historical choice is not between the "conservative"
traditional jurisprudence of the Lochner Era and modem liberal juris-
prudence, but between traditional jurisprudence and the crudely
majoritarian, statist, and pseudo-scientific views of the sociological
school,46 the adherents of which, judging by contemporary law review
articles, generally agreed that Louisville's segregation statute was
constitutional. One is entitled to believe that the triumph of socio-
logical jurisprudence would have been the preferable alternative, but
that opinion should be based on the actual record of its adherents and
not on utterly anachronistic view of what legal Progressives of the
early 1900s believed.
The history of Buchanan also has something to teach us about
the New Deal era. The history recounted in this Article belies the
traditional story that the basic structure of modern constitutional
jurisprudence regarding the Bill of Rights emerged from a clash be-
tween two great visions of judicial review: (1) the traditional constitu-
tionalism of the Lochner Era that wanted to protect phony economic
Recent historical scholarship has shown the absence of any systematic concern for the
civil rights of individual Americans during the progressive era. One possible reason for
this absence was the sociological nature of progressive reform .... [Left-wing]
reformers, in their rush to correct the evils of capitalism, rejected the natural-rights
thesis as mere economic rationalization preventing necessary state and national reform.
PICKENS, supra note 7, at 20-21.
Among other Progressive sins against civil liberties was support for state-enforced eugenic
policy, see id. at 55-68, a disdain for freedom of speech, see Rabban, supra note 86, at 955, the
Palmer raids undertaken by President Wilson's attorney general, and the militarism,
imperalism, and warmongering of President Theodore Roosevelt and his followers.
444. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1927) (Holmes, J.) (upholding a law
authorizing a state to sterilize the mentally retarded and strongly endorsing the eugenic policy
behind the law); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 412 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (voting to
uphold a law banning the teaching of foreign languages in school); see also G. EDWARD WHITE,
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 337-409 (1993) (reviewing
Holmes's record on civil liberties and concluding that Holmes favored deference to the
legislature except in free speech cases).
445. See STRUM, supra note 340, at 314-38 (describing Brandeis's civil rights and civil liber-
ties jurisprudence). Holmes and Brandeis ultimately supported heightened protections under
the First Amendment, but not for the civil libertarian reason that it was a fundamental
individual constitutional right. Rather, following ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH
88-106 (1920), they believed that freedom of speech was a prerequisite of intelligent democratic
deliberation and thus served an important social interest. Perhaps one reason that their free
speech jurisprudence did not win over their traditional colleagues is that other Justices, as
traditional anti-majoritarians, were not all that enamored of democracy, as such.
446. By the 1920s, legal realism was replacing sociological jurisprudence as the hot aca-
demic theory in the legal academy. However, it is not clear that legal realists had any signifi-
cant impact on the Supreme Court at this time, while sociological jurisprudence remairied
influential for decades through Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter.
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rights but not protect fundamental non-economic rights; and (2) the
Progressive jurisprudence that wanted to do the opposite. 447 The
Progressive vision, according to this view, was ultimately adopted in
Footnote Four of the famous Carolene Products case.
448
Foonote Four announced that the Court would protect funda-
mental individual rights and the rights of members of discrete and
insular minorities, but not economic liberties. The ideology implicit in
the footnote may be "progressive" in the sense that its intellectual
foundations lie on the left-wing of the political spectrum. However,
given Progressive contempt for individual rights and the manifest
racism of many leading Progressives, Footnote Four cannot accurately
be described as Progressive in the historical sense.
Moreover, it is not at all clear that Footnote Four represents a
victory for the constitutional protection of individual rights, as op-
posed to a retreat. The constitutional triumph of New Deal economic
policies was not a triumph for individual rights, but a triumph for
statism.449 Within the sea of New Deal statism, the Supreme Court
447. See James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L. J. 941, 941 (1997)
(describing the traditional story).
448. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); see also
Gray, supra note 63, at 27-28 (exploring how notions of what "ought to be" in law broaden
jurisprudence).
449. A recent article also argues that the New Deal represented, more than anything else,
the triumph of statism. See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the
Unshackling of the States, 64 U. Cmi. L. REV. 483, 520-32 (1997).
Bruce Ackerman has argued that the New Deal was a necessary prerequisite for federal
court protection of African-American rights, because the essence of the constitutional battles
during the New Deal was over the government's authority to pursue "'social, as distinguished
from political, equality.'" ACKERMAN, supra note 140, at 146 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 544 (1896)). In fact, few of the most important cases of the 1930s were primarily about
social equality. This is particularly true of the cases involving the scope of the federal
government's power, as opposed to those cases dealing with the scope of the states' police
powers.
Once one recognizes that the constitutional battles of the 1930s were really about go-
vernment power per se and not about government power to pursue social equality, Ackerman's
point actually cuts the other way. With pre-New Deal limits on government authority reduced
significantly, Buchanan v. Warley would seem to have been under greater direct threat than
Plessy. It is only an accident of history that the aggressive support for civil rights in the courts
followed the New Deal. See Klarman, supra note 141, at 789-90 (arguing that World War II and
the changes in racial attitudes it fostered, and not the New Deal, were key elements leading to
Brown). Certainly, the Progressives wanted the government to have the power to pursue social
equality, but had they been as successful in their quest to enlarge the power of government as
the New Dealers were in theirs, the consequences for civil rights would have been much less
happy.
Meanwhile, a racially egalitarian but jurisprudentially traditional Court would have had no
trouble enforcing a classical liberal vision of civil rights. As I wrote several years ago:
It is possible to imagine that but for the interruption of the Great Depression and the
New Deal, entirely different forms of civil rights protections would have arisen-a lais-
sez-faire combination of equal protection of the law, liberty of contract, and freedom of
association, instead of the more statist combination of interest group liberalism, the wel-
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chose to protect small islands of individual rights. Carolene Products
arose not as a part of the the triumph of the Progressive tradition, but
in response to the dangers that that triumph represented.450
The Justices of the Supreme Court were in retreat from their
previous activism on behalf of individual rights against the state, but,
with totalitarianism looming in Europe, they recognized the impor-
tance of continuing to at least protect vulnerable minorities and First
Amendment rights once power became concentrated at the national
level.4 11 Rather than declaring new rights, the Carolene Products
Court announced that it would continue the protection of minority
constitutional interests and civil liberties it had begun in Buchanan v.
Warley412 and other pre-New Deal decisions,453 even while it generally
abdicated review of economic regulations. 454
fare state, and government enforcement of nondiscrimination norms against private
parties.
Bernstein, Roots of the "Underclass", supra note 432, at 135; see also MORENO, supra note 9, at
29 (noting that "[firee market principles.., contained their own set* of antidiscrimination
principles").
As historian Raymond Wolters has noted, "ft]he New Deal was essentially an attempt to
solve the nation's economic problems democratically, but such a 'democratic' system usually
gives the greatest benefits to those who are best organized." See WOLTERS, supra note 414, at
xi. African-Americans may have been a discrete and insular minority eligible for protection un-
der Footnote Four, but they were also among the politically worst organized groups and were
often disenfranchised as well. African-Americans therefore received disproportionately few
benefits from the New Deal but suffered from a disproportionate allocation of the burdens. See
Bernstein, Roots of the "Underclass", supra note 432, at 131-33.
450. See Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities,
91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1289-97 (1982).
451. The importance of Catholics, Jews, and, to a lesser extent, African-Americans in the
New Deal Coalition may also have played a role in the left's newfound sympathy for minority
groups. The author thanks Michael Klarman for raising this point.
452. 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917) (overturning racial zoning).
453. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-73 (1932) (overturning the conviction of
the "Scottsboro boys"); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298-99 (1927) (invalidating a law
banning private schools run for the benefit of Japanese immigrants); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (McReynolds, J.) (protecting the right to private school education
from discriminatory legislation aimed at Catholics); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402-03
(1923) (McReynolds, J.) (protecting the right to teach foreign language by invalidating a statute
which arose from prejudice against German immigrants during World War I); Adkins v.
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 554-62 (1923) (invalidating a minimum wage law that applied to
women only), overruled in part by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
454. See Cushman, supra note 344, at 579 (positing that the "Four Horsemen simply did
not differentiate economic from noneconomic forms of civil liberty in the way that has come to
be seen as obvious and natural in moderal liberal thought, and in liberal constitutionalism at
least" since Footnote Four of Carolene Products).
It is worth noting that Felix Frankfurter, the last Justice to come out of the
Progressivelsociological jurisprudence tradition, did not easily reconcile himself to the Court's
aggressive protection of individual rights. See, e.g., H.N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX
FRANKFURTER 147-76 (1981); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1870-1960, at 252-64 (1992); CLYDE E. JACOBS, JUSTICE FRANKFURTER AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 210-
17 (1961); JAMES F. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER, AND CIVIL
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The history of Buchanan also has some relevance to current
political debates. In the last few years, nostalgia for Progressivism
has grown. Political figures ranging from President Clinton and
House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt to liberal pundits Michael
Lind and E.J. Dionne to conservative commentators William Kristol
and David Brooks have argued that modern Americans should look to
the energetic, muscular, interventionist government of the
Progressive era as a model for today.455
The events leading up to Buchanan should serve as a reminder
that energetic "Progressive" government is also dangerous govern-
ment. While modern Progressivists are undoubtedly well-meaning, so
were the original Progressives. One should recall that the same pas-
sions that motivated Progressivism and still motivate its modern
intellectual descendants also provided intellectual support for segre-
gation ordinances. These passions included the belief that politics
should be responsive to public opinion, distrust of property rights and
individualism, and faith in the ability of government to manage
society "scientifically." In the end, "scientific" management of
property rights became an excuse for putting the base prejudices of
white Americans into the law.
The project of Progressivism was, and remains for its modern
sympathizers, to overcome traditional American political and consti-
tutional resistance to statism. Every generation has its absurd and
often dangerous prejudices that later generations expose and ridicule.
The only way to prevent those prejudices from becoming the law of
the land is for the general public, its elected representatives, and the
courts to maintain a skeptical view of the role of government in soci-
ety. One can only hope, therefore, that the current vogue of
LIBERTIES IN MODERN AMERICA 101-56 (1989); MELVIN I. UROFSKY, FELIX FRANKFURTER:
JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 134-43, 212-14 (1991).
455. See E. J. DIONNE, JR., THEY ONLY LOOK DEAD: WHY PROGRESSIVES WILL DOMINATE
THE NExT POLITICAL ERA 265-313 (1996); MICHAEL LIND, THE NEXT AMERICAN NATION 347
(1996); Peter S. Canellos, A Step in the "Progressive" Direction: Gephardt Repeats Plea for Party
to Return to its Old Core Values, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 4, 1997, at All; William Kristol & David
Brooks, What Ails Conservatism, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 1997, at A22; Jon Sawyer, Clinton
Stumps for Rebirth of Progressive Era: Likens Tumult of Today to Days of Reform 100 Years
Ago, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 9, 1995, at 5B. The author also heard Speaker Newt
Gingrich praise the politics of the Progressive Era at a gathering sponsored by the Smithsonian
Institute on March 12, 1998. See Richard Bindetto, Enlightenment and Emptiness Side by Side,
USA TODAY, Mar. 16, 1998, at 10A.
With unintended irony, Brooks and Kristol argue that modern conservatives should look to
the "conservative nationalism" of Theodore Roosevelt for inspiration. Roosevelt did not claim to
be a conservative, nor would one reasonably say in hindsight that he was a conservative relative
to the political spectrum of his day.
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Progressivism is a passing trend and not a harbinger of future poli-
tics.
Finally, it is worth noting that sociological jurisprudence still
thrives in constitutional discourse, particularly with regard to civil
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and freedom of speech under
the First Amendment. One consistently reads appeals for the judici-
ary to focus on "modern social realities" when deciding cases in these
areas. 5
6
As the history of pro-segregation sentiment shows, however,
social realities are not self-evident and social science is not immune to
influence from general intellectual trends. Future government policy
in the First Amendment and civil rights areas may be influenced
primarily by Catharine MacKinnon, Cornel West, and like-minded
individuals; or, it may be influenced primarily by Pat Robertson,
Dinesh D'Souza, and their compatriots; or by some other faction.
Regardless, adoption of sociological jurisprudence would ultimately
serve statist ends, encouraging the judiciary to defer to the policies
imposed by the winners. It was to avoid putting Americans' liberties
in the hands of the vagaries of temporary 45 7 political and intellectual
trends that the Constitution's Framers and its amendments created a
written document with ascertainable interpretative boundaries that
established strict controls on government power.458  Perhaps, then,
one should reinterpret Chief Justice Marshall's famous aphorism:
because it is "a Constitution we are expounding,"459 courts should
ignore the allure of sociological theories and enforce the limitations on
government imposed by the Constitution.
456. One insidious attack on constitutional protection of freedom of speech was entitled
"Free Speech and Social Structure." See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71
IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1405 (1986). Where have you gone, Roscoe Pound?
457. As discovered during the 1930s, courts cannot hold out indefinitely against massive
political and intellectual forces aligned against constitutional limitations on government
authority.
458. For example, since the First Amendment states "Congress shall make no law," see
U.S. CONST. amend. I, it cannot possibly mean, as some would have it, that "Congress must
make a law," even if that seems like good social policy for the moment.
459. McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
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